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Blessed	  are	  the	  timid	  hearts	  that	  evil	  hate	  
that	  quail	  in	  its	  shadow,	  and	  yet	  shut	  the	  gate;	  
that	  seek	  no	  parley,	  and	  in	  guarded	  room,	  
though	  small	  and	  bate,	  upon	  a	  clumsy	  loom	  
weave	  tissues	  gilded	  by	  the	  far-­‐off	  day	  
hoped	  and	  believed	  in	  under	  Shadow’s	  sway.	  
	  







C.S.	  Lewis’s	  character	  Jane	  Studdock	  realizes	  one	  day	  that,	  “The	  bright,	  narrow	  
little	  life	  which	  she	  had	  proposed	  to	  live	  was	  being	  irremediably	  broken	  into.”1	  	  The	  
process	  of	  coming	  to	  and	  writing	  this	  dissertation	  has	  irremediably	  broken	  into	  the	  
bright,	  narrow	  little	  life	  I	  had	  proposed	  to	  live.	  	  It	  has	  required	  me	  to	  face	  questions,	  
personal	  and	  political,	  which	  have	  changed	  me.	  	  Along	  the	  way,	  I	  have	  received	  
encouragement,	  instruction,	  and	  friendship	  from	  many.	  	  Let	  me	  name	  some	  of	  them	  
here.	  
I	  thank	  the	  Earhart	  Foundation	  for	  financial	  support	  and	  for	  bringing	  me	  into	  
conversation	  with	  scholars	  who	  are	  committed	  to	  excellence	  in	  scholarship	  and	  
teaching.	  
It	  has	  been	  a	  privilege	  to	  pursue	  graduate	  studies	  at	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  
under	  the	  direction	  of	  master	  teachers.	  	  My	  professors	  of	  political	  theory	  have	  given	  me	  
direction	  with	  patience	  and	  encouragement.	  	  Dr.	  James	  Stoner	  teaches	  courage.	  	  Thank	  
you	  for	  caring	  enough	  to	  make	  me	  try,	  and	  try	  again.	  	  Dr.	  Cecil	  Eubanks	  teaches	  care	  for	  
students,	  and	  that,	  truly,	  “grace	  comes	  somehow	  violent.”	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  showing	  me	  
what	  a	  classroom	  can	  become,	  and	  that	  the	  point	  of	  life,	  as	  Winston	  Smith	  learns,	  “is	  
not	  to	  stay	  alive	  but	  to	  stay	  human.”	  	  Dr.	  Ellis	  Sandoz,	  who	  kindly	  serves	  as	  chairman	  of	  
my	  committee,	  teaches	  diligence—that	  it	  is	  worth	  doing	  one’s	  work	  with	  love	  and	  
perseverance.	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  inviting	  me	  into	  many	  great	  conversations.	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  
reminding	  me	  that	  life	  is	  more	  than	  books,	  and	  much	  fuller	  than	  I’ve	  yet	  learned	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





hope.	  	  Dr.	  Bill	  Clark,	  who	  oversaw	  my	  studies	  in	  comparative	  politics,	  teaches	  humility	  
and	  dedication	  by	  his	  example.	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  reading	  my	  papers	  with	  attention	  and	  
candor.	  	  Dr.	  Victor	  Stater,	  who	  oversaw	  my	  minor	  in	  Tudor	  and	  Stuart	  history,	  teaches	  
love	  of	  learning.	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  marking	  my	  papers	  with	  care,	  and	  for	  making	  me	  want	  
to	  be	  a	  better	  writer.	  	  Dr.	  Andrea	  Miller	  kindly	  serves	  as	  the	  Dean’s	  Representative	  for	  
my	  committee.	  
My	  professors	  are	  exemplary	  teachers.	  	  Their	  excellent	  instruction	  and	  good	  
humor	  made	  my	  studies	  and	  experience	  at	  LSU	  better	  than	  I	  could	  have	  asked	  for,	  had	  I	  
known	  what	  to	  ask	  for.	  	  These	  teachers	  know	  and	  love	  their	  fields	  of	  study.	  	  Throughout,	  
they	  have	  proven	  that	  care	  about	  my	  studies	  and	  even	  more	  about	  my	  character.	  
	   Throughout	  my	  time	  at	  LSU,	  Mrs.	  Wanda	  Ashley	  has	  encouraged	  my	  heart	  with	  
wisdom	  not	  her	  own,	  with	  her	  example	  of	  integrity,	  with	  her	  love	  for	  truth	  and	  for	  the	  
people	  around	  her.	  	  Mrs.	  Judy	  Roberts	  and	  Ms.	  Katherine	  Surek	  have	  done	  their	  best	  to	  
keep	  me	  in	  order.	  	  Thank	  you	  both	  for	  rescuing	  me	  when	  I	  needed	  term	  papers	  printed	  
at	  the	  last	  minute,	  and	  for	  brightening	  my	  days	  in	  Stubbs	  Hall	  with	  your	  kindness.	  
	   My	  thanks	  also:	  
To	  the	  teachers	  who	  first	  made	  me	  love	  to	  learn,	  especially	  Mom	  and	  Dad,	  Mrs.	  
Roxanne	  Dill,	  Mrs.	  Julie	  Meek,	  and	  Dr.	  Louis	  Day.	  
To	  the	  friend	  and	  mentor	  who	  saw	  that	  teaching	  made	  me	  come	  alive	  and	  took	  
my	  desire	  to	  teach	  seriously,	  Ben	  Williams.	  	  To	  his	  lovely	  wife,	  my	  candid	  friend,	  Jess	  




To	  Sarah	  and	  John	  Stonestreet	  for	  taking	  students	  and	  their	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  seriously,	  
and	  for	  sharing	  great	  conversations.	  
To	  Mrs.	  Gail	  and	  Mr.	  Jim	  Lloyd	  and	  their	  family,	  for	  always	  being	  there,	  for	  
sharing	  your	  home,	  stories,	  and	  faith.	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  Chris	  and	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  Shipley	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  their	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many	  good	  chats,	  meals,	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  rounds	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  laughter	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  big	  cypress	  table.	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  living	  in	  
mercy.	  
To	  the	  friends	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  listened	  to	  lots	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What	  does	  it	  mean,	  and	  what	  does	  it	  take,	  to	  practice	  personal	  responsibility	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  political	  oppression?	  	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  trace	  the	  essential	  themes	  of	  
responsibility	  through	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  three	  stories:	  Aldous	  Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  
World,	  C.	  S.	  Lewis’s	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  George	  Orwell’s	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.	  	  
No	  comparative	  study	  of	  these	  important	  works	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  political	  literature	  
exists.	  	  Yet,	  each	  of	  these	  stories	  merits	  the	  attention	  of	  students	  of	  character	  and	  
politics	  because	  all	  three	  unforgettably	  portray	  men	  who	  strive	  to	  live	  meaningful	  lives	  
against	  the	  contrived	  meaning	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  those	  in	  power.	  	  Importantly,	  my	  
inquiry	  into	  personal	  responsibility	  through	  these	  stories	  is	  also	  a	  study	  in	  poetic	  
imagination—a	  study	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  imagination	  and	  reason,	  and	  the	  
significance	  of	  that	  relationship	  for	  politics.	  	  In	  this	  task,	  I	  draw	  on	  C.S.	  Lewis’s	  
understanding	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  poetical	  animals,	  or	  story	  creatures,	  and	  his	  effort	  to	  
revalidate	  a	  balanced	  relationship	  between	  reason	  and	  imagination.	  
I	  contend	  that,	  through	  their	  stories,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  help	  us	  see	  what	  
it	  means	  to	  become	  accountable	  actors	  in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  oppression.	  	  I	  examine	  
three	  essential	  themes	  of	  personal	  responsibility:	  integrity	  of	  the	  word,	  integrity	  of	  the	  
human	  person,	  and	  foundations	  of	  political	  society.	  	  To	  conclude,	  I	  reflect	  on	  the	  
relationship	  between	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  justice	  in	  light	  of	  these	  
stories.	  	  Throughout,	  one	  of	  my	  primary	  tasks	  in	  this	  study	  is	  to	  show	  how	  each	  story	  
invites	  us	  to	  witness	  and	  reflect	  on	  the	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  words,	  of	  persons,	  and	  of	  
power,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  at	  once	  draws	  and	  enables	  us	  to	  become	  accountable	  actors.
	   1	  
INTRODUCTION	  
	   In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  examine	  the	  practice	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  rulers	  whose	  special	  intent	  is	  to	  destroy	  men’s	  capacity	  to	  become	  accountable	  
actors.	  	  I	  trace	  the	  essential	  themes	  of	  responsibility	  through	  three	  stories:	  Aldous	  
Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  World,	  C.	  S.	  Lewis’s	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  George	  Orwell’s	  
Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  stories	  merits	  the	  attention	  of	  students	  of	  
character	  and	  politics	  because	  all	  three	  unforgettably	  portray	  men	  who	  strive	  to	  live	  
meaningful	  lives	  against	  the	  contrived	  meaning	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  those	  in	  power.	  	  
These	  narratives	  invite	  a	  dissertation	  in	  political	  science	  because	  they	  show	  us	  
individuals	  who	  not	  only	  endeavor	  to	  become	  responsible	  persons,	  but	  who	  do	  so	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  a	  regime	  designed	  to	  destroy	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  One	  of	  my	  primary	  tasks	  in	  
this	  study	  is	  to	  show	  how	  each	  story	  invites	  us	  to	  witness	  and	  reflect	  on	  the	  use	  and	  
abuse	  of	  words,	  of	  persons,	  and	  of	  power,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  at	  once	  draws	  and	  enables	  us	  to	  
become	  accountable	  actors.	  
I	  come	  to	  this	  study	  with	  questions:	  What	  is	  personal	  responsibility?	  	  Who	  must	  
give	  account,	  and	  for	  what?	  	  To	  what	  standard	  or	  authority?	  	  Is	  responsibility	  a	  state	  or	  a	  
journey?	  	  How	  does	  each	  regime	  set	  out	  to	  vitiate	  its	  citizens’	  ability	  to	  become	  
responsible	  persons?	  	  How	  do	  the	  different	  central	  characters	  respond,	  and	  why?	  	  These	  
questions	  matter	  to	  students	  of	  politics	  because	  they	  compel	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  
conditions,	  costs,	  and	  rewards	  of	  responsibility.	  	  As	  we	  participate	  in	  these	  stories,	  we	  
journey	  with	  characters	  whose	  lives,	  like	  ours,	  are	  lived	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	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What	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  give	  us	  is	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  observe	  particular	  individuals	  as	  they	  struggle	  to	  become	  responsible.	  
	   In	  the	  pages	  that	  follow	  I	  examine	  fundamental	  questions	  of	  political	  science	  
through	  stories.	  	  It	  is	  important,	  I	  think,	  to	  remember	  that	  thinking	  about	  literature	  does	  
not	  substitute	  for	  thinking	  about	  politics	  as	  it	  happens	  in	  the	  world.	  	  And	  yet,	  as	  
literature	  illuminates	  and	  offers	  human	  experiences,	  it	  remains	  a	  distinct	  and	  
indispensible	  medium	  for	  communication.	  
As	  I	  read	  and	  thought	  about	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  
Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  over	  the	  past	  year,	  I	  was	  humbled.	  	  These	  stories	  show	  attentive	  
readers	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  is	  brave,	  daily	  work.	  	  Moreover,	  I	  
have	  grown	  in	  respect	  for	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell.	  	  Through	  their	  craftsmanship	  and	  
evocative	  language,	  these	  authors	  have	  made	  me	  more	  aware	  of	  my	  own	  inordinate	  
rationalism	  and	  its	  consequences.	  	  In	  addition,	  through	  their	  literary	  characters,	  these	  
authors	  give	  readers	  examples	  of	  persons	  who	  variously	  try,	  fail,	  and	  succeed	  at	  living	  as	  
whole	  persons	  in	  the	  face	  of	  manipulation	  and	  abuse	  by	  political	  authorities.	  	  As	  I	  have	  
journeyed	  with	  these	  characters,	  I	  have	  grown	  to	  deeply	  respect	  the	  story	  as	  a	  medium	  
adequate	  to	  the	  mystery	  of	  human	  experience,	  affection,	  choice,	  and	  action.	  
	  
SELECTION	  OF	  TEXTS	  
What	  recommends	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  
Eighty-­‐Four,	  in	  particular,	  for	  a	  study	  of	  personal	  responsibility,	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  a	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dissertation	  in	  political	  science?	  	  I	  have	  selected	  these	  works	  for	  their	  compelling	  
treatment	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  for	  their	  potential	  as	  aids	  in	  teaching	  political	  
theory.	  
When	  I	  started	  searching	  for	  a	  dissertation	  topic,	  I	  knew	  I	  wanted	  one	  that	  would	  
allow	  me	  to	  examine	  a	  significant	  theme	  in	  politics	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  better	  
prepare	  me	  to	  teach	  undergraduates	  in	  political	  science.	  	  One	  night,	  my	  brother,	  who	  
knows	  that	  one	  cannot—or	  at	  least,	  should	  not—attempt	  to	  think	  up	  a	  dissertation	  
topic	  in	  an	  office	  chair,	  took	  me	  to	  see	  the	  2012	  film	  remake	  of	  Les	  Misérables.	  	  The	  
story	  powerfully	  communicates	  themes	  of	  mercy	  and	  redemption,	  rebellion	  and	  
destruction.	  	  Later	  that	  night,	  after	  the	  movie,	  I	  reflected	  on	  the	  unique	  potential	  of	  
stories	  to	  move	  us	  to	  ask	  questions	  and	  reflect	  on	  our	  own	  lives.	  	  I	  wondered	  what	  texts	  
might	  foster	  an	  inquiry	  into	  a	  fundamental	  question	  or	  theme	  in	  political	  theory	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  that	  Les	  Misérables	  compels	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  mercy	  and	  pride	  in	  the	  human	  
experience	  more	  generally.	  	  I	  considered	  novels	  that	  dealt	  with	  political	  themes,	  and,	  as	  
the	  theme	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  became	  increasingly	  important	  to	  me,	  eventually	  
settled	  on	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  and	  That	  Hideous	  Strength.	  	  I	  had	  
read	  the	  first	  two	  in	  graduate	  seminars	  in	  political	  theory,	  and	  encountered	  the	  third	  
outside	  coursework	  around	  the	  same	  time.	  
The	  books	  at	  the	  center	  of	  this	  study	  initially	  attracted	  my	  attention	  because,	  
intellectually	  and	  experientially,	  the	  task	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  has	  been	  a	  riveting	  
theme	  for	  me.	  	  As	  a	  beginning	  student	  in	  political	  theory,	  I	  found	  compelling	  reflections	  
on	  responsibility	  in	  works	  that	  belong	  to	  traditional	  political	  thought,	  including,	  for	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example,	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  Democracy	  in	  America,	  John	  Adams’s	  essays	  and	  
letters,	  Eric	  Voegelin’s	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Germans,	  and	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  The	  Human	  
Condition.	  	  These	  students	  of	  politics	  made	  me	  see,	  in	  their	  works	  and	  by	  their	  lives,	  that	  
a	  person’s	  actions	  matter	  to	  the	  order	  of	  his	  community.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  quite	  
unexpectedly,	  I	  gained	  something	  distinctive	  from	  the	  novels	  my	  political	  theory	  
professor	  assigned.	  	  Initially,	  I	  was	  unsure	  of	  how	  to	  approach	  or	  interpret	  Brave	  New	  
World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  or	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  in	  the	  context	  of	  courses	  
concerned	  with	  themes	  such	  as	  liberty,	  constitutionalism,	  or	  totalitarianism.	  	  But	  as	  my	  
courses	  continued,	  the	  novels	  served	  to	  create	  a	  world	  of	  experience	  that	  provoked	  and	  
accommodated	  my	  reflections	  on	  fundamental	  questions	  in	  politics.	  
I	  selected	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  
first,	  because	  each	  offers	  an	  unforgettable	  portrayal	  of	  individuals	  who	  struggle	  to	  
become	  responsible	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  hostile	  regime.	  	  As	  I	  read,	  I	  noticed	  common	  themes	  
emerge	  through	  the	  stories.	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  were	  each	  concerned	  to	  show	  
some	  essential	  aspects	  of	  the	  journey	  of	  personal	  responsibility,	  and	  to	  point	  out	  ways	  
in	  which	  the	  modern	  state	  worked	  to	  staunch	  men’s	  efforts	  to	  become	  responsible.	  
Moreover,	  I	  noticed	  that	  each	  novel	  embodies	  its	  author’s	  keen	  awareness	  of	  the	  
unique	  capacity	  for	  improvement	  and	  destruction	  among	  men,	  so	  evident	  by	  the	  mid-­‐
twentieth	  century.	  	  These	  stories	  show	  us	  the	  personal	  and	  political	  consequences	  of	  
some	  remarkable	  developments	  in	  the	  human	  situation,	  including	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
technology,	  the	  greater	  authority	  assigned	  to	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  and	  
totalitarianism.	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Importantly,	  these	  twentieth-­‐century	  satires	  of	  ideology	  represent	  each	  author’s	  
quest	  for	  order,	  born	  in	  revolt	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  utopia	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  
unprecedented	  disorder	  that	  attended	  the	  attempt	  of	  totalitarianism	  in	  modernity.1	  	  
Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  compose	  imaginative	  inquiries	  into	  the	  human	  condition	  and	  
the	  novelty	  of	  the	  human	  situation—into	  the	  prospects	  for	  human	  destruction	  and	  
potential,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  development	  and	  novel	  applications	  of	  science	  and	  
technology.	  	  The	  proliferation	  of	  anti-­‐utopian	  literature	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  disillusionment	  with	  
failed	  attempts	  at	  perfection	  in	  politics.2	  
Further,	  these	  authors	  are	  conscious	  of	  one	  another’s	  works	  as	  responses	  to	  the	  
contemporary	  political	  situation.	  	  Together,	  their	  novels	  and	  reviews	  form	  an	  intriguing	  
conversation.	  	  Huxley	  and	  Lewis,	  for	  example,	  wrote	  specifically	  in	  response	  to	  H.G.	  
Wells’s	  utopian	  visions.	  	  As	  Caitrin	  Nicol	  reports,	  “Huxley	  told	  a	  friend	  in	  1931	  that	  he	  
was	  ‘writing	  a	  novel	  about	  the	  future—on	  the	  horror	  of	  the	  Wellsian	  Utopia	  and	  a	  revolt	  
against	  it.’”3	  	  In	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  review,	  Orville	  Prescott	  observed	  the	  common	  
concern	  of	  Lewis	  and	  Huxley:	  “That	  Hideous	  Strength	  is	  a	  parable	  on	  much	  the	  same	  
theme	  as	  was	  Aldous	  Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  World	  –	  the	  degeneration	  of	  man	  which	  
inevitably	  follows	  a	  gross	  and	  slavish	  scientific	  materialism	  which	  excludes	  all	  idealistic,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  “Equivalences	  of	  Experience	  and	  Symbolization	  in	  History,”	  in	  Published	  Essays	  1966-­‐
1985,	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  vol.	  12	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  115-­‐
133.	  
	  
2	  See	  Chad	  Walsh,	  From	  Utopia	  to	  Nightmare	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row	  Publishers,	  1962),	  11.	  	  See	  also,	  
Gorman	  Beauchamp,	  “Future	  Words:	  Language	  and	  the	  Dystopian	  Novel,”	  STYLE	  8,	  no.	  3	  (Fall	  1974),	  462	  
and	  462fn1;	  Mark	  R.	  Hillegas,	  “Dystopian	  Science	  Fiction:	  New	  Index	  to	  the	  Human	  Situation,”	  New	  
Mexico	  Quarterly	  31	  (1961),	  238-­‐249;	  and,	  most	  recently,	  M.	  Keith	  Booker,	  The	  Dystopian	  Impulse	  in	  
Modern	  Literature	  (Westport,	  Connecticut:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1994),	  17.	  
	  
3	  Caitrin	  Nicol,	  “Brave	  New	  World	  at	  75,”	  The	  New	  Atlantis,	  no.	  16	  (Spring	  2007),	  43.	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ethical,	  and	  religious	  values.”4	  	  C.S.	  Lewis	  not	  only	  positioned	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  in	  
response	  to	  Wells,	  but	  also	  conducted	  a	  critical	  exchange	  on	  its	  aims	  as	  a	  satire	  of	  
contemporary	  ideology	  with	  J.B.S.	  Haldane.5	  	  Lewis	  would	  later	  review	  both	  Animal	  
Farm	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.6	  
Likewise,	  George	  Orwell	  reviewed	  Yevgeny	  Zamyatin’s	  We	  and	  Lewis’s	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength	  before	  he	  wrote	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.7	  	  Once	  a	  student	  of	  Huxley’s	  at	  
Eton,	  Orwell	  would	  accuse	  Huxley	  of	  riffing	  on	  We.8	  	  Interestingly,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  
unlike	  Brave	  New	  World,	  was	  in	  fact	  influenced	  by	  We.	  	  Zamyatin,	  too,	  wondered	  about	  
similarities	  between	  We	  and	  Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  World.	  	  Caitrin	  Nicol	  reports	  that	  
“Zamyatin	  learned	  through	  a	  mutual	  friend	  that	  Huxley	  had	  not	  read	  We	  before	  he	  
published	  Brave	  New	  World,	  ‘which	  proves,’	  he	  said,	  that	  ‘these	  ideas	  are	  in	  the	  air	  we	  
breathe.’”9	  	  Huxley	  recognized	  Orwell’s	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  as	  an	  alternative	  account	  
of	  the	  tendencies	  of	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  He	  defended	  his	  own	  diagnosis	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  
Orwell:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Orville	  Prescott,	  review	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  May,	  21,	  1946,	  cited	  in	  Walter	  Hooper,	  C.S.	  Lewis	  
Companion	  and	  Guide	  (New	  York:	  HarperSanFrancisco,	  1996),	  240.	  
	  
5	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  front	  matter,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  “A	  Reply	  to	  Professor	  Haldane,”	  in	  On	  Stories	  and	  
Other	  Essays	  on	  Literature	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Books,	  1982),	  69-­‐79.	  
	  
6	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  “George	  Orwell,”	  in	  On	  Stories,	  101-­‐104.	  
	  
7	  George	  Orwell,	  “The	  Scientists	  Take	  Over,”	  in	  The	  Complete	  Works	  of	  George	  Orwell,	  ed.	  Peter	  Davidson	  
(orig.	  Manchester	  Evening	  News,	  August	  16,	  1945);	  George	  Orwell,	  “Review	  of	  ‘WE’	  by	  E.I.	  Zamyatin,”	  
available	  at	  http://orwell.ru/library/reviews/zamyatin/english/e_zamy.	  	  Retrieved	  on	  June	  14,	  2013.	  	  See	  
also,	  Kath	  Filmer,	  “That	  Hideous	  1984:	  The	  Influence	  of	  C.S.	  Lewis’	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  on	  Orwell’s	  
Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,”	  Extrapolation	  26,	  no.	  2	  (1985),	  160-­‐169.	  
	  
8	  Jonathan	  Rose,	  “Englands	  His	  Englands,”	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  George	  Orwell,	  ed.	  John	  
Rodden	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  32;	  George	  Orwell,	  “Review	  of	  ‘WE.’”	  
	  
9	  Nicol,	  “Brave	  New	  World	  at	  75,”	  44.	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Within	  the	  next	  generation	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  world’s	  rulers	  will	  discover	  that	  
infant	  conditioning	  and	  narco-­‐hypnosis	  are	  more	  efficient,	  than	  clubs	  and	  
prisons,	  and	  that	  the	  lust	  for	  power	  can	  be	  just	  as	  completely	  satisfied	  by	  
suggesting	  people	  into	  loving	  their	  servitude	  as	  by	  flogging	  and	  kicking	  them	  into	  
obedience.10	  
	  
In	  short,	  it	  is	  worth	  re-­‐approaching	  through	  an	  inquiry	  in	  political	  theory	  the	  novels	  that	  
epitomize	  the	  concerns	  and	  conflicts	  that	  characterize	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell’s	  
exchanges.	  
	   Eventually,	  I	  became	  convinced	  that	  I	  could	  attempt	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  journey	  
and	  practices	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  through	  a	  comparison	  of	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.	  	  Engaging	  these	  works	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
writing	  has	  allowed	  me	  to	  further	  explore	  their	  value	  as	  tools	  for	  teaching	  political	  
theory.	  
This	  inquiry	  has	  compelled	  me	  to	  ask	  how	  stories	  work	  as	  instruments	  that	  
provoke	  reflection	  and	  judgment.	  	  In	  the	  course	  of	  my	  study,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  understand	  
Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  as	  political	  theory	  in	  
the	  distinct	  mode	  of	  narrative.	  	  There	  are	  certainly	  other	  works	  that	  illustrate	  the	  
conflict	  between	  rulers	  and	  citizens	  over	  question	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  Yet	  these	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  “A	  Letter	  to	  George	  Orwell,”	  Letters	  of	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  ed.	  Grover	  Smith,	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  
1969,	  reprinted	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Appendix,	  12-­‐15.	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INTRODUCING	  THE	  AUTHORS	  
	   Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  all	  portray	  
central	  characters	  struggling	  to	  discern	  and	  become	  responsible	  to	  standards	  more	  
enduring	  than	  themselves.	  	  These	  stories	  share	  common	  themes,	  but	  each	  captures	  
those	  themes	  through	  distinct	  plots.	  	  In	  subsequent	  chapters	  I	  will	  examine	  themes	  that	  
emerge	  in	  these	  works.	  	  For	  now,	  I	  want	  to	  introduce	  each	  story’s	  author.	  
Aldous	  Huxley	  was	  born	  in	  1894	  in	  Surrey,	  England.	  	  While	  he	  is	  perhaps	  most	  
widely	  known	  for	  his	  novel	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Huxley	  wrote	  extensively.	  	  His	  works	  
include	  poetry,	  essays,	  screenplays,	  and	  a	  range	  of	  novels,	  including	  The	  Doors	  of	  
Perception,	  which	  details	  his	  experiments	  with	  psychedelic	  drugs.11	  	  From	  the	  late	  
1930s,	  he	  lived	  in	  Los	  Angeles.	  	  He	  died	  on	  November	  22,	  1963,	  the	  same	  day	  as	  C.S.	  
Lewis	  and	  John	  F.	  Kennedy.	  
	   Now	  perhaps	  most	  widely	  known	  as	  a	  children’s	  author	  and	  a	  capable	  translator	  
of	  theological	  ideas,	  for	  most	  of	  his	  life	  C.	  S.	  Lewis	  was	  a	  scholar	  and	  tutor	  in	  medieval	  
and	  renaissance	  literature	  at	  Magdalen	  College,	  Oxford,	  and	  then	  at	  Cambridge.12	  	  Clive	  
Staples	  Lewis	  was	  born	  in	  Belfast,	  Ireland,	  in	  1898.	  	  After	  his	  mother	  died	  in	  1908,	  his	  
father,	  Albert,	  sent	  him	  to	  English	  boarding	  schools,	  and	  then	  to	  a	  private	  tutor	  named	  
William	  Kirkpatrick	  in	  Surrey,	  England.	  	  Under	  Kirkpatrick’s	  effective	  discipline,	  Lewis	  
won	  a	  scholarship	  in	  December	  1916	  to	  study	  classics	  at	  University	  College,	  Oxford.	  	  As	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	  Dana	  Sawyer,	  Aldous	  Huxley:	  A	  Biography	  (New	  York:	  The	  Crossroad	  Publishing	  Company,	  2002).	  
	  
12	  Two	  thorough	  and	  fresh	  examinations	  of	  Lewis’s	  life	  and	  thought,	  respectively,	  are	  Alister	  E.	  McGrath’s	  
C.	  S.	  Lewis:	  A	  Life	  (Tyndale	  House,	  2013)	  and	  The	  Intellectual	  World	  of	  C.	  S.	  Lewis	  (Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2014).	  	  
Lewis’s	  own	  autobiography	  of	  his	  early	  life	  is	  Surprised	  by	  Joy	  (1955).	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student	  and,	  later,	  as	  a	  fellow	  at	  Oxford,	  he	  won	  recognition	  for	  excellence	  in	  
scholarship.	  	  His	  education	  in	  classics	  and	  literature,	  and	  contemporary	  concerns—
including	  the	  unlimited	  modern	  state,	  the	  pretensions	  of	  scientism,	  and	  the	  collusion	  of	  
the	  two—led	  him	  to	  comment	  insightfully	  on	  fundamental	  questions	  in	  politics.	  	  
“Omnivorous”	  is	  the	  word	  Lewis’s	  biographers	  Roger	  Lancelyn	  Green	  and	  Walter	  Hooper	  
use	  to	  describe	  his	  intellectual	  and	  imaginative	  appetite.13	  	  His	  work	  as	  an	  author	  is	  
similarly	  expansive.	  	  His	  books	  and	  essays	  include	  poetry,	  medieval	  and	  renaissance	  
scholarship,	  science	  fiction,	  children’s	  stories,	  theology,	  devotion,	  literary	  criticism,	  and	  
social	  criticism,	  as	  well	  as	  reflections	  on	  grief,	  pain,	  and	  love.	  	  Lewis	  died	  on	  November	  
22,	  1963,	  at	  his	  home	  in	  Oxford.	  
Eric	  Blair,	  later	  known	  by	  his	  pen	  name,	  George	  Orwell,	  was	  born	  in	  1903	  in	  
British	  India,	  where	  his	  father	  served	  in	  the	  Indian	  Civil	  Service.	  	  His	  mother	  and	  her	  
children	  soon	  relocated	  to	  Oxfordshire,	  England.	  	  He	  became	  a	  novelist,	  essayist,	  BBC	  
radio	  broadcaster,	  teacher,	  political	  writer,	  and	  social	  critic.	  	  Orwell	  wrote	  Nineteen	  
Eighty-­‐Four	  in	  his	  last	  years,	  during	  a	  battle	  with	  the	  tuberculosis	  that	  finally	  ended	  his	  
life.	  	  His	  biographer	  Bernard	  Crick	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  story	  is	  a	  parody	  of	  postwar	  
London,	  aimed	  at	  detailing	  the	  implications	  of	  totalitarianism,	  and	  written	  in	  a	  world	  
shaped	  by	  Hitler	  and	  Stalin.14	  	  The	  work	  deals	  with	  themes	  he	  exposits	  in	  some	  of	  his	  
best	  known	  and	  most	  memorable	  essays,	  including,	  “Politics	  and	  the	  English	  Language,”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Green	  and	  Hooper,	  C.	  S.	  Lewis:	  A	  Biography,	  160	  
	  
14	  Bernard	  Crick,	  “Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four:	  context	  and	  controversy,”	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  
George	  Orwell,	  ed.	  John	  Rodden	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  146-­‐159.	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and	  “Totalitarianism	  and	  Literature.”15	  	  Diagnosed	  with	  tuberculosis	  near	  the	  end	  of	  
1947,	  Orwell	  died	  in	  January	  1950.	  
	  
PLAN	  OF	  THE	  WORK	  
I	  introduce	  my	  focus	  on	  personal	  responsibility	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  
establish	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  orients	  my	  approach	  to	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  through	  a	  study	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
poetic	  imagination,	  moral	  meaning,	  and	  politics.	  	  Then,	  in	  the	  next	  three	  chapters,	  I	  
examine	  some	  essential	  themes	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  Chapter	  3	  deals	  with	  the	  
integrity	  of	  the	  word,	  Chapter	  4	  with	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  human	  person,	  and	  Chapter	  5	  
with	  the	  foundations	  of	  political	  society.	  	  I	  conclude,	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  with	  a	  reflection	  on	  
the	  relationship	  between	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  justice.	  	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  
Chapter	  1,	  which	  establishes	  my	  approach	  to	  the	  themes	  and	  texts	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  
study.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






We	  are	  on	  the	  stage.	  	  To	  play	  well	  the	  scenes	  in	  which	  we	  are	  “on”	  concerns	  us	  much	  
more	  than	  to	  guess	  about	  the	  scenes	  that	  follow	  it….[W]e	  do	  not	  know	  the	  play…That	  it	  
has	  a	  meaning	  we	  may	  be	  sure,	  but	  we	  cannot	  see	  it...The	  playing	  it	  well	  is	  what	  matters	  
infinitely.	  
	  
-­‐	  C.S.	  Lewis1	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
What	  is	  responsibility?	  	  The	  question	  concerns	  us.	  	  Elie	  Wiesel,	  who	  witnessed	  
the	  best	  and	  worst	  of	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  action	  and	  destruction,	  calls	  our	  attention	  
to	  the	  theme.	  	  	  He	  writes	  in	  the	  2006	  preface	  of	  his	  memoir	  of	  Auschwitz	  and	  
Buchenwald,	  Night,	  “When	  we	  speak	  of	  this	  era	  of	  evil	  and	  darkness,	  so	  close	  and	  yet	  so	  
distant,	  ‘responsibility’	  is	  the	  key	  word.”2	  	  Wiesel	  points	  to	  responsibility	  as	  the	  antidote	  
to	  dehumanization.	  
In	  examining	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  responsibility,	  I	  take	  as	  my	  point	  of	  
departure	  Aristotle’s	  recognition	  of	  accountability,	  constraint,	  and	  the	  tension	  between	  
these	  two	  facts	  of	  human	  experience.	  	  Aristotle	  rightly	  observes	  that	  responsibility	  rises	  
from	  the	  distinctive	  human	  capacity	  to	  speak	  and	  act.	  	  We	  have	  the	  powers	  of	  speech	  
and	  action,	  and	  exercise	  them	  in	  ways	  that	  shape	  our	  own	  lives	  and	  impact	  others.	  	  “But	  
if	  we	  have	  the	  power	  to	  act	  noble	  or	  basely,	  and	  likewise	  the	  power	  not	  to	  act,	  and	  if	  
such	  action	  or	  inaction	  constitutes	  our	  being	  good	  and	  evil,	  we	  must	  conclude	  that	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  “The	  World’s	  Last	  Night,”	  Essay	  Collection	  
	  
2	  Elie	  Wiesel,	  Night,	  xv.	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depends	  on	  us	  whether	  we	  are	  decent	  or	  worthless	  individuals.”3	  	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  man	  
is	  accountable	  for	  his	  actions	  because	  he	  is	  “the	  source	  and	  begetter	  of	  his	  actions	  as	  a	  
father	  is	  of	  his	  children.”4	  	  Following	  Aristotle,	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre	  summarizes	  the	  point:	  
“Human	  beings	  can	  be	  held	  to	  account	  for	  that	  of	  which	  they	  are	  the	  authors;	  other	  
beings	  cannot.”5	  	  Arendt	  further	  clarifies	  the	  stakes:	  “The	  fact	  that	  man	  is	  capable	  of	  
action	  means	  that	  the	  unexpected	  can	  be	  expected	  from	  him,	  that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  perform	  
what	  is	  infinitely	  improbable.”6	  	  Our	  character	  as	  accountable	  actors	  is	  key	  to	  our	  dignity	  
as	  human	  beings.	  
Furthermore,	  Aristotle	  sees	  that	  men	  are	  constrained	  in	  their	  actions.7	  	  Looking	  
along	  with	  Aristotle,	  MacIntyre	  observes,	  “We	  enter	  upon	  a	  stage	  we	  did	  not	  design	  and	  
we	  find	  ourselves	  part	  of	  an	  action	  that	  was	  not	  of	  our	  making.	  	  Each	  of	  us	  being	  a	  main	  
character	  in	  his	  own	  drama	  plays	  subordinate	  parts	  in	  the	  dramas	  of	  others,	  and	  each	  
drama	  constrains	  the	  others.”8	  	  Sometimes	  these	  constraints	  are	  so	  great	  that	  men	  
cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  “Yet,”	  Aristotle	  continues,	  “there	  are	  perhaps	  also	  
acts	  which	  no	  man	  can	  possibly	  be	  compelled	  to	  do,	  but	  rather	  than	  do	  them	  he	  should	  
accept	  the	  most	  terrible	  sufferings	  and	  death.”9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  3.5,	  1113b10-­‐15	  
	  
4	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  3.5,	  1113b15-­‐20	  
	  
5	  MacIntyre,	  After	  Virtue,	  209	  
	  
6	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  178.	  
	  
7	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  3	  
	  
8	  MacIntyre,	  After	  Virtue,	  213	  
	  
9	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  3.1,	  1110a20-­‐30	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At	  the	  outset,	  then,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  becoming	  responsible	  is	  learning	  to	  answer	  
rightly,	  in	  word	  and	  in	  deed,	  to	  the	  standard	  to	  which	  one	  finds	  oneself	  accountable,	  
within	  the	  conditions	  that	  limit	  human	  actors.	  
	  
SATIRES	  OF	  THE	  UTOPIAN	  PROJECT	  
	  
	   This	  is	  a	  dissertation	  in	  political	  science.	  	  Political	  science,	  as	  Aristotle	  observes,	  is	  
essentially	  concerned	  with	  living	  well	  together.10	  	  Within	  this	  broader	  context,	  I	  am	  
specifically	  concerned	  with	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  On	  my	  reading,	  
Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  are	  stories	  
performing	  the	  work	  of	  political	  science.	  	  The	  overarching	  question	  is	  this:	  how	  do	  these	  
stories	  help	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  what	  is	  noble	  and	  just	  for	  individuals	  and	  their	  political	  
societies?	  	  The	  more	  specific	  question	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  present	  study	  is	  this:	  how	  do	  
these	  stories	  call	  and	  enable	  us	  to	  take	  up	  the	  task	  of	  personal	  responsibility?	  	  I	  attempt	  
a	  fuller	  response	  to	  these	  questions	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  survey	  
the	  fundamental	  relationship	  between	  poetic	  imagination,	  moral	  meaning,	  and	  politics.	  	  
Then,	  in	  Chapters	  3,	  4,	  and	  5,	  I	  examine	  some	  essential	  themes	  of	  personal	  
responsibility.	  	  For	  now,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  identify	  these	  novels	  as	  satirical	  critiques	  of	  the	  
utopian	  project,	  and	  also	  to	  clarify	  the	  difference	  between	  political	  science	  and	  
utopianism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
10	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  I.2	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I	  pause	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  genre	  because	  our	  assumptions	  about	  what	  a	  
work	  is	  intended	  to	  do	  shape	  our	  expectations	  and	  reading	  of	  it.	  	  While	  studies	  based	  in	  
literary	  criticism	  identify	  works	  like	  Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Lewis’s	  That	  Hideous	  
Strength,	  and	  Orwell’s	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  as	  dystopian,	  the	  designation	  is	  inadequate.	  	  
To	  approach	  these	  stories	  as	  satires	  of	  the	  utopian	  project	  is	  to	  read	  them	  not	  as	  
predictions	  of	  future	  ill,	  but	  rather	  as	  works	  that	  help	  us	  reflect	  on	  what	  it	  means	  to	  
become	  accountable	  actors	  in	  the	  face	  of	  human	  corruptibility	  and	  political	  force.	  
Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  are	  more	  
commonly	  identified	  and	  read	  as	  “dystopias.”11	  	  However,	  I	  identify	  these	  stories	  as	  
satires	  of	  the	  utopian	  project	  because	  the	  description	  is	  more	  accurate	  and	  fosters	  a	  
more	  meaningful	  interpretation	  of	  the	  texts.	  	  My	  designation	  draws	  on	  Eric	  Voegelin’s	  
insight	  that	  these	  works	  are	  not	  “a	  peculiar	  kind	  of	  ‘negative	  utopia,’	  so	  called,”	  or	  
dystopia.12	  	  Instead,	  they	  are	  “satire,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  Menippean	  satires.”	  	  For	  in	  
these	  stories,	  “[t]he	  whole	  sense	  of	  utopia	  is	  shown	  up	  as	  the	  nonsense	  it	  is.”13	  
Dystopia	  is	  a	  derivative	  of	  the	  word	  utopia,	  coined	  and	  intended	  by	  St.	  Thomas	  
More	  as	  a	  pun.	  	  Critically,	  his	  Utopia	  envisions	  a	  political	  society	  that	  is	  a	  “good	  place”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Lyman	  Tower	  Sargent,	  British	  and	  American	  Utopian	  Literature,	  1516-­‐1975	  (Boston,	  MA:	  G.K.	  Hall	  &	  Co.,	  
1979);	  and	  “Authority	  &	  Utopia:	  Utopianism	  in	  Political	  Thought,”	  Polity	  14,	  no.	  4	  (Summer	  1982),	  565-­‐
584;	  Hillegas,	  “Dystopian	  Science	  Fiction.”	  
	  
12	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  “In	  Search	  of	  the	  Ground,”	  in	  Published	  Essays	  1953-­‐1965,	  CW	  vol.	  11	  (Columbia:	  
University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  2000),	  237.	  
	  




(eutopia)	  because	  its	  citizens	  do	  not	  have	  superbia,	  the	  pride	  of	  life.14	  	  Yet	  More	  knew	  
that	  a	  place	  that	  was	  “good”	  on	  these	  conditions	  could	  never	  be	  –	  or,	  could	  only	  be	  “no	  
place”	  (utopia).	  	  In	  Voegelin’s	  analysis,	  
Utopia	  is	  a	  symbolism	  created	  by	  Thomas	  More	  to	  express	  the	  Nowhere	  of	  a	  
society	  that	  is	  not	  marred	  by	  the	  superbia	  vitae,	  by	  the	  pride	  of	  life	  in	  the	  sense	  
of	  I	  John	  2:16.	  	  The	  author	  of	  the	  Utopia	  elaborates	  his	  dream	  of	  a	  supposedly	  
perfect	  society	  by	  omitting	  from	  its	  structure	  an	  important	  sector	  of	  reality,	  but	  
he	  knows	  what	  he	  has	  omitted	  and	  is	  conscious	  of	  his	  truncated	  image	  of	  reality	  
as	  Nowhere.15	  
	  
Yet,	  Voegelin	  continues,	  many	  contemporaries	  miss	  the	  pun.	  
In	  its	  contemporary	  usage	  by	  activist	  thinkers	  and	  nonthinkers,	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	  symbol	  has	  been	  transformed	  in	  a	  peculiar	  manner.	  	  A	  Utopia	  still	  means	  the	  
model	  of	  a	  perfect	  society	  that	  cannot	  be	  constructed	  because	  an	  important	  
sector	  of	  reality	  has	  been	  omitted	  from	  its	  construction,	  but	  its	  author	  and	  
addicts	  have	  suspended	  their	  consciousness	  that	  it	  is	  unrealizable	  because	  of	  the	  
omission.16	  
	  
	   Following	  Voegelin,	  I	  understand	  utopia	  as	  a	  dream	  built	  on	  the	  lust	  for	  
perfection.17	  	  The	  utopian	  conceit	  rejects	  human	  limitation,	  denies	  human	  corruption,	  
and	  aims	  to	  overcome	  the	  burdens	  of	  human	  existence.18	  	  The	  limitations,	  corruption,	  
and	  burdens	  the	  various	  utopianisms	  eschew	  may	  be	  physical,	  spiritual,	  or	  both.	  	  In	  
utopia,	  as	  Voegelin	  describes	  it,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Cf.	  1	  John	  2:16.	  	  Contrast	  Lyman	  Tower	  Sargent’s	  definition	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  1979	  of	  his	  
annotated	  bibliography	  of	  over	  1,000	  utopias,	  British	  and	  American	  Utopian	  Literature,	  1516-­‐1975	  
(Boston,	  MA:	  G.K.	  Hall	  &	  Co.,	  1979),	  x-­‐xi.	  
	  
15	  Voegelin,	  “Wisdom	  and	  the	  Magic	  of	  the	  Extreme:	  A	  Meditation,”	  316.	  
	  
16	  Voegelin,	  “Wisdom	  and	  the	  Magic	  of	  the	  Extreme:	  A	  Meditation,”	  316.	  
	  
17	  Voegelin,	  The	  New	  Science	  of	  Politics,	  in	  CW,	  vol.	  5,	  224.	  
	  
18	  Voegelin,	  Science	  Politics,	  and	  Gnosticism,	  in	  CW,	  vol.	  5,	  255-­‐256,	  305.	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The	  symbols	  of	  the	  myth	  are	  translated	  into	  realities	  and	  aims	  of	  
anthropomorphic	  man:	  The	  nature	  of	  man	  is	  basically	  good;	  the	  source	  of	  evils	  is	  
to	  be	  found	  in	  institutions;	  organization	  and	  revolution	  can	  abolish	  such	  evils	  as	  
still	  exist;	  the	  powers	  of	  man	  can	  create	  a	  society	  free	  from	  want	  and	  fear;	  the	  
ideas	  of	  infinite	  perfectibility,	  of	  the	  superman,	  and	  of	  self-­‐salvation	  make	  their	  
appearance.19	  
	  
Because	  of	  its	  ideological	  nature,	  the	  utopian	  dream	  is	  the	  “black	  magic	  of	  politics.”20	  
What,	  then,	  is	  “dystopia”?	  	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  makes	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  recorded	  
uses	  of	  the	  word	  in	  a	  speech	  before	  the	  Commons	  in	  1868.21	  	  “Regretful”	  of	  the	  
Government’s	  position	  in	  a	  dispute,	  Mill	  declaims,	  
I	  may	  be	  permitted,	  as	  one	  who,	  in	  common	  with	  many	  of	  my	  betters,	  have	  been	  
subjected	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  being	  Utopian,	  to	  congratulate	  the	  Government	  on	  
having	  joined	  that	  goodly	  company.	  	  It	  is,	  perhaps,	  too	  complimentary	  to	  call	  
them	  Utopians,	  they	  ought	  rather	  to	  be	  called	  dys-­‐topians,	  or	  cacotopians.	  	  What	  
is	  commonly	  called	  Utopian	  is	  something	  too	  good	  to	  be	  practicable;	  but	  what	  
they	  appear	  to	  favor	  is	  too	  bad	  to	  be	  practicable.	  
	  
Though	  Mill’s	  word	  has	  been	  increasingly	  employed,	  it	  does	  not	  adequately	  describe	  the	  
stories	  of	  interest	  in	  this	  study	  for	  a	  few	  reasons.	  	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  “dystopia”	  lacks	  
meaning	  because	  it	  derives	  from	  an	  intentionally	  nonsense	  word	  forged	  to	  name	  a	  
consciously	  nonsense	  speculation.	  	  Moreover,	  dystopia,	  like	  utopia,	  is	  no	  place.	  	  Yet,	  in	  
their	  satires,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  censure	  characters	  and	  causes	  that	  represent	  
their	  contemporary	  concerns—that	  is,	  concerns	  about	  their	  own	  times	  and	  places.	  	  To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  “Timaeus	  and	  Critias,”	  in	  Order	  and	  History	  vol.	  III,	  CW,	  vol.	  16	  (Columbia:	  University	  of	  
Missouri	  Press,	  2000),	  242.	  
	  
20	  Voegelin,	  “Timaeus	  and	  Critias,”	  263;	  see	  also	  Germino,	  Beyond	  Ideology,	  175-­‐177,	  for	  a	  helpful	  
summary	  of	  Voegelin’s	  work	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  good	  society	  and	  the	  dream	  utopia.	  
	  
21	  J.S.	  Mill,	  Hansard	  Commons	  Debate,	  March	  12,	  1868,	  available	  at	  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1868/mar/12/adjourned-­‐
debate#S3V0190P0_18680312_HOC_54.	  	  Retrieved	  on	  April	  19,	  2013.	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these	  objections,	  we	  could	  add	  another—namely	  that,	  since	  Mill,	  the	  word	  is	  routinely	  
ambiguously	  used.	  	  Typical	  of	  the	  unclear	  use	  of	  the	  word	  in	  contemporary	  literary	  
criticism	  is	  this	  passage	  from	  M.	  Keith	  Booker’s	  The	  Dystopian	  Impulse	  in	  Modern	  
Literature:	  
Indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  history	  of	  recent	  utopian	  thought	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  gradual	  
shift	  from	  utopian	  to	  dystopian	  emphases,	  while	  utopian	  thought	  itself	  has	  come	  
more	  and	  more	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  escapist	  or	  even	  reactionary.	  	  However…utopian	  
and	  dystopian	  visions	  are	  not	  necessarily	  diametrical	  opposites.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  one	  
man’s	  utopia	  another	  man’s	  dystopia,	  but	  utopian	  visions	  of	  an	  ideal	  society	  
often	  inherently	  suggest	  a	  criticism	  of	  the	  current	  order	  of	  things	  as	  nonideal,	  
while	  dystopian	  warnings	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  ‘bad’	  utopias	  still	  allow	  of	  the	  
possibility	  of	  ‘good’	  utopias,	  especially	  since	  dystopian	  societies	  are	  generally	  
more	  or	  less	  thinly	  veiled	  refigurations	  of	  a	  situation	  that	  already	  exists	  in	  reality.	  	  
Moreover,	  dystopian	  critiques	  of	  existing	  systems	  would	  be	  pointless	  unless	  a	  
better	  system	  appear	  conceivable.	  	  One	  might,	  in	  fact,	  see	  dystopian	  and	  utopian	  
visions	  as	  very	  much	  part	  of	  the	  same	  project.22	  
On	  the	  whole,	  although	  “dystopia”	  is	  widely	  used,	  along	  with	  terms	  such	  as	  
“inverted	  utopia”	  and	  “negative	  utopia,”	  its	  nonsense	  derivation	  and	  ambiguous	  use	  sap	  
its	  conceptual	  meaning	  and	  render	  it	  inadequate	  to	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  inquiry.	  	  If	  we	  
approach	  these	  stories	  as	  dystopias,	  we	  will	  likely	  consider	  them	  reports	  on	  no	  place,	  or	  
a	  time	  outside	  our	  own.	  	  By	  contrast,	  if	  we	  approach	  them	  as	  stories	  that	  satirize	  the	  
utopian	  project,	  they	  can	  better	  help	  us	  to	  see	  destructive	  attempts	  at	  perfection	  as	  
men	  launch	  them	  in	  our	  own	  times	  and	  places.	  
	   Importantly,	  the	  term	  anti-­‐utopia	  is	  meaningful.	  	  It	  denotes	  the	  response	  that	  
rejects	  the	  idea	  and	  attempt	  of	  utopia.	  	  “If	  the	  utopian-­‐dystopian	  form	  tends	  to	  
construct	  single,	  fool-­‐proof	  structures	  which	  solve	  social	  dilemmas,	  the	  anti-­‐utopian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  M.	  Keith	  Booker,	  The	  Dystopian	  Impulse	  in	  Modern	  Literature	  (1994),	  15	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form	  discovers	  problems,	  raises	  questions,	  and	  doubts.”23	  	  Eugene	  Weber	  captures	  the	  
anti-­‐utopian	  position.	  	  He	  identifies	  utopia’s	  “drive	  to	  harness	  nature	  and	  eliminate	  the	  
unpredictable”	  as	  the	  fundamental	  motive	  of	  the	  “heresy	  that	  man	  can	  build	  a	  paradise	  
on	  earth.”24	  	  Of	  the	  response	  to	  utopia,	  he	  writes:	  “it	  is	  not	  surprising,	  therefore,	  that	  an	  
age	  which	  has	  grown	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  omnipotence	  of	  human	  reason	  and	  the	  
results	  of	  utopian	  presumption	  should	  produce	  the	  anti-­‐Utopia:	  a	  literature	  of	  
disillusion,	  no	  mere	  statement	  of	  irrationalistic	  denial,	  but	  deeply	  skeptical	  and	  aware	  
that	  dreams—if	  pressed	  too	  far—lead	  either	  to	  nightmares	  or	  to	  frustrated	  waking.”25	  	  
The	  anti-­‐utopian	  authors	  expose	  the	  utopian	  dream	  as	  repulsive.	  	  They	  reveal	  ideologies	  
as	  false	  schemes	  that	  promise	  but	  fail	  to	  satisfy	  the	  legitimate	  human	  longing	  for	  justice.	  
While	  some	  contemporaries	  urge	  their	  fellows	  to	  continue	  to	  construct	  utopias,	  
in	  thought	  and	  in	  practice,26	  most	  see	  that	  the	  idea	  and	  attempt	  of	  utopia	  seems	  to	  be	  
behind	  the	  massive	  destruction	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Gorman	  Beauchamp	  
describes	  the	  “paradox	  of	  utopianism	  as	  it	  appears	  to	  us	  of	  [the	  twentieth]	  century—the	  
best	  of	  motives	  negated	  by	  the	  worst	  of	  means.”27	  	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “Utopia,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  John	  Huntington,	  “Utopian	  and	  Anti-­‐Utopian	  Logic:	  H.G.	  Wells	  and	  His	  Successors,”	  Science	  Fiction	  
Studies	  9,	  no.	  2	  (July	  1982),	  124.	  
	  
24	  Eugene	  Weber,	  “The	  Anti-­‐Utopia	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Century,”	  The	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  58	  (Summer	  
1959),	  447.	  
	  
25	  Weber,	  “Anti-­‐Utopia,”	  447.	  
	  
26	  For	  example,	  Ruth	  Levitas,	  “Looking	  for	  the	  Blue:	  The	  Necessity	  of	  Utopia,”	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Ideologies	  
12,	  no.	  3	  (October	  2007),	  289-­‐306;	  Bobby	  Newman,	  “Discriminating	  Utopian	  from	  Dystopian	  Literature:	  
Why	  is	  Walden	  Two	  Considered	  a	  Dystopia?”	  The	  Behavior	  Analyst	  16,	  no.	  2	  (Fall	  1993),	  167-­‐175.	  
	  
27	  Gorman	  Beauchamp,	  “Utopia	  and	  Its	  Discontents,”	  The	  Midwest	  Quarterly	  16,	  no.	  2	  (Winter	  1975),	  173.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  Beauchamp’s	  interesting	  and	  insightful	  analysis	  is	  too	  often	  obscured	  by	  a	  fundamental	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promised	  justice	  and	  happiness	  for	  all,	  [arrives]	  through	  its	  inexorable	  logic	  at	  a	  
solution—the	  final	  solution—of	  the	  human	  dilemma:	  unlimited	  despotism.”	  
And	  yet	  sometimes	  even	  those	  who	  can	  agree	  with	  Beauchamp	  come	  to	  reject	  
utopia	  reluctantly,	  or	  “with	  a	  guilty	  conscience.”28	  	  They	  rightly	  perceive	  that	  the	  draw	  
of	  utopia	  substitutes	  for	  something	  indispensible	  to	  the	  human	  endeavor—a	  vision	  of	  
something	  better.	  	  Indeed,	  we	  all	  have	  a	  keen	  sense	  that	  our	  lives	  and	  political	  societies	  
require	  a	  vision	  of	  human	  action	  as	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  be,	  over	  and	  against	  what	  it	  is.	  	  This	  
sense	  is	  misdirected,	  however,	  when	  its	  possessors	  fail	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  impulse	  
to	  overcome	  the	  limitations	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  suffering	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  in	  
pursuit	  of	  imagined	  perfection.	  
An	  ambivalence	  concerning	  utopia	  runs	  through	  utopia-­‐dystopia	  studies.	  	  The	  
practice	  of	  political	  theory	  offers	  resources	  of	  interpretation	  and	  analysis	  which	  can	  help	  
us	  to	  evaluate	  utopia’s	  attraction.	  	  In	  the	  section	  that	  follows,	  I	  distinguish	  between	  
political	  science,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  utopianism,	  on	  the	  other.	  
	  
POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  AND	  UTOPIANISM	  
Dante	  Germino	  observes	  that	  many	  confuse	  “political	  theory	  with	  political	  
doctrine	  and	  utopia	  construction.”29	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  some	  practitioners	  of	  contemporary	  
political	  science	  define	  the	  task	  of	  political	  theory	  as	  utopia	  construction,	  and	  studies	  of	  
utopia	  regularly	  start	  with	  the	  assertion	  that	  “the	  tradition	  of	  utopian	  thinking…began	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Walsh,	  From	  Nightmare	  to	  Utopia,	  Chapter	  13;	  see	  also,	  Levitas,	  “Looking	  for	  the	  Blue.”	  
	  
29	  Germino,	  Beyond	  Ideology,	  5.	  
	  
	  20	  
with	  Plato.”30	  	  In	  these	  accounts,	  “The	  Republic	  is	  generally	  accepted	  as	  the	  first	  
utopia—a	  depiction,	  that	  is,	  of	  the	  ideal	  state.”	  
The	  best	  thinkers	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  political	  theory	  maintain	  the	  tension	  
between	  perfect	  justice,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  approximate	  justice	  which	  is	  
attainable	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  on	  the	  other;	  they	  theorize	  about	  
the	  best	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  the	  best	  practicable	  regime.	  	  By	  contrast,	  while	  political	  
theory	  starts	  with	  the	  human	  being	  situated	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  political	  reality,	  utopian	  
dreaming	  starts	  with	  a	  vision	  of	  perfection	  abstracted	  from	  human	  nature	  and	  the	  
human	  condition.31	  
Tocqueville	  offers	  an	  excellent	  description	  of	  utopia	  construction.	  	  He	  writes,	  
“Above	  and	  beyond	  the	  real	  society	  itself…men’s	  minds	  gradually	  constructed	  an	  
imaginary	  society	  in	  which	  everything	  appeared	  simple	  and	  coordinated,	  uniform,	  just	  
and	  in	  harmony	  with	  reason.”32	  	  The	  utopian	  imagination	  becomes	  destructive	  when	  the	  
plan	  of	  the	  second,	  imaginary	  society	  is	  prosecuted	  over	  and	  against	  the	  first,	  real	  
society.33	  	  Divorced	  from	  the	  criteria	  and	  constraints	  of	  experience	  and	  the	  human	  
condition,	  literary	  politics	  aims	  at	  more	  than	  human	  perfection.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  effort	  to	  
be	  more	  than	  human	  is	  consistently	  dehumanizing	  and	  destructive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Gorman	  Beauchamp,	  “‘The	  Legend	  of	  the	  Grand	  Inquisitor’:	  The	  Utopian	  as	  Sadist,”	  Humanitas	  20,	  nos.	  
1	  and	  2	  (2007),	  125.	  
	  
31	  Cf.	  Plato,	  Republic,	  Book	  1;	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  Book	  1.	  
	  
32	  Tocqueville,	  The	  Ancien	  Regime,	  III.1,	  147.	  
	  
33	  Tocqueville,	  The	  Ancien	  Regime,	  III.1,	  147-­‐148.	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The	  task	  of	  political	  theory,	  then,	  is	  quite	  distinct	  from	  the	  pretensions	  of	  utopia	  
construction.34	  	  To	  make	  this	  claim	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  felt	  longing	  for	  a	  vision	  of	  better	  
men	  and	  better	  political	  communities.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  rather	  than	  dismiss	  the	  longing	  
for	  justice,	  the	  distinction	  between	  political	  theory	  and	  utopianism	  better	  illumines	  that	  
restless	  desire.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  political	  theory	  and	  utopia	  makes	  utopia’s	  
attraction	  more	  intelligible	  because	  it	  restores	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  longing	  for	  
perfect	  justice	  as	  the	  motivation	  for	  human	  action,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  from	  the	  utopian	  
attempt	  to	  make	  men	  and	  their	  societies	  perfect,	  on	  the	  other.	  
A	  theory	  of	  politics	  begins	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  human	  nature,	  or	  a	  philosophical	  
anthropology.	  	  For,	  “ultimately,	  the	  political	  problem	  resolves	  itself	  into	  the	  more	  
fundamental	  question:	  what	  is	  the	  nature	  and	  destiny	  of	  man?”35	  	  The	  trouble	  with	  
ideological	  utopias	  is	  that	  they	  start	  with	  a	  false	  image	  of	  human	  nature.36	  	  While	  each	  
system	  is	  compelling	  within	  its	  own	  terms,	  both	  conceal	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  
man	  and	  political	  society.	  
In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  the	  problem	  with	  utopia	  is	  that	  it	  conflates	  the	  search	  for	  
order	  with	  the	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  or	  remake	  reality.	  	  While	  those	  who	  pursue	  utopian	  
dreams	  seek	  escape	  from	  the	  burdens	  of	  existence,	  the	  task	  of	  political	  science	  is	  to	  
orient	  and	  assist	  men	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  order—that	  is,	  to	  illuminate	  the	  nature	  of	  justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Cf.	  Voegelin,	  “Timaeus	  and	  Critias,”	  262-­‐263.	  
	  
35	  Hallowell,	  Main	  Currents,	  12.	  Cf.	  James	  L.	  Wiser,	  “Preface,”	  Political	  Philosophy:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Search	  
for	  Order	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  NJ:	  Prentice-­‐Hall,	  1983),	  ix-­‐xi.	  
	  
36	  In	  this	  connection,	  see	  John	  Adams,	  “A	  Dissertation	  on	  the	  Canon	  and	  Feudal	  Law,”	  in	  The	  Revolutionary	  
Writings	  of	  John	  Adams,	  ed.	  C.	  Bradley	  Thompson	  (Indianapolis:	  Liberty	  Fund,	  2000),	  33;	  and	  Ellis	  Sandoz,	  
Republicanism,	  Religion,	  and	  the	  Soul	  of	  America	  (Columbia:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press),	  49.	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and	  foster	  its	  pursuit	  it	  in	  light	  of,	  rather	  than	  in	  spite	  of,	  the	  nature	  and	  corruption	  of	  
man.	  
	   That	  said,	  are	  not	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  more	  than	  enough	  to	  
deter	  denizens	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  from	  utopian	  projects?	  	  As	  David	  Walsh	  describes	  it,	  
“The	  age	  that	  began	  with	  the	  glory	  of	  the	  Renaissance,	  the	  bright	  expectations	  of	  the	  
Enlightenment,	  and	  the	  energies	  of	  the	  scientific,	  industrial,	  and	  political	  revolutions	  has	  
devolved	  into	  the	  horror,	  vacuity,	  and	  mediocrity	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.”37	  	  The	  
dreams	  that	  once	  inspired	  now	  evoke	  caution	  instead.	  	  Gorman	  Beauchamp	  adds,	  “As	  
visions	  of	  systematically	  planned	  and	  regimented	  societies	  threatened	  to	  become	  
realities,	  fantasies	  to	  be	  transformed	  into	  fact,	  chiliastic	  hope	  gave	  way	  to	  cautionary	  
anxiety.”38	  	  But	  restraint	  grounded	  in	  fear	  is	  frail	  protection.	  	  Though	  frightened	  by	  what	  
men	  have	  done,	  the	  anxious	  remain	  unwittingly	  open	  to	  the	  allure	  of	  the	  same	  false	  
promises	  that	  empowered	  men	  to	  perpetrate	  horror,	  vacuity,	  and	  mediocrity	  in	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  	  Fear	  is	  not	  enough.	  	  Besides,	  people	  forget.	  
Because	  the	  desire	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  utopia	  is	  ultimately	  a	  perverted	  form	  of	  the	  
human	  desire	  for	  justice,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  expose	  the	  idea	  and	  attempt	  of	  utopia	  as	  
dangerous.	  	  Political	  science	  can	  recognize	  the	  lust	  for	  perfection	  as	  the	  motive	  of	  the	  
utopian	  dream.	  	  They	  can	  reject	  the	  utopian	  dream	  because	  they	  take	  seriously	  the	  
longing	  for	  justice	  that,	  perverted,	  gives	  rise	  to	  rebellion	  against	  the	  purpose	  and	  limits	  
of	  our	  nature.	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  satirize	  the	  utopian	  project	  not	  because	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  David	  Walsh,	  After	  Ideology,	  9.	  
	  
38	  Beauchamp,	  “Future	  Words,”	  462.	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want	  to	  debunk	  the	  vision	  and	  pursuit	  of	  a	  better	  men	  and	  better	  cities,	  but	  because	  
they	  want	  to	  see	  that	  vision	  and	  pursuit	  better	  informed	  of	  the	  criteria,	  conditions,	  and	  
constraints	  on	  pursuit	  of	  order	  amidst	  the	  dignity	  and	  corruptibility	  of	  men.	  	  In	  the	  next	  
section,	  I	  examine	  the	  medium	  of	  their	  critique:	  satire.	  
	  
SATIRE	  
The	  form	  and	  purpose	  of	  satire	  have	  been	  well	  described	  as	  follows:	  	  “A	  literary	  
manner	  which	  blends	  a	  critical	  attitude	  with	  humor	  and	  wit	  to	  the	  end	  that	  human	  
institutions	  or	  humanity	  may	  be	  improved.	  	  The	  true	  satirist	  is	  conscious	  of	  the	  frailty	  of	  
institutions	  of	  man’s	  devising	  and	  attempts	  through	  laughter	  not	  so	  much	  to	  tear	  them	  
down	  as	  to	  inspire	  a	  remodeling.”39	  	  C.	  Hugh	  Holman	  further	  notes	  that	  fictional	  
narratives	  have	  served	  as	  “the	  vehicles	  for	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  powerfully	  effective	  
satiric	  treatment	  of	  man	  and	  his	  institutions.”40	  	  More	  specifically,	  Menippean	  satire	  is	  
“a	  form	  named	  after	  Menippus	  of	  Gadara	  (3rd	  century	  BC),	  which	  emphasizes	  combining	  
parody	  with	  satire	  and	  mixing	  several	  different	  kinds	  of	  discourse	  in	  a	  single	  work.”41	  
To	  be	  effective	  satire,	  a	  work	  need	  not	  necessarily	  provoke	  laughter,	  because	  
satire	  works	  through	  ironic	  exposure	  as	  well	  as	  wit	  and	  humor.	  	  Jonathan	  Swift	  explains	  
its	  function:	  “Satire	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  glass,	  wherein	  beholders	  do	  generally	  discover	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  C.	  Hugh	  Holman,	  A	  Handbook	  to	  Literature	  (New	  York:	  The	  Odyssey	  Press,	  1960),	  436.	  
	  
40	  Holman,	  Handbook	  to	  Literature,	  437.	  
	  
41	  Michael	  F.	  Suarez,	  S.J,	  “Swift’s	  Satire	  and	  Parody,”	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Jonathan	  Swift,	  ed.	  
Christopher	  Fox	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  116.	  	  See	  also,	  Carter	  Kaplan,	  “The	  Advent	  
of	  Literary	  Dystopia,”	  Extrapolation	  40,	  no.	  3	  (1999),	  200-­‐212.	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everybody’s	  face	  but	  their	  own;	  which	  is	  the	  chief	  reason	  for	  that	  kind	  of	  reception	  it	  
meets	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  that	  so	  very	  few	  are	  offended	  with	  it.”42	  
The	  novels	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  present	  study	  exhibit	  precisely	  the	  blending	  of	  
modes	  Holman	  and	  Suarez	  identify	  as	  characteristic.	  	  That	  said,	  the	  satiric	  nature	  of	  
these	  works—the	  use	  of	  wit,	  humor,	  irony,	  and	  parody	  to	  land	  a	  substantive	  critique—
has	  sometimes	  eluded	  readers.	  	  One	  commentator	  holds,	  for	  instance,	  that	  when	  Brave	  
New	  World	  was	  initially	  published	  only	  one	  critic	  could	  “see	  beyond	  the	  caustic	  laughter	  
to	  the	  serious,	  even	  savage	  protest	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  book.”43	  	  Occasional	  conspicuous	  
misreading	  notwithstanding,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  and	  Nineteen	  
Eighty-­‐Four	  have	  all	  been	  recognized	  as	  satirical.44	  
Like	  other	  forms	  of	  literature,	  satire	  relies	  for	  its	  persuasive	  power	  on	  an	  
author’s	  ability	  to	  construct	  a	  resonant	  world	  of	  experience.	  	  “[S]ignificant	  authors,”	  
writes	  James	  Davidson,	  convey	  a	  “correspondence	  with	  the	  real	  world	  that	  intelligent	  
and	  informed	  readers	  can	  recognize.”45	  	  He	  continues,	  “Satire	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  
exception,	  but	  it	  cannot	  exist	  without	  the	  contrast	  of	  an	  implicit	  view	  of	  reality	  which	  
satire	  mocks	  by	  deliberate	  exaggeration,	  in	  fun,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  reform,	  or	  in	  simple	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Jonathan	  Swift,	  Preface,	  The	  Battle	  of	  the	  Books	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1920,	  and	  available	  at	  
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/battle.html.	  	  Retrieved	  on	  June	  25,	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43	  Appendix,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  HarperPerennial,	  10.	  
	  
44	  See,	  for	  example,	  Peter	  J.	  Schakel,	  “The	  Satiric	  Imagination	  of	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,”	  Studies	  in	  the	  Literary	  
Imagination	  22,	  no.	  2	  (Fall	  1989),	  129-­‐148;	  Appendix,	  Brave	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  World,	  10;	  Jerome	  Meckier,	  Aldous	  
Huxley:	  Satire	  and	  Structure	  (London:	  Chatto	  &	  Windus,	  1969);	  Bernard	  Crick,	  “Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four:	  
context	  and	  controversy,”	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  George	  Orwell,	  ed.	  John	  Rodden	  (New	  York:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  146-­‐159.	  
	  
45	  James	  F.	  Davidson,	  “Political	  Science	  and	  Political	  Fiction,”	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  55,	  no.	  
4	  (1961),	  858.	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malice.	  	  The	  humor,	  light	  or	  bitter	  depending	  on	  how	  much	  the	  author	  cares,	  lies	  in	  the	  
distorted	  image	  produced	  when	  reality	  is	  highlighted	  by	  absurdities.”	  	  Ultimately,	  as	  
Davidson	  concludes,	  “The	  world	  of	  experience	  is	  still	  the	  test,	  although	  the	  
correspondence	  is	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  for	  satire	  than	  for	  realistic	  writing.”	  
Especially	  important	  to	  this	  dissertation	  is	  the	  insight	  that	  satire	  performs	  what	  
Michael	  F.	  Suarez,	  S.J.,	  describes	  as	  a	  “dual	  movement.”46	  	  Its	  destructive	  task	  is	  to	  
expose	  its	  target	  as	  ridiculous.	  	  No	  less	  important,	  however,	  is	  its	  constructive	  task,	  
moral	  education.	  	  In	  their	  satires,	  Lewis,	  Huxley,	  and	  Orwell	  refrain	  from	  direct	  
instruction.	  	  They	  would	  agree	  with	  Swift,	  who,	  as	  Suarez	  writes,	  
suggests	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  satire	  shaming	  the	  guilty	  into	  reform	  ‘may	  be	  little	  
regarded	  by	  such	  hardened	  and	  abandoned	  Natures	  as	  I	  have	  to	  deal	  with.’	  	  
Accordingly,	  [Swift]	  directs	  his	  attention	  to	  those	  who	  could	  be	  harmed	  by	  the	  
reprobate:	  ‘but,	  next	  to	  taming	  or	  binding	  a	  Savage-­‐Animal…the	  best	  Service	  you	  
can	  do	  the	  Neighborhood,	  is	  to	  give	  them	  warning,	  either	  to	  arm	  themselves,	  or	  
not	  come	  in	  its	  Way.’47	  
	  
Rather,	  like	  Swift’s	  satire,	  a	  shared	  goal	  of	  Lewis,	  Huxley,	  and	  Orwell’s	  works	  is	  “the	  
active	  fostering	  of	  moral	  discernment,	  leading	  readers	  to	  develop	  their	  critical	  acumen	  
about	  the	  workings	  of	  vice	  and	  folly—venality,	  ignorance,	  vanity,	  pride,	  dereliction	  of	  
duty—in	  others	  as	  well	  as	  ourselves.”	  	  In	  advancing	  satire	  as	  a	  means	  of	  exposure	  and	  
moral	  education,	  Lewis,	  Huxley,	  and	  Orwell	  rank	  with	  the	  company	  of	  satirists	  who	  
“promote	  a	  vigilance	  against	  the	  strategems	  of	  those	  who	  would	  abridge	  the	  liberty	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Suarez,	  “Swift’s	  Satire,”	  115.	  
	  
47	  Jonathan	  Swift,	  cited	  in	  Suarez,	  “Swift’s	  Satire,”	  115.	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living	  in	  truth.”48	  	  Satire	  is	  a	  medium	  especially	  conducive	  to	  moral	  education,	  as	  distinct	  
from	  moralizing.	  
Through	  a	  satiric	  novel,	  protagonist	  and	  reader	  together	  discover	  what	  happens	  
to	  the	  individual	  who	  finds	  the	  regime’s	  conventions	  dehumanizing	  and	  challenges	  
them.	  	  Along	  the	  way,	  we	  encounter	  other	  characters—some	  apparently	  oblivious	  to	  the	  
situation,	  others	  committed	  to	  perpetuating	  the	  regime’s	  artificial	  standards	  of	  
existence.	  	  Thrown,	  with	  each	  protagonist,	  into	  a	  world	  of	  contrived	  absolutes,	  we	  begin	  
to	  probe	  for	  reality.	  	  In	  satires	  of	  ideology,	  as	  in	  political	  science,	  the	  experience	  of	  
disorder	  spurs	  the	  quest	  for	  order.49	  
	  
LIMITATIONS	  OF	  THESE	  STORIES	  
	   I	  argue	  that	  by	  more	  accurately	  naming	  the	  genre	  of	  the	  stories	  we	  are	  
approaching,	  we	  gain	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  their	  purpose	  and	  potential.	  	  However,	  Eric	  
Voegelin	  and	  David	  Walsh,	  the	  insightful	  commentators	  who	  give	  us	  the	  designation	  
“satires	  of	  ideology,”	  also	  suggest	  that	  works	  of	  this	  kind	  may	  be	  of	  severely	  limited	  
value.	  	  While	  Voegelin	  and	  Walsh	  agree	  that	  satiric	  novels	  effectively	  expose	  ideologies,	  
they	  see	  no	  further	  therapeutic	  value.	  	  In	  Voegelin’s	  words,	  a	  “very	  peculiar	  generation	  
of	  scholars”	  effectively	  “criticized	  to	  pieces”	  the	  ideologies	  of	  its	  day.	  	  “But,”	  he	  
continues,	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  Suarez,	  “Swift’s	  Satire,”	  126.	  
	  
49	  See	  Voegelin,	  Anamnesis.	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that	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  Huxley,	  or	  Orwell	  before	  he	  died,	  knew	  what	  to	  do	  next.	  	  
They	  had	  known	  that	  all	  the	  utopian	  excrescence	  of	  their	  political	  creeds	  are	  
nonsensical.	  	  But	  what	  now?50	  
	  
Like	  Voegelin,	  Walsh	  sees	  similar	  limits.	  	  He	  writes,	  “One	  need	  only	  consider	  the	  
most	  famous	  and	  devastating	  satires	  of	  ideology	  by	  Zamyatin,	  Huxley,	  and	  Orwell,	  which	  
can	  hardly	  be	  improved	  on	  as	  critiques,	  to	  realize	  that	  they	  provide	  us	  with	  little	  
illumination	  as	  to	  how	  to	  proceed	  from	  here.”51	  	  For	  these	  political	  philosophers,	  satires	  
can	  brilliantly	  expose	  perversity	  in	  people	  and	  their	  polities	  but	  have	  little	  more	  to	  offer	  
and	  soon	  fall	  silent.	  	  Voegelin	  and	  Walsh’s	  conclusion,	  however,	  seems	  premature.	  	  A	  
critical	  and	  comparative	  evaluation	  of	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  and	  
Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  reveals	  the	  therapeutic	  potential	  of	  these	  novels.	  
	  
POTENTIAL	  OF	  THESE	  STORIES	  
These	  stories	  are	  of	  interest	  to	  students	  of	  character	  and	  politics	  for	  a	  number	  of	  
reasons.	  	  Most	  fundamentally,	  they	  ask	  the	  questions	  basic	  to	  political	  science.	  	  In	  
particular,	  these	  stories	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  task	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  in	  tension	  
with	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  These	  stories	  confront	  us	  with	  questions	  about	  the	  
meaning	  and	  possibility	  of	  becoming	  accountable	  actors	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  regime	  
committed	  to	  remolding	  its	  citizens	  to	  be	  members	  of	  a	  stable	  society.	  	  Gorman	  
Beauchamp	  writes	  with	  reference	  to	  satires	  of	  ideology,	  “The	  mythos	  of	  each	  of	  these	  
novels	  centers	  on	  the	  question…has	  man	  an	  innate,	  instinctual	  nature	  beyond	  the	  reach	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  Voegelin,	  “In	  Search	  of	  the	  Ground,”	  237.	  
	  
51	  Walsh,	  After	  Ideology,	  32.	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of	  culture	  to	  manipulate,	  or	  is	  he	  limitlessly	  plastic,	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  
state?”52	  
Importantly,	  these	  stories	  are	  not	  merely	  incisive	  critiques	  which	  ultimately	  fall	  
silent.	  	  Rather,	  they	  have	  lasting	  resonance	  because	  they	  carry	  out	  the	  prophetic	  
vocation—they	  call	  us	  to	  right	  order.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  prophetic	  voice	  in	  the	  recovery	  of	  
order	  is	  significant.53	  	  The	  prophet	  announces,	  “Woe	  to	  those	  who	  call	  evil	  good	  and	  
good	  evil,	  who	  put	  darkness	  for	  light	  and	  light	  for	  darkness,	  who	  put	  bitter	  for	  sweet	  and	  
sweet	  for	  bitter!”54	  	  He	  calls	  men	  and	  women	  to	  oppose	  injustice	  and	  wickedness.	  
More	  than	  one	  observer	  has	  recognized	  the	  prophetic	  role	  of	  stories	  that	  satirize	  
the	  utopian	  project.	  	  Chad	  Walsh	  calls	  these	  writers	  “the	  prophets	  of	  our	  times.”55	  	  He	  
explains:	  “I	  use	  the	  word	  prophet	  in	  something	  of	  its	  biblical	  sense,	  to	  mean	  one	  who	  
observes	  society,	  evaluates	  it	  in	  accordance	  with	  principles	  he	  considers	  eternal,	  and	  
offers	  messages	  of	  warning	  where	  he	  sees	  it	  going	  astray;	  messages	  not	  merely	  of	  
warning	  but	  predictions	  of	  the	  wrath	  to	  come	  unless	  society	  renounces	  its	  false	  
turnings.”56	  	  My	  task	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow	  is	  to	  show	  how	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	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  Gorman	  Beauchamp,	  “Utopia	  and	  Its	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  no.	  2	  (1975),	  169.	  
	  
53	  See	  especially	  Voegelin’s	  account	  of	  the	  prophetic	  voice	  and	  “the	  duty	  of	  being	  a	  human	  being,”	  in	  
Hitler	  and	  the	  Germans,	  CW,	  vol.	  31	  (Columbia:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1999),	  200-­‐201	  and	  75;	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Science,	  Politics,	  and	  Gnosticism,	  in	  CW,	  vol.	  5,	  261:	  “No	  one	  is	  obliged	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  spiritual	  crisis	  of	  
a	  society;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  everyone	  is	  obliged	  to	  avoid	  this	  folly	  and	  live	  his	  life	  in	  order.”	  	  See	  also,	  C.S.	  
Lewis,	  “On	  Science	  Fiction,”	  in	  On	  Stories,	  58.	  
	  
54	  Isaiah	  5:20	  ESV.	  
	  
55	  Walsh,	  From	  Utopia	  to	  Nightmare,	  135.	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  Walsh,	  From	  Utopia	  to	  Nightmare,	  135.	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Orwell	  deal	  specifically	  with	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  by	  highlighting	  
experiences	  they	  present	  as	  essential	  to	  becoming	  accountable	  actors.	  
Crucially,	  these	  authors	  aim	  not	  merely	  to	  predict,	  but	  to	  warn	  and	  provoke	  
response.	  	  Philip	  Rahv,	  for	  example,	  makes	  the	  point	  strongly	  in	  his	  review	  of	  Nineteen	  
Eighty-­‐Four,	  immediately	  after	  its	  publication.	  
Hence	  to	  read	  this	  novel	  simply	  as	  a	  flat	  prediction	  of	  what	  is	  to	  come	  is	  to	  
misread	  it.	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  writ	  of	  fatalism	  to	  bind	  our	  wills…	  ‘Wave	  of	  the	  future’	  
notions	  are	  alien	  to	  Orwell.	  	  His	  intention,	  rather,	  is	  to	  prod	  the	  Western	  world	  
into	  a	  more	  conscious	  and	  militant	  resistance	  to	  the	  totalitarian	  virus	  to	  which	  
we	  are	  now	  exposed.57	  
	  
Rahv	  rightly	  receives	  the	  work	  as	  a	  call	  to	  right	  order	  in	  the	  present	  rather	  than	  simply	  a	  
speculation	  about	  the	  future.	  	  “This	  novel	  is	  the	  best	  antidote	  to	  the	  totalitarian	  disease	  
that	  any	  writer	  has	  so	  far	  produced.”58	  	  Voegelin	  and	  Walsh	  fail	  to	  see	  that	  satires	  of	  the	  
utopian	  project	  are	  not	  merely	  critiques,	  but	  actually	  invite	  their	  readers	  to	  become,	  
more	  and	  more,	  the	  kind	  of	  people	  who	  take	  responsibility.	  
Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  have	  much	  
to	  teach	  us	  because	  these	  treatments	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  its	  essential	  themes	  
help	  us	  to	  see	  our	  own	  assumptions.	  	  “[F]or	  one	  person	  whose	  armor	  of	  self-­‐deception	  
is	  penetrated	  by	  pulpit	  preaching,”	  writes	  Chad	  Walsh,	  “there	  must	  be	  a	  dozen	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Philip	  Rahv,	  “The	  Unfuture	  of	  Utopia,”	  Partisan	  Review	  16	  (July	  1949),	  746.	  	  Incidentally,	  the	  study	  I	  
propose	  differs	  from	  other	  well	  known	  works,	  such	  as	  Neil	  Postman’s	  Amusing	  Ourselves	  to	  Death,	  that	  
attempt	  to	  compare	  Huxley	  and	  Orwell,	  for	  example,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  predictive	  power.	  	  Rather,	  I	  share	  
Rahv’s	  conclusion	  that	  these	  works	  are	  intended	  not	  to	  foretell	  the	  shape	  of	  things	  to	  come,	  but	  to	  
diagnose	  perversions	  in	  the	  present	  order.	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  Rahv,	  “The	  Unfuture	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have	  been	  pierced	  by	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  or	  Brave	  New	  World.”59	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  
realm	  of	  experience	  each	  novel	  evokes	  is	  a	  forum	  for	  moral	  education.	  	  It	  has	  been	  said	  
of	  Jonathan	  Swift,	  and	  is	  true	  of	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell,	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  his	  satire	  is	  
“to	  educate	  our	  capacity	  for	  critical	  reflection	  on	  the	  human	  condition	  and,	  hence,	  to	  
enlarge	  our	  capacity	  for	  humanity.”60	  
	  
APPROACHING	  THE	  TEXTS	  
	   It	  is	  helpful	  to	  say	  more	  at	  the	  outset	  about	  my	  intent	  and	  approach	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  	  This	  study	  is	  not	  a	  work	  of	  intellectual	  history.	  	  Rather,	  I	  approach	  these	  
novels	  as	  works	  of	  art.	  	  They	  are	  stories	  that	  communicate	  significant	  themes	  of	  interest	  
to	  students	  of	  character	  and	  politics.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  mine	  what	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  have	  to	  teach	  us	  about	  personal	  
responsibility.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  write	  from	  their	  own	  distinctive	  
historical	  moments	  and	  influential	  intellectual	  heritages.	  	  When	  and	  where	  these	  
become	  essential	  to	  their	  particular	  stories,	  I	  try	  to	  make	  the	  connections	  explicit.	  	  On	  
the	  whole,	  however,	  I	  want	  to	  examine	  each	  work	  as	  a	  world	  of	  its	  own,	  to	  see	  what	  the	  
themes	  each	  evokes	  have	  to	  teach	  us	  about	  personal	  and	  political	  order	  in	  our	  world.	  	  	  
Further,	  this	  study	  is	  not	  a	  work	  of	  literary	  criticism.	  	  Instead,	  I	  am	  primarily	  
interested	  in	  these	  stories	  for	  their	  capacity	  to	  prompt	  thinking	  and	  judgment	  about	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  become	  responsible	  persons.	  	  Throughout,	  I	  build	  on	  the	  premise	  that	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  Walsh,	  From	  Utopia	  to	  Nightmare,	  135.	  
	  
60	  Suarez,	  “Swift’s	  Satire	  and	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  116.	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Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell’s	  stories	  are	  worlds	  of	  experience	  within	  which	  we	  can	  
examine	  the	  nature	  and	  conditions	  of	  accountability.	  	  However,	  as	  Paul	  Elie	  observes,	  
“ours	  is	  an	  age	  suspicious	  of	  literature’s	  claim	  to	  speak	  to	  us	  directly,	  to	  suggest	  patterns	  
of	  experience	  that	  we	  might	  read	  back	  into	  our	  lives.”61	  	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  lay	  out	  the	  
thinking	  that	  frames	  my	  approach	  to	  these	  stories	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  help	  us	  to	  think	  
about	  fundamental	  questions	  in	  politics.	  
This	  inquiry	  is	  organized	  thematically.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  themes,	  rather	  than	  novels,	  for	  
two	  reasons.	  	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  that	  a	  thematic	  inquiry	  gives	  primacy	  to	  the	  permanent	  
things.	  	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  and	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  are	  not	  
great	  works	  of	  poetry.	  	  They	  are	  stories;	  and	  they	  have	  lasted	  remarkably	  as	  stories	  
because	  they	  deal	  with	  truly	  great	  themes.	  	  Ultimately,	  these	  themes	  are	  what	  are	  
significant	  and	  enduring.	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  art	  of	  story,	  as	  C.S.	  Lewis	  explains	  in	  his	  essay,	  “On	  Stories,”	  is	  to	  
incarnate	  what	  the	  author	  is	  imagining.62	  	  “For,”	  as	  he	  writes	  elsewhere	  of	  poetry	  
broadly,	  “poetry	  too	  is	  a	  little	  incarnation,	  giving	  body	  to	  what	  had	  been	  before	  invisible	  
and	  inaudible.”63	  	  In	  a	  story,	  the	  author	  unfolds	  a	  series	  of	  events—the	  plot—which	  “is	  
only	  really	  a	  net	  whereby	  to	  catch	  something	  else”—namely,	  a	  theme	  or	  set	  of	  themes.	  	  
The	  stories	  are	  not	  themselves	  fundamental,	  but	  are	  nets	  to	  catch	  themes.	  	  Brave	  New	  
World,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  and	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  are	  examples	  of	  the	  effort	  to	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  Paul	  Elie,	  The	  Life	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  Save	  May	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  York:	  Farrar,	  Straus	  and	  Giroux,	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62	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  “On	  Stories,”	  in	  On	  Stories,	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63	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Psalms,	  in	  The	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  Works	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  Lewis,	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regain	  reality	  through	  poetic	  imagination.	  	  Each	  work	  tells	  a	  story,	  yet	  each	  evokes	  much	  
more	  than	  a	  series	  of	  events.	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  create	  worlds	  and	  compel	  us	  to	  
participate	  in	  those	  worlds	  in	  order	  to	  show	  us	  significant	  themes,	  not	  merely	  a	  series	  of	  
events.	  
“In	  life	  and	  art	  both,	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  me,”	  Lewis	  continues,	  “we	  are	  always	  trying	  
to	  catch	  in	  our	  net	  of	  successive	  moments	  something	  that	  is	  not	  successive.”	  	  We	  are	  
trying	  to	  make	  a	  coherent	  story	  out	  of	  moments	  whose	  meaning	  is	  not	  initially	  coherent.	  	  
He	  puts	  off,	  for	  the	  moment,	  the	  question	  “whether	  in	  real	  life	  there	  is	  any	  doctor	  who	  
can	  teach	  us	  how	  to	  do	  it,	  so	  that	  at	  least	  either	  the	  meshes	  will	  become	  fine	  enough	  to	  
hold	  the	  bird,	  or	  we	  be	  so	  changed	  that	  we	  can	  throw	  our	  nets	  away	  and	  follow	  the	  bird	  
to	  its	  own	  country.”	  	  For	  now,	  he	  says,	  stories	  sometimes	  “very,	  very	  nearly”	  capture	  the	  
themes	  we	  seek.	  
The	  second	  reason	  for	  a	  thematic	  approach	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
analyzing	  story—of	  speaking	  discursively	  about	  an	  imagined	  world.	  	  In	  the	  world	  each	  
story	  incarnates,	  as	  in	  our	  world,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  consider	  everything.	  	  To	  be	  
meaningful,	  inquiry	  must	  be	  limited.	  	  Stories	  share	  in	  the	  quality	  by	  which	  “every	  myth	  
becomes	  the	  father	  of	  innumerable	  truths	  on	  the	  abstract	  level.”	  	  As	  Lewis	  tells	  us,	  
“Myth	  is	  the	  mountain	  whence	  all	  the	  different	  streams	  arise,	  which	  become	  truths	  
down	  here	  in	  the	  valley;	  in	  hac	  valle	  abstractionis.”64	  	  The	  important	  thing	  about	  story	  is	  
that	  it	  goes	  beyond	  reason.	  	  We	  cannot	  exhaust	  the	  meaning	  of	  any	  story	  by	  rational	  
reflection.	  	  We	  certainly	  cannot	  scale	  every	  inch	  of	  the	  mountain,	  or	  even	  step	  into	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every	  stream	  which	  flows	  from	  it.	  	  But	  we	  can	  wade	  in	  some	  of	  the	  streams,	  and	  
perhaps	  a	  good	  number	  of	  them.	  	  We	  can	  reflectively	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  truths	  
refracted	  through	  each	  story.	  	  We	  can	  search	  out	  insights	  communicated	  in	  and	  through	  
each	  story,	  and	  then	  compare	  and	  contrast	  what	  each	  author	  shows	  us.	  	  In	  sum,	  a	  
thematic	  approach	  allows	  me	  to	  focus	  on	  certain	  images	  and	  insights,	  guided	  by	  the	  
themes	  that	  seem	  most	  important	  for	  this	  inquiry	  in	  political	  science.	  
In	  the	  present	  study,	  as	  always,	  to	  approach	  analytically	  is	  to	  risk	  violence	  to	  the	  
selected	  imaginative	  works.	  	  Through	  their	  stories,	  Lewis,	  Huxley,	  and	  Orwell	  try	  to	  
incarnate	  worlds	  for	  us	  to	  participate	  in	  and	  reflect	  upon.	  	  These	  stories	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  unify	  for	  us	  the	  distinct	  experiences	  of	  looking	  along	  and	  looking	  at.65	  	  To	  
discuss	  these	  stories	  is	  to	  attempt	  to	  play	  on	  the	  border	  of	  the	  two	  distinct	  experiences	  
of	  participation	  and	  reflection,	  without	  detracting	  from	  either.	  	  We	  approach	  these	  
works	  of	  imagination	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  and	  evaluate	  the	  images	  and	  insights	  
they	  offer.	  	  The	  potential	  reward	  is	  that	  reflection	  will	  make	  each	  imaginatively	  
incarnated	  world	  more	  real	  to	  us.	  	  As	  worlds	  made	  for	  us	  to	  participate	  in	  and	  reflect	  
upon,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell’s	  images	  present	  insights	  sufficient	  to	  feed	  endless	  
conversation.	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  notice	  all	  of	  the	  significant	  themes	  these	  stories	  
convey.	  	  Likewise,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  exhaust	  the	  few	  themes	  highlighted	  here.	  
Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  a	  thematic	  approach,	  then,	  is	  that	  stories	  have	  the	  capacity	  
to	  communicate	  innumerable	  themes.	  	  If	  our	  reflection	  here	  is	  to	  be	  rewarding,	  we	  must	  
choose	  a	  few	  complementary	  themes	  and	  dwell	  on	  them.	  	  To	  approach	  thematically	  is	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  Chapter	  2	  below.	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to	  clarify,	  by	  limiting,	  what	  I	  want	  to	  notice	  in	  each	  world.	  	  Beyond	  noticing	  and	  naming	  
select	  themes,	  my	  bent	  is	  to	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  what	  is	  resonant,	  persuasive,	  
remarkable,	  unsettling,	  and	  dissatisfactory	  in	  each	  author’s	  treatment.	  
Before	  I	  establish	  the	  specific	  themes	  that	  shape	  this	  study,	  let	  me	  describe	  how	  
I	  attempt	  to	  conduct	  the	  thematic	  analysis	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  essay.	  	  In	  the	  chapters	  
that	  follow	  I	  try	  to	  show	  how	  these	  works	  evoke	  select	  themes	  through	  specific	  
characters	  and	  events.	  	  For	  example,	  to	  explore	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  human	  
person	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  I	  examine	  Huxley’s	  portrayal	  of	  different	  characters	  as	  they	  
variously	  manifest,	  struggle	  with,	  or	  decline	  to	  pursue	  personal	  integrity.	  	  The	  difficult	  
part	  of	  exegesis	  is	  tracing	  themes	  persuasively	  and	  succinctly.	  	  Beyond	  the	  basic	  task	  of	  
exegesis,	  this	  study	  requires	  me	  to	  evaluate	  and,	  where	  called	  for,	  compare	  and	  critique	  
each	  author’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  selected	  themes.	  	  Throughout,	  my	  interest	  in	  each	  
chapter’s	  particular	  theme	  rises	  from	  my	  overarching	  interest	  in	  personal	  responsibility.	  
While	  the	  stories	  I	  engage	  in	  this	  dissertation	  are	  well	  known,	  they	  stand	  outside	  
the	  traditional	  canon	  of	  Western	  political	  thought.	  	  Why,	  then,	  should	  we	  approach	  
Aldous	  Huxley,	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  and	  George	  Orwell	  as	  serious	  thinkers	  who	  can	  help	  us	  think	  
clearly	  about	  politics?	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  are	  masterful	  storytellers;	  they	  evoke	  
enduring	  themes	  through	  their	  characters’	  actions	  and	  reflections.	  	  The	  questions	  and	  
themes	  they	  engage	  are	  familiar	  to	  the	  best	  political	  theorists	  in	  our	  tradition.	  	  Open	  
Aristotle	  or	  Arendt	  and	  you	  will	  find	  them	  inviting	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  many	  of	  the	  same	  
themes	  that	  surface	  when	  we	  ask	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  and	  live	  well	  together.	  	  In	  
fact,	  it	  is	  easy,	  upon	  meeting	  a	  theme	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  or	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Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  to	  turn,	  for	  example,	  to	  Aristotle	  or	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  or	  Eric	  
Voegelin	  for	  further	  illumination.	  	  They	  are	  natural	  conversation	  partners	  because	  they	  
share	  many	  of	  the	  same	  enduring	  questions.	  	  My	  purpose	  in	  this	  study,	  however,	  is	  not	  
to	  put	  them	  into	  conversation.	  	  Explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  Aristotle,	  Hobbes,	  Arendt,	  and	  
Voegelin	  all	  affirm	  story	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  political	  thought.	  	  For	  the	  present	  inquiry,	  I	  want	  
to	  practice	  the	  discipline	  of	  reflecting	  within	  the	  medium	  of	  story.	  
C.S.	  Lewis,	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  and	  George	  Orwell	  work	  as	  artists	  and	  theorists.	  	  
These	  storytellers	  perform	  the	  task	  of	  political	  theory	  in	  a	  different	  mode.	  	  By	  taking	  us	  
into	  their	  worlds,	  they	  lead	  us	  in	  the	  basic	  tasks	  of	  political	  theory	  as	  they	  evoke	  great	  
themes,	  confront	  us	  with	  experiences,	  and	  even	  enable	  us	  to	  act	  in	  our	  own	  world.	  	  Like	  
discursive	  inquiry,	  their	  stories	  require	  us	  to	  think,	  to	  observe,	  reflect,	  and	  evaluate.	  	  
Different	  from	  discursive	  inquiry,	  their	  stories	  offer	  a	  forum	  and	  formation	  that	  works	  at	  
a	  level	  that	  appeals	  to	  imagination	  as	  well	  as	  reason.	  	  It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  present	  venture	  to	  
approach	  our	  novelists	  as	  theorists,	  and	  their	  novels	  as	  works	  of	  art	  which	  are	  fertile	  for	  
thought.	  
Lewis	  notes	  that,	  in	  stories,	  as	  in	  real	  life,	  themes	  tend	  to	  fade	  in	  the	  succession	  
of	  events.	  	  He	  observes,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  theme	  or	  “idea	  of	  adventure	  fades	  when	  
the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  details	  begin	  to	  happen…Other	  grand	  ideas—home-­‐coming,	  reunion	  with	  
a	  beloved—similarly	  elude	  our	  grasp.”66	  	  My	  task	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  novels	  work	  to	  
capture	  a	  theme—and,	  at	  moments,	  illuminate	  our	  own	  experiences.	  	  In	  this	  work,	  I	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must	  remain	  aware	  and	  humbled	  by	  the	  reminder	  that,	  in	  life	  and	  in	  stories	  both,	  
themes	  are	  elusive	  things.	  
The	  interpretive	  and	  critical	  task	  before	  me	  is	  difficult	  and	  promising.	  	  Lewis	  
closes	  his	  essay,	  “On	  Stories,”	  by	  affirming	  that	  although	  the	  art	  of	  story	  is	  demanding,	  it	  
is	  an	  art	  worth	  the	  effort	  because	  it	  sometimes	  succeeds	  in	  capturing	  significant	  themes	  
for	  at	  least	  a	  few	  pages.67	  	  My	  central	  goal	  in	  the	  present	  study	  is	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  
themes	  evoked	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  and	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  
that	  are	  most	  interesting	  to	  students	  of	  character	  and	  politics.	  	  Our	  reward	  will	  be	  to	  
better	  understand	  those	  themes,	  in	  our	  moment,	  through	  three	  stories	  widely	  
recognized	  for	  their	  capacity	  to	  illuminate	  the	  human	  condition	  in	  an	  era	  marked	  by	  a	  
crisis	  of	  meaning	  and	  proliferating	  technological	  capabilities.	  	  “[W]e	  know	  at	  once,”	  
writes	  Lewis	  of	  Tolkien’s	  The	  Lord	  of	  the	  Rings,	  “that	  it	  has	  done	  things	  to	  us.	  	  We	  are	  
not	  quite	  the	  same	  men.”68	  	  These	  stories,	  too,	  have	  potential	  to	  change	  their	  readers.	  
	  
TOWARD	  RESPONSIBILITY:	  THEMES	  
In	  selecting	  the	  themes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  turn	  for	  
justification	  to	  Aristotle,	  Arendt,	  or	  another	  voice	  in	  the	  traditional	  canon	  of	  political	  
theory.	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  a	  few	  common	  themes	  that	  clearly	  emerge	  in	  Huxley,	  
Lewis,	  and	  Orwell’s	  accounts	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  men	  and	  their	  regimes.	  	  I	  examine	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  Stories,”	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  “Tolkien’s	  The	  Lord	  of	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  Rings,”	  90.	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the	  practice	  of	  responsibility	  by	  tracing	  a	  few	  themes	  that	  their	  narratives	  reveal	  as	  
essential	  to	  becoming	  accountable	  actors.	  
One	  theme	  is	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  word.	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  all	  show	  the	  
corruption	  of	  language	  as	  a	  key	  instrument	  their	  imagined	  regimes	  use	  to	  hinder	  
citizens.	  	  All	  three	  regimes	  foster	  the	  dissolution	  of	  language,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  in	  different	  
ways.	  	  In	  Orwell’s	  Oceania,	  newspeak	  and	  double	  think	  truncate	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  
name	  things	  as	  they	  are.	  	  In	  Huxley’s	  World	  State,	  information	  and	  entertainment	  
displace	  literature,	  reflection,	  and	  art,	  while	  pleasant	  euphemisms	  further	  obscure	  
reality.	  	  At	  Belbury	  and	  Bracton,	  a	  web	  of	  bureaucratic	  words	  supports	  the	  pretense	  of	  
meaningful	  communication.	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  journey	  to	  become	  responsible	  actors	  is	  every	  man’s	  quest	  
for	  personal	  integrity.	  	  Each	  regime	  directly	  attempts	  to	  prevent	  men	  from	  recognizing	  
themselves,	  and	  acting,	  as	  responsible	  individuals.	  	  In	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  citizens	  of	  
Oceania	  cannot	  escape	  the	  political	  meaning	  the	  Party	  imposes	  on	  everything,	  including	  
the	  most	  intimate	  elements	  of	  their	  personal	  relationships.	  	  In	  Brave	  New	  World,	  the	  
World	  State	  induces	  men	  to	  remain	  infantile	  by	  constantly	  imbibing	  base	  pleasures.	  	  
Those	  in	  power	  in	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  entice	  Mark	  to	  further	  their	  plan	  to	  stabilize,	  
standardize,	  and	  sterilize	  the	  wider	  population	  by	  playing	  on	  his	  ambition	  and	  fear	  of	  
exclusion.	  
Of	  special	  interest	  in	  this	  study	  are	  the	  foundations	  of	  political	  society.	  	  In	  all	  
three	  novels,	  each	  regime	  asserts,	  and	  claims	  to	  legitimate,	  unlimited	  power	  over	  
individuals.	  	  Yet	  each	  casts	  its	  claim	  to	  unlimited	  power	  in	  its	  own	  peculiar	  terms.	  	  The	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World	  State	  promises	  a	  stable	  happiness.	  	  The	  N.I.C.E.	  pursues	  progress	  through	  a	  plan	  
to	  eliminate	  the	  passions,	  limitations,	  and	  unpredictability	  that	  mark	  the	  human	  
condition.	  	  The	  Party	  in	  Oceania	  is	  baldly	  bent	  on	  control	  over	  its	  citizens	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
control.	  
I	  examine	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  word	  in	  Chapters	  3,	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  human	  
person	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  and	  the	  foundation	  of	  political	  community	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  Finally,	  my	  
conclusions	  in	  Chapter	  6	  connect	  the	  journey	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  with	  the	  quest	  
for	  justice.	  	  Throughout,	  my	  analysis	  compares	  select	  characters	  from	  each	  novel	  as	  they	  
encounter	  and,	  sometimes,	  embody	  these	  themes	  in	  their	  own	  choices	  to	  become	  or	  
else	  to	  refuse	  to	  become	  responsible	  persons.	  	  For	  us,	  as	  for	  the	  characters	  in	  Brave	  
New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  these	  themes	  matter	  
because	  they	  are	  essential	  to	  becoming	  responsible.	  	  I	  know	  this	  better	  than	  I	  might	  
otherwise	  because	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  have	  helped	  me	  to	  see	  it	  through	  their	  
stories.	  	  Importantly,	  when	  I	  distinguish	  these	  themes	  and	  examine	  them	  in	  turn,	  I	  do	  
not	  mean	  to	  imply	  that	  they	  are,	  in	  the	  stories	  or	  in	  our	  lives,	  lessons	  to	  be	  picked	  up	  in	  
succession.	  	  They	  are	  not	  lessons	  we	  pick	  up	  one	  after	  another,	  but	  are	  instead	  
interwoven,	  constituent	  elements	  of	  the	  journey	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  
It	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  ask	  here,	  why	  compare	  these	  three	  novels?	  	  Why	  not	  
focus	  on	  one	  or	  two?	  	  In	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐
Four	  we	  encounter	  very	  different	  regimes	  and	  very	  different	  men.	  	  The	  common	  themes	  
which	  come	  through	  these	  narratives,	  the	  struggles	  each	  central	  character	  faces,	  
actually	  heighten	  the	  contrast	  between	  these	  accounts.	  	  Considering	  the	  distinct	  ways	  in	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which	  each	  regime	  attempts	  to	  cut	  out	  men’s	  capacity	  to	  become	  responsible	  actors	  is	  
illuminating	  and	  sobering.	  	  Considering	  the	  common	  themes	  as	  well	  as	  the	  points	  of	  
contrast	  between	  these	  stories	  prevents	  us	  from	  dismissing	  any	  one	  of	  them	  as	  
irrelevant	  to	  the	  particular	  time	  or	  place	  to	  which	  we	  happen	  to	  belong,	  and	  thus	  
missing	  the	  central	  phenomena	  of	  the	  journey	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  each	  portrays.	  	  
By	  examining	  the	  three	  stories	  together,	  we	  stand	  to	  gain	  greater	  insight	  into	  the	  
different	  threats	  and	  aids	  to	  the	  journey	  in	  responsibility	  which	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  
Orwell	  examine.	  
	   Before	  I	  take	  up	  each	  theme,	  I	  need	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  and	  why	  these	  
stories	  provide	  experiences	  which	  call	  and	  enable	  us	  to	  become	  responsible.	  	  
Accordingly,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  poetic	  imagination,	  moral	  
meaning,	  and	  politics	  in	  Chapter	  2.
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CHAPTER	  2	  
POETIC	  IMAGINATION,	  MORAL	  MEANING,	  AND	  POLITICS	  
	  
Man	  is	  a	  poetical	  animal	  and	  touches	  nothing	  he	  does	  not	  adorn.	  
	  
-­‐	  C.S.	  Lewis1	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  poetic	  imagination	  in	  thinking	  about	  politics?	  	  In	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  I	  started	  an	  inquiry	  into	  personal	  responsibility	  using	  three	  stories	  that	  portray	  
individuals	  who	  strive	  to	  become	  responsible	  in	  the	  face	  of	  regimes	  designed	  to	  
undermine	  their	  efforts.	  	  I	  argued	  that	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  and	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength	  are	  political	  science	  in	  narrative	  form.	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  
examine	  a	  few	  essential	  themes	  of	  responsibility	  that	  come	  through	  these	  stories.	  	  First,	  
however,	  I	  pause	  to	  ask	  how	  these	  works,	  as	  stories,	  foster	  an	  inquiry	  into	  personal	  
responsibility.	  	  What	  interest	  does	  a	  student	  of	  politics	  have	  in	  fictional	  narratives?	  	  
More	  specifically,	  the	  questions	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  these:	  why	  turn	  to	  
stories?	  And,	  how	  do	  stories	  work?	  
These	  two	  questions	  orient	  my	  inquiry	  in	  the	  sections	  that	  follow.	  	  I	  start	  by	  
examining	  the	  problem	  and	  critique	  of	  rationalism	  as	  these	  reach	  their	  height	  in	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  	  Next,	  I	  trace	  C.S.	  Lewis’s	  response	  to	  rationalism	  through	  his	  
understanding	  of	  humans	  as	  creative	  creatures	  and	  his	  effort	  to	  restore	  a	  balanced	  
relationship	  between	  reason	  and	  imagination.	  	  Finally,	  I	  sketch	  the	  features	  of	  our	  
experience	  as	  story-­‐making,	  story-­‐formed,	  and	  meaning-­‐bearing	  creatures.	  	  I	  conclude	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  “Is	  Theology	  Poetry?,”	  Essay	  Collection,	  15.	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with	  a	  brief	  reflection	  on	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell’s	  parallel	  efforts	  to	  present	  and	  
provoke	  us	  to	  personal	  responsibility	  through	  their	  own	  works	  of	  poetic	  imagination.	  
	  
DILEMMA	  OF	  INTELLECT	  AND	  IMAGINATION	  
Political	  science,	  as	  Dante	  Germino	  writes,	  is	  concerned	  with	  man	  “in	  the	  fullness	  
of	  his	  experience,”	  which	  includes	  ethical,	  religious,	  and	  aesthetic	  elements.2	  	  Political	  
science	  is	  interested	  in	  these	  elements,	  says	  Germino,	  following	  Aristotle,	  because	  it	  is	  
“an	  experiential,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  exclusively	  experimental,	  science.”	  	  Crucially,	  works	  
of	  literature	  have	  a	  special	  capacity	  to	  convey	  the	  world	  of	  human	  experience.3	  	  
Catherine	  Zuckert	  describes	  the	  role	  of	  literature	  in	  presenting	  the	  questions	  we	  aspire	  
to	  illuminate	  through	  political	  science.	  	  “The	  questions	  that	  led	  political	  scientists	  to	  look	  
to	  works	  of	  art	  for	  enlightenment	  concern	  the	  aspects	  of	  human	  life	  that	  are	  most	  
difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  study	  and	  observe	  externally	  or	  objectively—the	  attitudes,	  
emotions,	  and	  opinions	  that	  shape	  and	  are	  shaped	  by	  people’s	  circumstances,	  especially	  
their	  political	  circumstances.”4	  	  She	  continues,	  “Chief	  among	  the	  issues	  that	  escape	  the	  
positivist	  paradigm	  and	  attract	  political	  scientists	  to	  the	  study	  of	  literature	  have	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Germino,	  Beyond	  Ideology,	  6.	  
	  
3	  On	  literature	  and	  politics,	  see	  also:	  Maureen	  Whitebrook,	  “Only	  Connect:	  Politics	  and	  Literature	  10	  Years	  
Later,	  1982-­‐92,”	  PS:	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  26,	  no.	  2	  (Jun.	  1993),	  257-­‐262;	  Jean	  Bethke	  Elshtain,	  
“Stories	  and	  Political	  Life,”	  PS:	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  28,	  no.	  2	  (Jun.	  1995),	  196-­‐197;	  and,	  Wilson	  
Carey	  McWilliams,	  “Poetry,	  Politics,	  and	  the	  Comic	  Spirit,”	  PS:	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  28,	  no.	  2	  (Jun.	  
1995),	  197-­‐200.	  
	  
4	  Catherine	  Zuckert,	  “Why	  Political	  Scientists	  Want	  to	  Study	  Literature,”	  PS	  (1995),	  189.	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the	  moral	  dimensions	  of	  politics.”	  	  As	  Zuckert	  points	  out,	  the	  questions	  that	  interest	  
students	  of	  politics	  are	  complex	  and	  require	  an	  adequate	  mode	  of	  presentation.	  
The	  difficulty,	  however,	  as	  Zuckert	  rightly	  names	  it,	  is	  that	  rationalism,	  the	  
dominant	  paradigm	  in	  contemporary	  studies	  of	  politics,	  constrains	  many	  people	  in	  their	  
efforts	  to	  think	  about	  politics.	  	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  stories	  work,	  why	  they	  matter,	  
and	  how	  they	  aid	  a	  study	  in	  personal	  responsibility,	  I	  need	  to	  introduce	  the	  problem	  of	  
rationalism	  and	  its	  consequences	  for	  imagination,	  stories,	  moral	  experiences,	  and	  
politics.	  	  To	  make	  this	  introduction,	  I	  draw	  on	  Max	  Weber’s	  insightful	  evaluation	  in	  his	  
1918	  speech,	  “Science	  as	  a	  Vocation.”5	  
Rationalism	  is	  the	  name	  for	  the	  movement	  that	  first	  divorces	  intellect	  and	  
imagination,	  and	  then	  elevates	  reason	  and	  denies	  imagination.	  	  Rationalism	  tempts	  us	  
to	  believe	  that	  we	  can	  know	  all	  there	  is	  to	  know	  by	  means	  of	  instrumental	  reason—and,	  
worse,	  that	  what	  we	  can	  know	  by	  instrumental	  reason	  is	  all	  there	  is	  to	  know.6	  	  In	  Max	  
Weber’s	  account,	  rationalism	  affirms	  that	  we	  “can,	  in	  principle,	  master	  all	  things	  by	  
calculation.”7	  	  Nothing	  remains	  mysterious.	  	  Weber	  calls	  the	  result	  disenchantment.	  
Rationalism	  rises	  from	  an	  inordinate	  desire	  for	  knowledge,	  and	  attracts	  those	  
who	  long	  for	  certain	  knowledge.	  	  Critically,	  however,	  rationalism	  promises	  more	  than	  
reason	  can	  competently	  deliver.	  	  It	  guarantees	  reliable	  and	  effective	  knowledge	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Max	  Weber,	  “Science	  as	  a	  Vocation.”	  	  From	  H.H.	  Gerth	  and	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	  (Translated	  and	  edited),	  From	  
Max	  Weber:	  Essays	  in	  Sociology,	  pp.	  129-­‐156,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1946	  [orig.	  1919].	  	  
Available	  at	  http://mail.www.anthropos-­‐lab.net/wp/wp-­‐content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-­‐Science-­‐as-­‐a-­‐
Vocation.pdf.	  	  Retrieved	  on	  July	  29,	  2014.	  
	  
6	  See	  also,	  Voegelin,	  New	  Science	  of	  Politics.	  
	  
7	  Weber,	  “Science,”	  7.	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a	  science	  “free	  from	  presuppositions.”8	  	  Yet,	  as	  Weber	  explains,	  all	  science—all	  our	  
attempts	  to	  know—is	  built	  on	  presuppositions	  embodied	  in	  “our	  ultimate	  position	  
towards	  life.”9	  	  Natural	  science,	  for	  example,	  “gives	  us	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  
what	  we	  must	  do	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  master	  life	  technically.	  	  It	  leaves	  quite	  aside,	  or	  assumes	  
for	  its	  purposes,	  whether	  we	  should	  and	  do	  wish	  to	  master	  life	  technically	  and	  whether	  
it	  ultimately	  makes	  sense	  to	  do	  so.”10	  
In	  other	  words,	  Weber	  contends	  that	  science	  tells	  us	  what	  to	  do	  to	  achieve	  
particular	  goals—it	  answers	  the	  question,	  “How?”	  	  But	  science	  and	  technology	  cannot	  
answer	  the	  orienting	  questions,	  “Does	  it	  make	  sense?”	  and	  “Should	  we?”	  	  These	  
questions	  address	  meaning	  and	  ethics,	  and	  they	  require	  special	  attention.	  	  Rationalism,	  
meanwhile,	  quietly	  assures	  us	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  attend	  to	  these	  questions	  because	  
we	  already	  have	  the	  answers.	  	  Consequently,	  we	  answer	  too	  often	  these	  questions	  
functionally,	  by	  our	  practices,	  but	  without	  reflection.	  
The	  basic	  presupposition	  of	  any	  scientific	  endeavor	  is	  our	  conviction	  that	  what	  
the	  inquiry	  may	  yield	  is	  worth	  knowing,	  within—and	  this	  is	  key—within	  a	  broader	  vision	  
of	  the	  purpose	  of	  human	  life.11	  	  When	  we	  divorce	  and	  distort	  intellect	  and	  imagination,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ibid.,	  9.	  
	  
9	  Ibid.,	  9.	  
	  
10	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
	  
11	  Cf.	  Husserl,	  Vienna	  Lecture	  “Philosophy	  and	  the	  Crisis	  of	  European	  Humanity;	  or,	  the	  ‘Vienna	  Lecture,’”	  
(online	  at	  http://www.users.cloud9.net/~bradmcc/husserl_philcris.html,	  orig.	  1935.	  	  Retrieved	  on	  May	  9,	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we	  forget	  this	  presupposition.	  	  Simply	  put,	  we	  forget	  that	  all	  our	  sciences,	  including	  
natural	  science	  and	  politics,	  build	  on	  the	  stories	  we	  tell	  about	  the	  point	  of	  human	  life.	  
The	  dilemma	  of	  intellect	  and	  imagination	  Weber	  and	  some	  of	  his	  contemporaries	  
identify	  has	  consequences	  that	  matter	  to	  our	  everyday	  lives,	  to	  political	  science,	  and	  to	  
the	  present	  study.	  	  Perniciously,	  rationalism	  prevents	  us	  from	  asking	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
significant	  questions	  of	  ethics	  and	  politics.	  	  Our	  diligence	  or	  failure	  in	  asking	  those	  
questions	  shapes	  all	  our	  endeavors.	  	  The	  questions	  of	  meaning	  and	  ethics	  are	  old,	  but,	  
now	  more	  than	  ever,	  they	  compel	  our	  attention.12	  
These	  questions	  of	  meaning	  and	  ethics	  matter	  because	  of	  key	  developments—
namely,	  the	  expanding	  development	  and	  use	  of	  biotechnologies—that	  Brave	  New	  
World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  each	  treat.	  	  These	  works	  
remain	  resonant,	  in	  part,	  because	  their	  authors	  see	  that	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  endeavor	  is	  
set	  to	  expand	  exponentially	  as	  men	  apply	  technologies	  to	  human	  life.	  	  We	  can	  do	  more	  
now	  than	  ever.	  	  In	  2009,	  Nick	  Bostrom	  and	  Julian	  Savulescu	  reported	  from	  the	  University	  
of	  Oxford:	  “Human	  enhancement	  has	  moved	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  science	  fiction	  to	  that	  of	  
practical	  ethics.	  	  There	  are	  now	  effective	  physical,	  cognitive,	  mood,	  cosmetic,	  and	  sexual	  
enhancers.”13	  	  Bostrom	  and	  Savulescu	  say	  innovations	  within	  this	  century	  will	  “provide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Eric	  Cohen,	  “Bioethics	  in	  Wartime,”	  The	  New	  Atlantis,	  no.	  3	  (Fall	  2003),	  23-­‐33.	  
	  
13	  Nick	  Bostrom	  and	  Julian	  Savulescu,	  “Introduction:	  Human	  Enhancement	  Ethics:	  The	  State	  of	  the	  
Debate,”	  in	  Nick	  Bostrom	  and	  Julian	  Savulescu,	  eds.	  	  Human	  Enhancement.	  	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2009,	  18.	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the	  opportunity	  fundamentally	  to	  change	  the	  human	  condition.”	  	  They	  conclude:	  “Our	  
fate	  is,	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  ever	  before	  in	  human	  history,	  in	  our	  own	  hands.”14	  
The	  biotech	  conversation,	  in	  particular,	  matters	  because	  now	  as	  never	  before	  
our	  answers	  provoke	  exponential	  consequences.	  	  As	  we	  apply	  new	  technologies	  to	  
change	  how	  we	  are	  born,	  live,	  and	  die,	  we	  recast	  the	  human	  situation.	  	  Following	  C.S.	  
Lewis,	  Eric	  Cohen	  rightly	  says	  our	  plans	  become	  “more	  plausible	  and	  more	  
irreversible.”15	  	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  the	  rationalism	  that	  blinds	  men	  to	  questions	  of	  
meaning	  and	  ethics	  bears	  consequences	  for	  our	  daily	  lives.	  
Rationalism	  is	  a	  particular	  problem	  for	  the	  study	  of	  politics	  because	  politics,	  as	  
Aristotle	  observes,	  is	  founded	  on	  ethics,	  which	  in	  turn	  depends	  on	  meaning.	  	  More	  
simply,	  the	  study	  of	  politics	  is	  essentially	  concerned	  with	  the	  question,	  “What	  does	  it	  
mean	  to	  live	  well	  together?”	  which	  in	  turn	  depends	  on	  two	  questions:	  “What	  does	  it	  
mean	  to	  live	  well?”	  and	  “What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  human?”	  	  Because	  rationalism	  blinds	  
us	  to	  questions	  of	  moral	  meaning,	  it	  undermines	  any	  robust	  study	  of	  politics	  at	  the	  
outset.	  	  In	  short,	  as	  Zuckert	  writes,	  rationalism	  hinders	  contemporary	  studies	  of	  politics	  
because	  it	  blinds	  us	  to	  the	  most	  significant	  dimensions	  of	  politics.	  
In	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  certain	  theorists	  recognized	  rationalism	  and	  started	  to	  
search	  for	  a	  more	  adequate	  mode	  of	  asking	  questions	  about	  human	  experience	  and	  the	  
world.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Bostrom	  and	  Savulescu,	  Human	  Enhancement,	  20-­‐21.	  
	  
15	  Cohen,	  “Bioethics	  in	  Wartime,”	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SEARCH	  FOR	  AN	  ADEQUATE	  MODE	  OF	  INQUIRY	  
Some	  theorists	  who	  critique	  rationalism	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  include	  
Edmund	  Husserl,	  Max	  Weber,	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  and	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre.	  	  
These	  thinkers	  recognize	  rationalism	  as	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  discourse	  in	  the	  Western	  
world.	  	  In	  the	  main,	  they	  critique	  it	  as	  inadequate	  for	  considering	  questions	  of	  moral	  
meaning	  and	  politics.	  	  In	  response,	  each	  theorist	  searches	  for	  a	  mode	  of	  thought	  and	  
expression	  that	  is	  more	  adequate	  for	  observing	  and	  evaluating	  human	  experience.	  	  	  
Arendt	  and	  MacIntyre,	  in	  particular,	  adopt	  the	  language	  of	  narrative.	  	  They	  
describe	  the	  structure	  of	  human	  life	  in	  terms	  of	  story,	  and	  understand	  persons	  as	  agents	  
capable	  of	  giving	  an	  intelligible	  account	  of	  their	  actions.	  	  Arendt	  writes,	  for	  example:	  
Although	  everybody	  started	  his	  life	  by	  inserting	  himself	  into	  the	  human	  world	  
through	  action	  and	  speech,	  nobody	  is	  the	  author	  or	  producer	  of	  his	  own	  life	  
story.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  stories,	  the	  results	  of	  action	  and	  speech,	  reveal	  an	  
agent,	  but	  this	  agent	  is	  not	  an	  author	  or	  producer.	  	  Somebody	  began	  it	  and	  is	  its	  
subject	  in	  the	  twofold	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  namely,	  its	  actor	  and	  sufferer,	  but	  
nobody	  is	  the	  author.16	  
	  
Similarly,	  MacIntyre	  affirms	  that	  we	  are	  not	  autonomous	  authors	  of	  our	  stories.	  	  He	  
writes,	  
I	  spoke	  earlier	  of	  the	  agent	  as	  not	  only	  an	  actor,	  but	  an	  author.	  	  Now	  I	  must	  
emphasize	  that	  what	  the	  agent	  is	  able	  to	  do	  and	  say	  intelligibly	  as	  an	  actor	  is	  
deeply	  affected	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  never	  more	  (and	  sometimes	  less)	  than	  
the	  co-­‐authors	  of	  our	  own	  narratives.17	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  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  184.	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  Alasdair	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  After	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Weber	  and	  Voegelin,	  in	  turn,	  exhort	  their	  audiences	  to	  turn	  to	  literature.	  	  For	  
example,	  Weber	  encourages	  us	  to	  pick	  up	  Tolstoy.18	  	  When	  Voegelin	  finds	  Albert	  Camus	  
undertaking	  the	  quest	  for	  meaning	  through	  novels,	  he	  identifies	  Camus’	  effort	  as	  a	  
“meditation	  in	  the	  medium	  of	  a	  myth.”19	  	  He	  observes	  that	  myth	  is	  distinctively	  
appropriate	  for	  considering	  human	  experience,	  especially	  political	  questions—questions	  
of	  right	  order	  in	  persons	  and	  their	  communities.	  	  Accordingly,	  Voegelin	  directs	  young	  
students	  of	  politics	  not	  to	  professional	  political	  science,	  but	  to	  contemporary	  literary	  
works,	  and	  to	  scholarship	  on	  myths,	  ethnic	  cultures,	  philology,	  history,	  and	  religion.20	  	  In	  
Search	  of	  Order,	  the	  final	  volume	  of	  Voegelin’s	  lifework,	  Order	  and	  History,	  is	  a	  
meditative	  inquiry	  into	  the	  narrative	  structure	  of	  reality.	  	  	  
These	  scholars’	  appeal	  to	  narrative	  and	  myth	  matters	  to	  us	  because	  they	  revive	  a	  
language	  and	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  human	  action	  that	  recover	  the	  questions	  of	  moral	  
meaning	  to	  which	  rationalism	  remains	  blind.	  	  They	  ably	  use	  the	  language	  of	  narrative	  
and	  describe	  humans	  as	  accountable	  actors.	  
Though	  significant,	  their	  appeal	  to	  narrative	  remains	  limited.	  	  On	  the	  whole,	  their	  
critiques	  of	  rationalism	  are	  penetrating	  but	  incomplete.	  	  To	  show	  how	  their	  response	  to	  
rationalism	  is	  unfinished,	  and	  with	  what	  consequence,	  I	  turn	  to	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,	  a	  thinker	  not	  
usually	  associated	  with	  the	  canon	  of	  Western	  political	  thought.	  	  Lewis’	  stories	  and	  
scholarship	  can	  help	  illuminate	  the	  relationship	  between	  poetic	  imagination,	  meaning,	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and	  politics.	  	  Like	  these	  political	  theorists,	  Lewis	  diagnoses	  the	  crisis	  of	  intellect.	  	  But,	  
perhaps	  better	  than	  they	  do,	  he	  sees	  that	  a	  crisis	  of	  intellect	  is	  equally	  a	  crisis	  of	  
imagination.	  	  He	  understands	  that	  any	  adequate	  response	  to	  rationalism	  must	  include	  
not	  only	  a	  critique	  of	  rationalism,	  but	  also	  a	  renewal	  of	  imagination.	  	  In	  turn,	  his	  
theoretical	  work	  and	  poetic	  craftsmanship	  evidence	  and	  contribute	  to	  a	  restoration	  of	  a	  
balanced	  relationship	  between	  intellect	  and	  imagination.	  	  	  
Lewis	  contends	  with	  rationalism—first	  in	  his	  own	  intellectual	  life	  and,	  later,	  in	  
conversation	  with	  those	  who	  confine	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  to	  what	  we	  can	  know	  by	  
intellect	  alone.	  	  In	  certain	  of	  his	  essays	  and	  stories,	  he	  shows	  why	  rationalism	  fails	  those	  
it	  attracts.	  	  While	  he	  acknowledges	  the	  longing	  for	  certitude	  that	  drives	  the	  move	  to	  
elevate	  reason	  and	  dismiss	  imagination,	  Lewis	  advocates	  a	  healthy	  relationship	  between	  
reason	  and	  imagination	  as	  the	  more	  satisfactory	  path	  to	  knowledge.	  	  He	  goes	  further	  to	  
show	  why,	  in	  our	  quest	  for	  knowledge,	  imagination	  is	  as	  important	  as	  intellect.	  	  Perhaps	  
most	  significantly,	  his	  insights	  into	  the	  role	  of	  imagination	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  moral	  
dimensions	  of	  our	  experience	  rise	  from	  his	  understanding	  of	  humans	  as	  poetical	  
animals,	  to	  which	  I	  now	  turn.	  
	  
HUMAN	  BEINGS	  AS	  POETICAL	  ANIMALS	  
C.	  S.	  Lewis	  is	  exemplary	  in	  his	  effort	  to	  revalidate	  our	  capacity	  and	  practice	  of	  
asking	  questions	  that	  draw	  out	  the	  moral	  dimensions	  of	  our	  experience.	  	  What	  frames	  
the	  present	  study	  is	  Lewis’s	  profound	  understanding	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  poetical	  
animals,	  a	  concept	  I	  elaborate	  below.	  	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  a	  view	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  story-­‐
	  49	  
making,	  story-­‐formed,	  and	  meaning-­‐bearing	  creatures.	  	  Readers	  acquainted	  with	  Lewis	  
as	  a	  Christian	  apologist	  or	  author	  of	  children’s	  literature	  may	  be	  surprised	  by	  his	  
contribution	  to	  the	  conversation	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge.	  	  The	  conversation	  on	  
knowledge,	  or	  epistemology,	  reaches	  back	  to	  the	  pre-­‐Socratics	  and	  Plato,	  finds	  definite	  
development	  in	  Aristotle,	  and	  is	  a	  central,	  though	  often	  implicit,	  theme	  in	  western	  
thought	  throughout	  the	  tradition.21	  	  At	  issue	  in	  this	  debate,	  where	  Lewis	  takes	  it	  up	  in	  
his	  moment,	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  man.	  	  The	  question	  he	  engages:	  is	  man	  essentially	  a	  
rational	  creature—a	  creature	  whose	  approach	  to	  the	  world	  is	  essentially	  one	  of	  
information	  gaining	  and	  problem	  solving,	  or	  is	  he	  instead	  essentially	  a	  creative	  
creature—a	  creature	  for	  whom	  true	  knowledge	  depends	  on	  both	  imagination	  and	  
reason?	  
Before	  I	  examine	  C.S.	  Lewis’s	  response	  to	  the	  question,	  let	  me	  say	  why	  I	  think	  his	  
contribution	  matters.	  	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  on	  Lewis’s	  insights	  because	  his	  life	  is	  formed	  by	  his	  
effort	  to	  recover	  poetic	  imagination	  against	  the	  existential	  and	  intellectual	  threats	  that	  
characterize	  the	  age	  of	  totalitarianism	  and	  rationalism.	  	  His	  work	  resonates	  with	  our	  
experiences	  as	  people	  who	  hunger	  for	  a	  universal	  story,	  in	  an	  age	  where	  individuals	  are	  
cynical	  toward	  stories	  and	  universals.22	  	  Importantly,	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  dilemma	  of	  
intellect	  and	  imagination	  emerge	  through	  his	  personal	  quest	  for	  coherence	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Indeed,	  Lewis	  and	  his	  friends	  Owen	  Barfield	  and	  J.R.R.	  Tolkien	  are	  all	  aware	  that	  the	  conversation	  they	  
participate	  in	  evokes	  themes	  presented	  in	  key	  myths	  of	  the	  Genesis	  account—in	  particular,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Tree	  of	  Knowledge	  and	  the	  Tree	  of	  Life,	  and	  the	  Tower	  of	  Babel.	  	  Barfield,	  for	  
example,	  comments:	  “Only	  when	  poesy,	  who	  is	  herself	  alive,	  looks	  backward,	  does	  she	  see	  at	  a	  glance	  
how	  much	  younger	  is	  the	  Tree	  of	  Knowledge	  than	  the	  Tree	  of	  Life”	  (Owen	  Barfield,	  Poetic	  Diction,	  90).	  
	  
22	  Amidst	  a	  vast	  literature	  on	  the	  loss	  of	  story	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rationalism,	  see	  Robert	  W.	  Jenson,	  “How	  the	  
World	  Lost	  Its	  Story,”	  First	  Things,	  October	  1993.	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meaning.	  	  While	  Lewis	  joins	  many	  others	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  restore	  imagination	  and	  
intellect,	  his	  work	  is	  distinctive	  for	  its	  clarity	  and	  common	  sense	  language.23	  	  Finally,	  like	  
Huxley	  and	  Orwell,	  Lewis	  is	  an	  author	  of	  stories.	  	  He	  writes	  as	  a	  philosopher	  and	  teacher,	  
and,	  crucially,	  as	  a	  master	  craftsman.	  	  In	  his	  own	  description,	  “The	  imaginative	  man	  in	  
me	  is	  older,	  more	  continuously	  operative,	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  more	  basic	  than	  either	  the	  
religious	  writer	  or	  the	  critic.”24	  
The	  young	  C.	  S.	  Lewis	  sought	  to	  reconcile	  discursive	  reason,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
and	  poetic	  imagination,	  on	  the	  other,	  within	  himself.	  	  He	  had	  imbibed	  the	  
Enlightenment	  narrative,	  in	  which	  primitive	  myth	  gives	  way	  to	  science	  and	  reason.25	  	  
Lewis	  describes	  the	  conflict	  of	  intellect	  and	  imagination	  that	  characterized	  his	  youth	  in	  
his	  autobiography,	  Surprised	  by	  Joy:	  “The	  two	  hemispheres	  of	  my	  mind	  were	  in	  sharpest	  
contrast.	  	  On	  the	  one	  side	  a	  many-­‐islanded	  sea	  of	  poetry	  and	  myth;	  on	  the	  other,	  a	  glib	  
and	  shallow	  ‘rationalism.’	  	  Nearly	  all	  that	  I	  loved	  I	  believed	  to	  be	  imaginary;	  nearly	  all	  
that	  I	  believed	  to	  be	  real	  I	  thought	  grim	  and	  meaningless.”26	  	  Lewis	  wonders	  about	  the	  
conflict	  of	  reason	  and	  imagination	  in	  his	  poem,	  “Reason,”	  written	  in	  the	  late	  1920s	  or	  
early	  1930s.27	  	  There	  he	  asks,	  “Who	  [will]	  make	  imagination’s	  dim	  exploring	  touch/Ever	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Compare	  Barfield’s	  retrospection	  on	  Lewis’s	  attempt	  to	  revalidate	  language	  through	  his	  scholarship	  and	  
craftsmanship,	  “Lewis,	  Truth,	  and	  Imagination,”	  in	  Owen	  Barfield	  on	  C.S.	  Lewis	  (Middletown,	  CT:	  Wesleyan	  
University	  Press,	  1989),	  103	  
	  
24	  Undated	  letter	  to	  the	  Milton	  Society	  of	  America,	  which	  on	  28	  December	  1954	  held	  “A	  Milton	  Evening	  in	  
Honor	  of	  Douglas	  Bush	  and	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,”	  in	  Letters	  of	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,	  259-­‐260.	  
	  
25	  Alister	  McGrath,	  The	  Intellectual	  World	  of	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  56.	  
	  
26	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  Surprised	  by	  Joy,	  95.	  
	  
27	  The	  poem,	  which	  Barfield	  thought	  should	  be	  titled	  “Reason	  and	  Imagination,”	  is	  reprinted	  in	  Owen	  
Barfield	  on	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,	  117.	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report	  the	  same	  as	  intellectual	  sight?”	  	  Malcolm	  Guite	  notes	  that	  the	  poem	  anticipates	  a	  
concord	  between	  reason	  and	  imagination	  that	  Lewis	  started	  to	  articulate	  not	  long	  after	  
he	  penned	  the	  piece.28	  
In	  the	  1930s,	  C.S.	  Lewis	  comes	  to	  see	  humans	  as	  essentially	  creative	  creatures,	  
and,	  accordingly,	  to	  view	  reason	  and	  imagination	  as	  interdependent,	  complementary	  
modes	  of	  knowledge.	  	  He	  discovers	  that,	  in	  reality,	  intellect	  and	  imagination	  are	  
opposed	  not	  to	  one	  another,	  but	  to	  the	  rationalism	  that	  damages	  both.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  
Lewis	  is	  a	  rationalist—that	  is,	  he	  values	  reason—but	  he	  rejects	  rationalism,	  a	  strict	  
reliance	  on	  reason	  as	  an	  adequate	  means	  to	  know	  all	  truth.	  
How	  does	  the	  concord	  of	  reason	  and	  poetic	  imagination	  develop	  for	  Lewis?	  	  To	  
understand	  how	  he	  comes	  to	  reconcile	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  we	  must	  make	  a	  
brief	  survey	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Lewis	  forges	  and	  refines	  his	  thoughts	  on	  man	  
as	  a	  poetical	  animal	  in	  conversation	  with	  friends	  in	  his	  literary	  circle,	  the	  Inklings.	  	  Two	  
of	  his	  friends	  in	  particular,	  Owen	  Barfield	  and	  J.R.R.	  Tolkien,	  influence	  his	  understanding	  
of	  the	  kinds	  of	  creatures	  we	  are	  and	  how	  we	  acquire	  true	  knowledge.	  	  Barfield	  and	  
Tolkien’s	  concern,	  which	  Lewis	  came	  to	  share,	  is	  “that	  the	  right	  balance	  should	  be	  
maintained	  between	  the	  poetic	  and	  rational	  principles,	  otherwise	  truth	  is	  lost.”29	  
Owen	  Barfield’s	  theories	  of	  knowledge	  and	  language	  deeply	  appealed	  to	  both	  
Lewis	  and	  Tolkien.	  	  He	  published	  Poetic	  Diction	  in	  1928	  and	  dedicated	  the	  book	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Malcolm	  Guite,	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  307.	  
	  
29	  Clive	  Tolley,	  “Tolkien’s	  ‘Essay	  on	  Man,’:	  a	  look	  at	  Mythopoeia,”	  Chesterton	  Review	  vol.	  28	  
(February/May	  2002),	  92.	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Lewis.30	  	  In	  turn,	  we	  find	  J.R.R.	  Tolkien’s	  most	  distinctive	  statements	  on	  how	  humans	  
know	  and	  name	  reality	  in	  his	  poem,	  Mythopoeia,	  and	  his	  essay,	  On	  Fairy	  Stories.31	  	  Both	  
works	  date	  to	  around	  1931	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  imagination,	  reason,	  and	  
language.	  	  Tolkien	  addresses	  his	  Mythopoeia	  to	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,	  “one	  who	  said	  that	  myths	  
were	  lies	  and	  therefore	  worthless,	  even	  though	  breathed	  through	  silver.”32	  	  Clive	  Tolley	  
elaborates	  the	  connection	  between	  Barfield	  and	  Tolkien’s	  works	  in	  his	  2002	  essay,	  
“Tolkien’s	  ‘Essay	  on	  Man’:	  a	  look	  at	  Mythopoeia.”33	  	  We	  see	  Barfield	  and	  Tolkien’s	  
subsequent	  influence	  on	  Lewis	  in	  the	  essays	  collected	  in	  On	  Stories,	  as	  well	  as	  “Myth	  
Became	  Fact”	  and	  “Meditation	  in	  a	  Toolshed.”	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these,	  his	  essay	  from	  the	  
1930s	  entitled	  “Bluspels	  and	  Flalansferes:	  A	  Semantic	  Nightmare,”	  is	  especially	  
significant.34	  
In	  their	  conversations	  and	  writings,	  Lewis	  and	  his	  friends	  attempt	  to	  address	  
what	  they	  saw	  as	  an	  epistemological	  rupture	  with	  real	  world	  consequences.	  	  In	  Malcolm	  
Guite’s	  description,	  
[Lewis	  and	  Barfield’s]	  great	  project,	  together	  with	  some	  of	  the	  other	  members	  of	  
the	  Inklings,	  notably	  Tolkien	  and	  Charles	  Williams,	  was	  to	  heal	  the	  widening	  split	  
between	  outer	  and	  inner,	  rational	  and	  imaginative,	  microcosm	  and	  macrocosm.	  	  
They	  aimed	  to	  do	  so	  by	  using	  the	  power	  of	  poetic	  language	  in	  verse	  and	  prose	  to	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid.,	  94,	  87.	  
	  
31	  J.R.R.	  Tolkien,	  “On	  Fairy	  Stories,”	  in	  Tree	  and	  Leaf,	  ca.	  1931.	  
	  
32	  Tolkien,	  “Mythopoeia.”	  
	  
33	  Tolley,	  “Tolkien’s	  ‘Essay,’”	  79-­‐95.	  
	  
34	  “Bluspels”	  dates	  to	  the	  late	  1930s,	  according	  to	  Hooper,	  Companion	  and	  Guide,	  570.	  	  The	  essay	  appears	  
in	  Rehabilitations	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  1939,	  and	  again	  in	  Selected	  Literary	  Essays,	  1969.	  	  Page	  numbers	  here	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effect	  a	  “felt	  change	  of	  consciousness,”	  to	  heighten	  and	  deepen	  our	  awareness	  
by	  re-­‐enchanting	  the	  disenchanted,	  by	  remythologizing	  a	  demythologized	  
world.35	  
	  
In	  short,	  Lewis	  and	  his	  friends	  endeavor	  to	  heal	  the	  divorce	  and	  consequent	  mutual	  
distortion	  of	  reason	  and	  imagination.	  
Before	  proceeding	  here,	  I	  should	  note	  that	  Lewis,	  together	  with	  Barfield	  and	  
Tolkien,	  confronts	  us	  with	  ideas	  of	  human	  being	  and	  knowledge	  which	  are,	  as	  Clive	  
Tolley	  writes	  of	  Barfield’s	  ideas,	  “difficult	  to	  accommodate…in	  much	  of	  the	  western	  
philosophical	  tradition.”36	  	  His	  ideas	  challenge	  conventional	  western	  thought,	  as	  Tolley	  
continues,	  because	  “they	  require	  us	  to	  accept	  that	  truth	  may	  be	  arrived	  at	  by	  other	  
means	  than	  mere	  reasoning,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  basic	  tenet	  of	  that	  philosophical	  
tradition,	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  positivism	  which	  gave	  rise	  to	  modern	  science	  and	  
materialism.”37	  
	   Certain	  of	  Barfield’s	  ideas	  became	  key	  points	  in	  the	  conversation	  that	  developed	  
between	  Barfield,	  Tolkien,	  and	  Lewis.	  	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  helpful	  to	  focus	  on	  Barfield’s	  work	  
for	  a	  moment.	  	  His	  Poetic	  Diction	  is	  a	  complex	  study	  of	  knowledge,	  myth,	  and	  
consciousness.	  	  The	  point	  of	  departure,	  for	  Barfield,	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  Nature	  has	  instilled	  
original	  meanings	  in	  reality.	  	  He	  writes,	  “Men	  do	  not	  invent	  those	  mysterious	  relations	  
between	  separate	  external	  objects,	  and	  between	  objects	  and	  feelings	  and	  ideas,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Guite,	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  306.	  
	  
36	  Tolley,	  “Tolkien’s	  ‘Essay,’”	  89.	  
	  
37	  Ibid.	  	  Italics	  in	  original.	  	  If	  Tolley	  abridges	  the	  lines	  between	  reason,	  positivism,	  modern	  science,	  and	  
materialism,	  he	  rightly	  warns	  that	  Lewis,	  Barfield,	  and	  Tolkien	  offer	  a	  view	  of	  knowledge	  discounted	  by	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  basic	  prejudices	  which	  dominate	  contemporary	  opinions	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  knowledge.	  	  See	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  Vienna	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it	  is	  the	  function	  of	  poetry	  to	  reveal.	  	  These	  relations	  exist	  independently,	  not	  indeed	  of	  
Thought,	  but	  of	  any	  individual	  thinker.”38	  
Barfield	  holds,	  as	  Tolley	  summarizes,	  “that	  mankind	  has	  undergone	  a	  
development—one	  might	  say	  evolution—of	  consciousness	  from	  one	  in	  which	  certain	  
things	  are	  perceived	  as	  one	  whole	  to	  one	  in	  which	  they	  are	  conceived	  as	  separate	  or	  at	  
most	  related	  entities,	  e.g.	  the	  original	  unitary	  concept	  of	  breath-­‐wind-­‐spirit	  becomes	  
split	  into	  three	  or	  more	  concepts	  we	  recognize.”39	  	  This	  development	  of	  consciousness,	  
argues	  Barfield,	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  development	  of	  language.	  
The	  language	  of	  primitive	  men	  reports	  to	  them	  direct	  perceptual	  experience.	  	  
The	  speaker	  has	  observed	  a	  unity,	  and	  is	  not	  therefore	  himself	  conscious	  of	  
relation.	  	  But	  we,	  in	  the	  development	  of	  consciousness,	  have	  lost	  the	  power	  to	  
see	  this	  one	  as	  one.	  	  Our	  sophistication,	  like	  Odin’s,	  has	  cost	  us	  an	  eye;	  and	  now	  
it	  is	  the	  language	  of	  the	  poets,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  create	  true	  metaphors,	  which	  
must	  restore	  this	  unity	  conceptually,	  after	  it	  has	  been	  lost	  from	  perception.40	  
	  
In	  short,	  he	  concludes,	  it	  is	  by	  imagination	  that	  we	  see.41	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  poet’s	  task	  is	  
to	  once	  again	  see,	  and	  to	  make	  others	  see,	  the	  world.42	  
On	  Barfield’s	  account,	  early	  “myths,	  which	  represent	  the	  earliest	  meanings,	  were	  
not	  the	  arbitrary	  creation	  of	  ‘poets,’	  but	  the	  natural	  expression	  of	  man’s	  being	  and	  
consciousness	  at	  the	  time.	  	  These	  primary	  ‘meanings’	  were	  given,	  as	  it	  were,	  by	  Nature,	  
but	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  their	  being	  given	  was	  that	  they	  could	  not	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be	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  Barfield,	  Poetic	  Diction,	  86.	  
	  
39	  Tolley,	  “Tolkien’s	  ‘Essay,’”	  87.	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  Barfield,	  Poetic	  Diction,	  86-­‐87.	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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apprehended	  in	  full	  consciousness;	  they	  could	  not	  be	  known,	  but	  only	  experienced	  or	  
lived.”43	  	  With	  the	  development	  of	  consciousness,	  Barfield	  continues,	  it	  becomes	  the	  
poet’s	  task	  to	  recover	  original	  meaning	  by	  making	  metaphors:	  “In	  place	  of	  the	  simple,	  
given	  meaning,	  we	  find	  the	  metaphor—a	  real	  creation	  of	  the	  individual—though,	  in	  so	  
far	  as	  it	  is	  true,	  it	  is	  only	  re-­‐creating,	  registering	  as	  thought,	  one	  of	  those	  eternal	  facts	  
which	  may	  already	  have	  been	  experienced	  in	  perception.”44	  
Barfield	  argues	  that	  the	  denial	  of	  imagination	  bears	  great	  consequences	  for	  
thought	  and	  practice.	  	  In	  his	  1951	  Preface	  to	  the	  Second	  Edition,	  he	  further	  develops	  his	  
basic	  account	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  rationalism	  as	  a	  self-­‐deception	  and	  distortion	  of	  reality.	  	  He	  
describes	  men	  who	  reject	  imagination	  as	  paralyzed.	  	  Poisoned	  by	  scientism,	  their	  “habit	  
of	  mind”	  is	  to	  “assume	  that	  man	  is	  a	  detached	  observer	  of	  a	  world	  devoid	  of	  human	  
spirit	  and	  ‘going	  on	  by	  itself.’	  	  Within	  such	  a	  framework	  imagination	  can	  be	  no	  more	  
than	  a	  kind	  of	  pretending,	  and	  it	  is	  as	  such	  that	  it	  is	  presented.”45	  	  Barfield	  continues,	  
with	  a	  call	  to	  attention:	  
No	  doubt	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  outside	  world	  as	  something	  ‘which	  goes	  on	  by	  
itself,’	  and	  appears	  to	  have	  lost	  all	  connection	  with	  human	  imagination,	  was	  
burnt	  into	  many	  modern	  poets	  by	  the	  combined	  violence	  and	  passivity	  of	  trench	  
warfare;	  and	  today	  the	  objectized	  nothing,	  which	  scientism	  supposes	  at	  the	  base	  
of	  the	  phenomenal	  world,	  is	  taking	  shape	  as	  the	  spectre	  of	  nuclear	  fission	  and	  
scientific	  warfare	  on	  a	  world-­‐wide	  scale.	  	  Some	  ‘habit	  of	  mind’!	  the	  empiricist	  
may	  well	  object,	  with	  a	  chuckle;	  and	  it	  is	  no	  part	  of	  my	  case	  that	  push-­‐and-­‐pull	  
empiricism	  is	  weak	  or	  ineffectual,	  only	  that	  it	  is,	  like	  other	  giants,	  ignorant.	  	  The	  
possibility	  of	  man's	  avoiding	  self-­‐destruction	  depends	  on	  his	  realizing	  before	  it's	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too	  late	  that	  what	  he	  let	  loose	  over	  Hiroshima,	  after	  fiddling	  with	  its	  exterior	  for	  
three	  centuries	  like	  a	  mechanical	  toy,	  was	  the	  forces	  of	  his	  own	  unconscious	  
mind.46	  
	  
With	  a	  tone	  of	  admonition,	  Barfield	  remarks	  on	  the	  man	  who	  possesses	  overly	  
rationalistic	  habits	  of	  thought:	  “There	  was	  a	  time	  when...he	  still	  regarded	  himself	  as	  
responsible,	  and	  thought	  he	  might	  do	  something	  to	  change	  them	  [i.e.,	  these	  habits].”47	  
	   Owen	  Barfield’s	  effort	  to	  provoke	  individuals	  to	  personal	  responsibility	  starts	  in	  
his	  challenge	  to	  western	  rationalism.	  	  To	  summarize,	  he	  holds	  that	  Nature	  gives	  primary	  
meanings,	  and	  that	  those	  meanings	  are	  accessible	  through	  the	  complementary	  working	  
of	  logos	  and	  imagination.	  	  He	  then	  traces	  the	  implications	  of	  habits	  formed	  by	  
rationalism,	  and,	  against	  these	  habits,	  urges	  his	  readers	  to	  reconsider	  their	  suppositions	  
regarding	  knowledge	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  recovering	  the	  integrity	  required	  for	  responsible	  
action.	  
What	  Owen	  Barfield	  says	  in	  Poetic	  Diction,	  J.R.R.	  Tolkien	  says	  in	  his	  poem	  
Mythopoeia.	  	  Of	  the	  connection	  between	  Barfield	  and	  Tolkien’s	  works	  Clive	  Tolley	  
writes,	  “It	  would	  not	  be	  stretching	  things	  too	  far	  to	  say	  that	  Mythopoeia	  is	  a	  poetic	  
version	  of	  the	  main	  arguments	  of	  Poetic	  Diction.”48	  	  Most	  fundamentally,	  “For	  
Tolkien”—as	  for	  Barfield—“man	  is	  not	  essentially	  a	  scientific	  beast,	  but	  a	  creative	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  Tolley,	  “Tolkien’s	  ‘Essay,’”	  87.	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  close	  comparison	  of	  Mythopoeia	  and	  




one.”49	  	  In	  Mythopoeia,	  Tolkien	  echoes	  Barfield’s	  theory	  of	  language.	  	  He	  also	  presents	  a	  
similar	  critique	  of	  the	  rationalism	  that	  distorts	  both	  reason	  and	  imagination,	  and	  
likewise	  highlights	  its	  consequences	  for	  industrialization	  and	  violence.	  	  Importantly,	  
Tolkien	  further	  develops	  in	  this	  poem	  a	  concept	  that	  becomes	  particularly	  important	  to	  
Lewis:	  human	  being	  as	  subcreator,	  an	  idea	  to	  which	  I	  will	  return	  below.	  
Barfield	  and	  Tolkien’s	  understanding	  of	  humans	  as	  creative	  creatures	  influenced	  
C.S.	  Lewis’s	  reconception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  intellect	  and	  imagination.	  	  The	  
maturing	  Lewis’s	  understanding	  of	  how	  humans	  know	  and	  speak	  about	  the	  world	  
informs	  his	  subsequent	  essays	  on	  intellect,	  imagination,	  and	  story,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  potent	  
study,	  The	  Abolition	  of	  Man.	  	  Let’s	  survey	  the	  basic	  account	  of	  human	  knowledge	  and	  
language	  Lewis	  presents	  in	  “Bluspels	  and	  Flalansferes.”	  
In	  this	  essay,	  Lewis	  responds	  to	  the	  contention	  that	  metaphorical	  language	  is	  
inadequate	  for	  securing	  real	  knowledge	  and,	  conversely,	  that	  language	  free	  from	  
metaphor	  delivers	  more	  certain	  knowledge.	  	  He	  cites	  Barfield’s	  response	  to	  two	  authors	  
who	  claimed	  that	  “it	  is	  impossible	  thus	  to	  handle	  a	  scientific	  matter	  in	  metaphorical	  
terms.”50	  	  “[These	  authors]	  had	  forgotten,	  [Barfield]	  complained,	  that	  all	  language	  has	  a	  
figurative	  origin	  and	  that	  the	  ‘scientific’	  terms	  on	  which	  they	  piqued	  themselves—words	  
like	  organism,	  stimulus,	  reference—were	  not	  miraculously	  exempt.”51	  	  Lewis	  quotes	  
Barfield’s	  conclusion:	  “As	  a	  result,	  they	  are	  absolutely	  rigid	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  those	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verbal	  ghosts	  of	  the	  physical	  sciences,	  which	  today	  make	  up	  practically	  the	  whole	  
meaning-­‐system	  of	  so	  many	  European	  minds.”52	  	  The	  difficulty,	  Lewis	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  for	  
the	  man	  who	  claims	  to	  move	  from	  poetic	  or	  metaphorical	  language	  to	  scientific	  
language	  instead,	  is	  that	  he	  forgets	  that	  “when	  he	  deserted	  metaphor	  for	  mathematics,	  
he	  did	  not	  really	  pass	  from	  symbol	  to	  symbolized,	  but	  only	  from	  one	  set	  of	  symbols	  to	  
another.”53	  
We	  depend	  upon	  imagination	  and	  metaphor	  more	  than	  we	  usually	  appreciate.	  	  
Throughout	  “Bluspels	  and	  Flalansferes,”	  Lewis	  compellingly	  highlights	  the	  fact	  of	  our	  
constant	  and	  often	  unacknowledged	  recourse	  to	  imagination.	  	  The	  moment	  we	  start	  to	  
think	  of	  “causes,	  relations,	  of	  mental	  states	  or	  acts,”	  he	  observes,	  “we	  become	  incurably	  
metaphorical.”54	  	  We	  cannot	  think	  beyond	  particular	  objects	  without	  metaphor:	  “At	  the	  
very	  humblest	  we	  must	  speak	  of	  things	  in	  the	  plural;	  we	  must	  point	  not	  only	  to	  isolated	  
sensations,	  but	  to	  groups	  and	  classes	  of	  sensations;	  and	  the	  universal	  latent	  in	  every	  
group	  and	  every	  plural	  inflection	  cannot	  be	  thought	  without	  metaphor.	  	  Thus	  far	  beyond	  
the	  security	  of	  literal	  meaning	  all	  of	  us,	  we	  may	  be	  sure,	  are	  going	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  our	  
daily	  needs;	  indeed,	  not	  to	  go	  thus	  far	  would	  be	  to	  abandon	  reason	  itself.”55	  	  Lewis	  here	  
advances	  the	  insight	  that	  it	  is	  by	  imagination	  that	  we	  see	  the	  world.	  	  Reason,	  in	  turn,	  
depends	  upon	  and	  works	  in	  concert	  with	  imagination.	  	  Reason,	  then,	  compels	  us	  to	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make	  use	  of	  imagination.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  rationalism,	  then,	  in	  Lewis’s	  diagnosis,	  is	  
that	  it	  hinders	  our	  response	  to	  reason’s	  requirement	  that	  we	  rely	  on	  imagination	  as	  
well.	  
On	  the	  whole,	  Lewis	  contends	  that	  metaphor	  is	  no	  impediment	  to,	  but	  is,	  quite	  
the	  opposite,	  essential	  to	  knowledge.	  	  In	  reaching	  this	  conclusion,	  Lewis	  remains	  a	  
rationalist:	  he	  maintains	  that	  we	  arrive	  at	  truth	  by	  use	  of	  reason.	  	  But	  he	  rejects	  
rationalism:	  he	  denies	  that	  we	  can	  live	  by	  reason	  alone.	  	  Here	  we	  come	  to	  the	  heart,	  for	  
Lewis,	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  reason	  and	  imagination:	  
I	  am	  a	  rationalist.	  	  For	  me,	  reason	  is	  the	  natural	  organ	  of	  truth;	  but	  imagination	  is	  
the	  organ	  of	  meaning.	  	  Imagination,	  producing	  new	  metaphors	  or	  revivifying	  old,	  
is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  truth,	  but	  the	  condition.56	  
	  
The	  key	  point	  is	  that,	  for	  Lewis,	  to	  maintain	  a	  healthy	  balance	  between	  intellect	  and	  
imagination,	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  their	  complementary	  roles.	  	  He	  values	  reason	  as	  our	  
means	  of	  coming	  to	  truth.	  	  We	  gain	  truth	  when	  we	  think	  and	  speak	  rightly	  about	  the	  
world	  as	  it	  is.	  	  We	  cannot,	  however,	  think	  or	  speak	  rightly	  about	  the	  reality	  as	  it	  is	  until	  
we	  first	  see	  it—and	  we	  see	  by	  imagination.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  meaning	  comes	  through	  
imagination:	  imagination	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is.	  	  Imagination	  and	  metaphor	  
complement	  and	  supply	  reason	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  truth.	  
Before	  I	  further	  examine	  Lewis’s	  revaluation	  of	  imagination,	  I	  need	  to	  address	  a	  
fundamental	  question	  he	  raises	  in	  his	  account	  of	  knowledge.	  	  In	  his	  2002	  essay,	  Clive	  
Tolley	  points	  out	  an	  open	  question	  in	  Barfield’s	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  and	  language,	  
which	  Lewis’s	  theory	  similarly	  invites.	  	  Tolley	  asks,	  “How	  do	  we	  know,	  when	  confronted	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by	  a	  new	  and	  perhaps	  striking	  metaphor,	  that	  a	  true	  unitary	  concept	  is	  being	  presented	  
to	  us,	  rather	  than	  just	  a	  clever	  juxtaposition	  of	  concepts	  by	  the	  poet?”57	  	  Lewis	  sees	  the	  
question	  coming	  and	  addresses	  it	  in	  the	  closing	  lines	  of	  “Bluspels	  and	  Flalansferes”:	  
I	  said	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  truth	  we	  won	  by	  metaphor	  could	  not	  be	  greater	  than	  
the	  truth	  of	  the	  metaphor	  itself;	  and	  we	  have	  seen	  since	  that	  all	  our	  truth,	  or	  all	  
but	  a	  few	  fragments,	  is	  won	  by	  metaphor.	  	  And	  thence,	  I	  confess,	  it	  does	  follow	  
that	  if	  our	  thinking	  is	  ever	  true,	  then	  the	  metaphors	  by	  which	  we	  think	  must	  
have	  been	  good	  metaphors.	  	  It	  does	  follow	  that	  if	  those	  original	  equations	  
between	  good	  and	  light,	  or	  evil	  and	  dark,	  between	  breath	  and	  soul	  and	  all	  the	  
others,	  were	  from	  the	  beginning	  arbitrary	  and	  fanciful—if	  there	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	  a	  
kind	  of	  psycho-­‐physical	  parallelism	  (or	  more)	  in	  the	  universe—then	  all	  our	  
thinking	  is	  nonsensical.	  	  But	  we	  cannot,	  without	  contradiction,	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  
nonsensical.	  	  And	  so,	  admittedly,	  the	  view	  I	  have	  taken	  has	  metaphysical	  
implications.	  	  But	  so	  has	  every	  view.58	  
	  
To	  close	  this	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  make	  a	  connection	  between	  Lewis’s	  
understanding	  of	  humans	  as	  poetical	  animals	  and	  the	  thesis	  of	  his	  later	  1945	  essay,	  The	  
Abolition	  of	  Man.	  	  The	  connection	  is	  this:	  the	  reason,	  at	  bare	  minimum,	  that	  it	  matters	  
that	  we	  recognize	  humans	  as	  poetical	  animals	  is	  that,	  unless	  we	  do	  so,	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  
a	  rationalism	  that	  easily	  leads	  us	  to	  destruction.	  	  Tolley	  writes	  of	  Tolkien—and	  the	  same	  
is	  emphatically	  true	  of	  Lewis—that,	  while	  he	  was	  not	  hostile	  to	  scientific	  investigation,	  
“he	  clearly	  felt	  that	  the	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  outside	  a	  realization	  of	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  
man	  was	  not	  merely	  limited	  but	  leads	  to	  damnation.”59	  	  As	  it	  discredits	  imagination,	  
rationalism	  distorts	  knowledge	  into	  scientism	  and	  language	  into	  literalism.	  	  Ultimately,	  
rationalism	  is	  the	  skewed	  and	  blinding	  view	  of	  man	  as	  a	  creature	  whose	  knowledge	  of	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nature	  enables	  him	  to	  conquer	  nature.	  	  It	  promises	  a	  fully	  planned	  and	  conditioned	  
world.	  	  Yet,	  as	  Lewis	  writes,	  “If	  the	  fully	  planned	  and	  conditioned	  world…comes	  into	  
existence,	  Nature	  will	  be	  troubled	  no	  more	  by	  the	  restive	  species	  that	  rose	  in	  revolt	  
against	  her	  so	  many	  millions	  of	  years	  ago,	  will	  be	  vexed	  no	  longer	  by	  its	  chatter	  of	  truth	  
and	  mercy	  and	  beauty	  and	  happiness.”60	  	  Rationalism	  ends	  in	  the	  abolition	  of	  man	  
because	  it	  blinds	  us	  to	  our	  true	  nature,	  and	  lures	  us	  into	  a	  project	  that	  ultimately	  
silences	  all	  our	  chatter	  of	  meaning.	  	  The	  reign	  of	  reason	  alone	  promises	  the	  conquest	  of	  
nature,	  but	  ends	  in	  the	  conquest	  of	  man.	  
Critically,	  C.S.	  Lewis	  warns	  against	  rationalism	  and	  revalidates	  poetic	  imagination	  
because	  he	  sees	  more	  clearly	  than	  most	  our	  true	  nature:	  “Man	  is	  a	  poetical	  animal	  and	  
touches	  nothing	  he	  does	  not	  adorn.”61	  	  One	  of	  the	  chief	  marks	  of	  our	  character	  as	  
poetical	  animals	  is	  our	  language.	  	  Try	  to	  speak	  without	  metaphor.	  	  “The	  reason	  why	  we	  
don’t	  is	  that	  we	  can’t,”	  Lewis	  writes.	  	  “We	  can	  make	  our	  language	  duller;	  we	  cannot	  
make	  it	  less	  metaphorical.	  	  We	  can	  make	  the	  pictures	  more	  prosaic;	  we	  cannot	  be	  less	  
pictorial.”62	  	  We	  cannot	  abandon	  poetic	  imagination	  and	  still	  think	  accurately	  because	  
“all	  language	  about	  things	  other	  than	  physical	  objects	  is	  necessarily	  metaphorical.”	  	  
Lewis	  sees	  that	  we	  cannot	  comprehend	  or	  communicate	  meaning	  if	  we	  deny,	  as	  
rationalism	  does,	  that	  we	  are	  poetical	  animals.	  	  But	  if	  we	  aim	  to	  avoid	  metaphor	  and	  
mystery—to	  trust	  discursive	  reason	  alone	  and	  discredit	  all	  else—we	  blind	  ourselves	  to	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the	  very	  realities	  that	  make	  life	  worth	  living.	  	  We	  distort	  our	  view	  of	  reality	  and	  separate	  
ourselves	  from	  the	  meaning	  we	  desire.	  	  We	  cut	  off	  our	  access	  to	  the	  most	  significant	  
dimensions	  of	  politics.	  
So	  far,	  then,	  C.S.	  Lewis’s	  understanding	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  creative	  creatures	  
helps	  us	  respond	  to	  the	  first	  question	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  chapter:	  why	  turn	  to	  stories?	  	  
By	  understanding	  our	  nature	  as	  poetical	  animals,	  we	  start	  to	  see	  more	  clearly	  the	  special	  
potential	  of	  stories.	  	  Stories	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  resonant	  form	  of	  
communication	  because	  we	  are	  more	  than	  solely	  scientific	  creatures	  and	  they	  appeal	  to	  
our	  imaginative	  as	  well	  as	  rational	  capacities.	  
	  
REVALIDATING	  IMAGINATION	  
Imagination,	  as	  Lewis	  and	  his	  friends	  argue,	  is	  indispensible	  in	  our	  efforts	  to	  
engage	  fundamental	  questions	  of	  meaning,	  ethics,	  and	  politics.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  
I	  surveyed	  Lewis’s	  view	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  poetical	  animals	  in	  order	  to	  better	  
understand	  why	  story	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  especially	  significant	  form	  of	  communication.	  	  My	  
purpose	  in	  this	  section	  and	  the	  next	  is	  to	  further	  probe	  this	  chapter’s	  second	  question:	  
how	  do	  stories	  work?	  	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  focus	  on	  Lewis’s	  critique	  of	  rationalism	  and,	  more	  
important	  still,	  his	  revalidation	  of	  imagination.	  
In	  what	  follows,	  I	  draw	  on	  a	  few	  essays	  in	  which	  Lewis	  shows	  how	  rationalism	  
distorts	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world.	  	  In	  these	  essays,	  Lewis	  confronts	  dominant	  
contemporary	  opinions	  about	  how	  we	  know.	  	  His	  purpose	  is	  to	  expose	  the	  lust	  for	  
certitude	  as	  destructive,	  and	  yet	  affirm	  our	  legitimate	  longing	  for	  meaning	  and	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coherence.	  	  Rationalism,	  he	  argues,	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  satisfy	  our	  over-­‐desire	  for	  certain	  
knowledge,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  legitimate	  means	  of	  fulfilling	  our	  rightful	  longing	  for	  
significance	  and	  truth.	  	  Ultimately,	  rationalism	  is	  a	  cruelly	  self-­‐defeating	  pretension.	  	  It	  
denies	  the	  balance	  of	  imaginative	  and	  rational	  powers	  that	  enable	  us	  to	  comprehend	  
and	  communicate	  the	  significance	  of	  our	  experiences,	  from	  service,	  to	  worship,	  to	  
nuptial	  embrace,	  to	  learning,	  work,	  play,	  and	  more.63	  	  
Lewis	  affirms	  the	  legitimate	  longing	  for	  knowledge	  that	  might	  motivate	  people	  
to	  rationalism.	  	  Yet,	  he	  argues,	  the	  move	  to	  rationalism	  cannot	  deliver	  the	  certitude	  it	  
promises	  and,	  worse,	  actually	  hinders	  our	  access	  to	  the	  knowledge	  we	  can	  have.	  
One	  of	  Lewis’s	  most	  concise	  and	  clear	  attempts	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  
rationalism	  is	  his	  essay,	  “Meditation	  in	  a	  Toolshed.”	  	  To	  start,	  he	  makes	  a	  basic	  
distinction	  between	  knowledge	  by	  observation	  and	  knowledge	  by	  participation.	  	  Lewis	  
illustrates	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  by	  reflecting	  on	  his	  own	  experience	  of	  a	  
sunbeam.	  	  “I	  was	  standing	  today	  in	  the	  dark	  toolshed.	  	  The	  sun	  was	  shining	  outside	  and	  
through	  a	  crack	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  door	  there	  came	  a	  sunbeam.”64	  	  He	  describes	  two	  
distinct	  experiences	  of	  the	  beam,	  looking	  at	  and	  looking	  along.	  	  First,	  he	  looked	  at	  the	  
sunbeam.	  	  “From	  where	  I	  stood	  that	  beam	  of	  light,	  with	  the	  specks	  of	  dust	  floating	  in	  it,	  
was	  the	  most	  striking	  thing	  in	  the	  place.”65	  	  Then,	  he	  moved	  closer	  and	  looked	  along	  the	  
beam,	  through	  the	  crack	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  door,	  to	  the	  green	  leaves	  and,	  much	  further	  
above,	  up	  to	  the	  sun.	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Lewis	  makes	  his	  experience	  of	  the	  sunbeam	  a	  metaphor	  to	  describe	  two	  
different	  modes	  of	  knowledge.	  	  In	  many	  situations—for	  example,	  being	  in	  love,	  viewing	  
a	  work	  of	  art,	  washing	  clothes,	  or	  having	  a	  tooth	  pulled—one	  can	  observe	  from	  the	  
outside,	  or	  else	  know	  from	  the	  inside	  by	  performing	  these	  actions	  or	  participating	  in	  
these	  experiences	  oneself.	  	  Recognizing	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  knowing	  provokes	  us	  to	  ask,	  
“Which	  is	  the	  ‘true’	  or	  ‘valid’	  experience?	  	  Which	  tells	  you	  the	  most	  about	  the	  thing?”66	  
Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Lewis	  contends,	  people	  in	  the	  West	  
credit	  looking	  at	  over	  looking	  along.	  	  “It	  has	  even	  come	  to	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  
external	  account	  of	  a	  thing	  somehow	  refutes	  or	  ‘debunks’	  the	  account	  given	  from	  the	  
inside.”67	  	  He	  acknowledges	  that,	  in	  a	  way,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  privilege	  the	  external	  
account.	  	  Lewis	  asks	  us	  to	  consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  lover	  who	  finds	  his	  beloved	  to	  be	  
not	  quite	  what	  he	  first	  thought,	  or	  people	  who	  dance	  to	  bring	  rain,	  crops,	  and	  babies	  
but	  remain	  unaware	  that	  they	  are	  not	  the	  agents	  they	  think	  themselves.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  
conclude	  that	  the	  knowledge	  we	  gain	  by	  looking	  at,	  with	  reflective	  distance,	  is	  superior	  
to	  the	  knowledge	  we	  gain	  by	  participating	  in	  an	  event	  or	  exchange.	  	  Lewis	  asks,	  “Having	  
been	  so	  often	  deceived	  by	  looking	  along,	  are	  we	  not	  well	  advised	  to	  trust	  only	  to	  looking	  
at?	  —in	  fact	  to	  discount	  all	  these	  inside	  experiences?”68	  	  His	  answer:	  “Well,	  no.”	  
	   He	  asks	  us	  to	  think	  about	  why	  we	  are	  tempted	  to	  distrust	  the	  knowledge	  we	  gain	  
by	  looking	  along.	  	  We	  want	  to	  dismiss	  it,	  he	  affirms,	  because	  we	  aim	  to	  think	  more	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accurately.	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  things	  you	  can	  only	  truly	  know	  by	  experience.	  	  If	  
we	  discount	  all	  we	  learn	  by	  looking	  along,	  we	  cut	  off	  our	  access	  to	  these	  things.	  	  You	  
cannot	  think	  more	  accurately	  if	  you	  don’t	  have	  something	  to	  think	  about.	  	  Lewis	  writes,	  
It	  is	  perfectly	  easy	  to	  go	  on	  all	  your	  life	  giving	  explanations	  of	  religion,	  love,	  
morality,	  honor,	  and	  the	  like,	  without	  having	  been	  inside	  any	  of	  them.	  	  And	  if	  you	  
do	  that,	  you	  are	  simply	  playing	  with	  counters.	  	  You	  go	  on	  explaining	  a	  thing	  
without	  knowing	  what	  it	  is.	  	  That	  is	  why	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  contemporary	  thought	  is,	  
strictly	  speaking,	  thought	  about	  nothing—all	  the	  apparatus	  of	  thought	  busily	  
working	  in	  a	  vacuum.69	  
	  
In	  sum,	  rationalism	  condemns	  those	  it	  attracts	  to	  deal	  in	  counterfeit	  tokens,	  but	  assures	  
them	  that	  they	  deal	  in	  genuine	  currency.	  
Even	  more	  fundamentally,	  Lewis	  adds,	  there	  is	  ultimately	  no	  escape	  to	  some	  
sure	  footing	  outside	  of	  human	  experience—in	  every	  experience,	  you	  are	  either	  looking	  
along,	  or	  else	  looking	  at.	  	  “In	  other	  words,	  you	  can	  step	  outside	  one	  experience	  only	  by	  
stepping	  inside	  another.”70	  
Sound	  knowledge,	  Lewis	  concludes,	  is	  possible	  only	  if	  we,	  “on	  pain	  of	  idiocy,	  
deny	  from	  the	  very	  outset	  the	  idea	  that	  looking	  at	  is,	  by	  its	  own	  nature,	  intrinsically	  
truer	  or	  better	  than	  looking	  along.”71	  	  Instead,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  “One	  must	  both	  look	  
along	  and	  at	  everything.”	  	  While	  Lewis	  heartily	  affirms	  our	  desire	  for	  knowledge,	  he	  
reminds	  us	  that	  reason	  alone—looking	  at—is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  true	  understanding.	  	  The	  
knowledge	  we	  can	  have	  can	  only	  be	  won	  through	  the	  more	  difficult	  but	  more	  rewarding	  
task	  of	  constantly	  holding	  in	  tension	  our	  experiences	  of	  looking	  at	  and	  looking	  along.	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Importantly,	  Lewis	  gives	  us	  more	  than	  an	  account	  of	  rationalism’s	  failure.	  	  He	  
goes	  further	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  imagination.	  	  Imagination’s	  special	  function	  is	  a	  
memorable	  highlight	  of	  his	  essay,	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact.”	  	  Lewis	  opens	  with	  an	  example	  
that	  evokes	  the	  distinction	  between	  what	  is	  solely	  rational	  and	  what	  is	  meaningful.	  	  	  
“‘Would	  not	  conversation	  be	  much	  more	  rational	  than	  dancing?’	  said	  Jane	  Austen’s	  Miss	  
Bingley.	  	  ‘Much	  more	  rational,’	  replied	  Mr.	  Bingley,	  ‘but	  much	  less	  like	  a	  ball.’”72	  
Here,	  as	  in	  “Meditation	  in	  a	  Toolshed,”	  Lewis	  addresses	  the	  dilemma	  between	  
reflective	  distance	  and	  direct	  experience.	  	  Our	  dilemma	  arises,	  according	  to	  Lewis,	  
because	  we	  think	  abstractly,	  but	  the	  “only	  realities	  we	  experience	  are	  concrete—this	  
pain,	  this	  pleasure,	  this	  dog,	  this	  man.”73	  	  For	  us,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  knowing	  something	  
by	  reflection	  and	  knowing	  it	  by	  participation	  are	  distinct	  and	  exclusive	  moments.	  	  “You	  
cannot	  study	  Pleasure	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  nuptial	  embrace,	  nor	  repentance	  while	  
repenting,	  nor	  analyze	  the	  nature	  of	  humor	  while	  roaring	  with	  laughter.	  	  But	  when	  else	  
can	  you	  really	  know	  these	  things?”74	  	  We	  cannot	  have	  meaningful	  experiences	  of	  
reflection	  without	  experiences	  of	  participation.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  participation	  puts	  off	  
reflection,	  and	  reflection	  inhibits	  participation.	  	  Across	  most	  of	  our	  experience,	  the	  two	  
moments	  never	  quite	  coincide.	  	  Yet	  each	  moment	  calls	  for	  the	  other;	  each	  reveals	  its	  
meaning	  more	  fully	  through	  the	  other.	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   In	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact,”	  Lewis	  again	  exhorts	  us	  to	  not	  abandon	  imagination	  on	  
the	  illusion	  that	  we	  will	  gain	  more	  certain	  knowledge	  by	  trusting	  intellect	  alone.	  	  Here,	  
as	  in	  his	  later	  and	  more	  basic	  “Meditation,”	  he	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  meaningful	  
experience	  we	  long	  for	  remains	  possible	  only	  while	  we	  hold	  intellect	  and	  imagination	  in	  
balance.	  	  Yet,	  in	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact,”	  Lewis	  goes	  farther	  to	  consider	  a	  way	  to	  relieve	  the	  
tension	  between	  these	  complementary	  yet	  typically	  mutually	  exclusive	  modes	  of	  
knowing.	  
	   Our	  dilemma,	  at	  any	  moment,	  is	  between	  knowing	  universals	  through	  reflection,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  knowing	  particulars	  through	  direct	  participation,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
“Of	  this	  tragic	  dilemma,”	  he	  argues,	  “myth	  is	  the	  partial	  solution.”75	  	  Myth,	  as	  Lewis	  
explains,	  has	  the	  special	  capacity	  to	  make	  principles	  imaginable.	  	  That	  is,	  myths	  give	  us	  
participatory	  experience	  of	  universal	  principles.	  	  These	  universal	  principles	  are	  
otherwise	  available	  to	  us	  only	  through	  rational	  reflection.	  	  In	  receiving	  a	  myth,	  “You	  
were	  not	  knowing,	  but	  tasting;	  but	  what	  you	  tasted	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  universal	  
principle.”	  	  State	  the	  principle	  and	  you	  return	  immediately	  to	  the	  world	  of	  abstraction.	  	  
“It	  is	  only	  while	  receiving	  the	  myth	  as	  a	  story	  that	  you	  experience	  the	  principle	  
concretely.”76	  
	   The	  ability	  of	  myth	  to	  reintegrate	  discursive	  reason	  and	  participatory	  experience	  
rises	  from	  its	  special	  capacity	  to	  convey	  reality.	  	  Lewis	  describes	  myth’s	  function:	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What	  flows	  into	  you	  from	  the	  myth	  is	  not	  truth	  but	  reality	  (truth	  is	  always	  about	  
something,	  but	  reality	  is	  that	  about	  which	  truth	  is),	  and,	  therefore,	  every	  myth	  
becomes	  the	  father	  of	  innumerable	  truths	  on	  the	  abstract	  level.	  	  Myth	  is	  the	  
mountain	  whence	  all	  the	  different	  streams	  arise	  which	  become	  truths	  down	  here	  
in	  the	  valley;	  in	  hac	  valle	  abstractionis.77	  
	  
	   Myth’s	  integrative	  function	  transcends	  both	  discursive	  knowledge	  and	  direct	  
experience:	  “if	  you	  prefer,	  [myth]	  is	  the	  isthmus	  which	  connects	  the	  peninsular	  world	  of	  
thought	  with	  that	  vast	  continent	  we	  really	  belong	  to.	  	  It	  is	  not,	  like	  truth,	  abstract;	  nor	  is	  
it,	  like	  direct	  experience,	  bound	  to	  the	  particular.”78	  	  Myth	  carries	  us	  into	  a	  realm	  that	  
compels	  us	  not	  to	  deliberation	  on	  principles,	  but	  to	  wonder	  and	  reflection	  before	  
realities.	  
	   Myth	  conveys	  meaning.	  	  Two	  implications	  concern	  us.	  	  First,	  as	  noted	  above,	  
Lewis	  warns	  us	  against	  abandoning	  imagination	  on	  the	  pretense	  of	  securing	  certitude	  
because	  in	  doing	  so	  we	  deny	  ourselves	  access	  to	  the	  themes	  that	  make	  life	  worth	  
living—for	  example,	  beauty,	  joy,	  and	  wonder.	  	  Second,	  Lewis	  warns	  us	  against	  a	  second	  
and	  equally	  fatal	  error:	  confusing	  truths	  about	  the	  reality	  with	  the	  reality	  itself.	  	  It	  
matters	  that	  we	  speak	  rightly	  about	  reality.	  	  But	  the	  truths,	  as	  far	  as	  we	  can	  see	  them,	  
gain	  their	  significance	  from	  the	  reality.	  	  Reality,	  not	  our	  vision	  of	  it,	  is	  ultimate.	  
	   For	  all	  Lewis	  delivers	  in	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact,”	  he	  sees	  there	  is	  a	  further	  point	  to	  
be	  made.	  	  He	  begins	  his	  appeal	  in	  the	  essay	  by	  magnifying	  the	  distinction	  between	  
efficiency	  and	  meaning.	  	  His	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  that,	  often	  in	  human	  experience,	  the	  most	  
rational,	  efficient	  action	  contradicts	  the	  more	  reasonable,	  meaningful	  action.	  	  Yet	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





fails	  to	  fully	  develop	  this	  tension.	  	  He	  completes	  the	  task	  in	  a	  1948	  essay,	  “Priestesses	  in	  
the	  Church.”79	  	  Here,	  as	  in	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact,”	  he	  starts	  by	  evoking	  the	  difference	  
between	  rational	  efficiency	  and	  meaning,	  with	  assistance	  from	  Austen’s	  Bingley	  siblings.	  	  
This	  time,	  however,	  Lewis	  strengthens	  Mr.	  Bingley’s	  position.	  	  “He	  ought	  to	  have	  replied	  
with	  a	  distinguo.	  	  In	  one	  sense	  conversation	  is	  more	  rational	  for	  conversation	  may	  
exercise	  the	  reason	  alone,	  dancing	  does	  not.”80	  	  Miss	  Bingley	  prefers	  rational	  activity.	  	  
Her	  brother	  reminds	  us	  that	  reason	  alone	  is	  often	  inadequate	  to	  the	  occasion.	  	  Lewis,	  
for	  his	  part,	  insists	  that	  we	  avoid	  the	  error	  of	  identifying	  as	  irrational	  activities	  that	  
exercise	  faculties	  other	  than	  reason.	  	  “[T]here	  is,”	  he	  writes,	  “nothing	  irrational	  in	  
exercising	  other	  powers	  than	  our	  reason.”	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  he	  continues,	  “On	  certain	  
occasions	  and	  for	  certain	  purposes,	  the	  real	  irrationality	  is	  with	  those	  who	  will	  not	  do	  
so.”	  	  He	  gives	  examples:	  “The	  man	  who	  would	  break	  a	  horse	  or	  write	  a	  poem	  or	  beget	  a	  
child	  by	  pure	  syllogizing	  would	  be	  an	  irrational	  man;	  though	  at	  the	  same	  time	  syllogizing	  
is	  in	  itself	  a	  more	  rational	  activity	  than	  the	  activities	  demanded	  by	  these	  
achievements.”81	  
	   Lewis’s	  insight	  is	  that	  a	  balanced	  use	  of	  intellect	  and	  imagination	  helps	  us	  to	  
understand	  the	  world.	  	  Stephen	  Logan	  writes,	  “Just	  as	  Lewis	  knows	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  
reality	  than	  what	  our	  senses	  can	  get	  at,	  epistemologically	  he	  knows	  that	  there	  is	  more	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to	  the	  mind	  than	  ratiocination.”82	  	  Against	  a	  distorted	  and	  distorting	  view	  of	  reason,	  
Lewis	  contends,	  “It	  is	  rational	  not	  to	  reason,	  or	  not	  to	  limit	  oneself	  to	  reason,	  in	  the	  
wrong	  place;	  and	  the	  more	  rational	  a	  man	  is	  the	  better	  he	  knows	  this.”83	  	  The	  point,	  as	  
the	  more	  truly	  rational	  man	  knows,	  is	  not	  efficiency	  gained	  by	  reason	  alone.	  	  Rather,	  the	  
point	  is	  to	  receive,	  experience,	  and	  embody	  meaning	  through	  activities	  that	  require	  
powers	  in	  addition	  to,	  and	  other	  than,	  discursive	  reason—namely,	  through	  imagination.	  
As	  I	  conclude	  this	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  reemphasize	  the	  special	  function	  of	  story	  or	  
myth	  in	  Lewis’s	  estimation.	  	  “The	  story,”	  he	  writes,	  “does	  what	  no	  theorem	  can	  quite	  
do.”84	  	  It	  has	  the	  special	  capacity	  to	  convey	  human	  experience	  because,	  like	  our	  
experience,	  it	  transcends	  discursive	  thought.	  	  “For	  Lewis,”	  Alister	  McGrath	  writes,	  “a	  
myth	  is	  a	  story	  which	  evokes	  awe,	  enchantment,	  and	  inspiration,	  and	  which	  conveys	  or	  
embodies	  an	  imaginative	  expression	  of	  the	  deepest	  meanings	  in	  life—meanings	  that	  
prove	  totally	  elusive	  in	  the	  face	  of	  any	  attempt	  to	  express	  them	  abstractly	  or	  
conceptually.”85	  	  Lewis	  is	  attracted	  to	  “myths	  as	  a	  deeper	  mode	  of	  engagement	  with	  
fundamental	  human	  questions,	  yearnings,	  and	  imaginative	  questings.”86	  	  In	  his	  account,	  
myth	  is	  enduringly	  effective	  because	  it	  illuminates	  some	  permanent	  feature	  of	  the	  
human	  condition.	  	  “A	  great	  myth,”	  he	  writes,	  “is	  relevant	  as	  long	  as	  the	  predicament	  of	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humanity	  lasts;	  as	  long	  as	  humanity	  lasts.	  	  It	  will	  always	  work,	  on	  those	  who	  can	  receive	  
it,	  the	  same	  catharsis.”87	  
	  
DIMENSIONS	  OF	  POETIC	  EXPERIENCE	  
The	  insight	  that	  humans	  are	  poetical	  animals	  grounds	  and	  animates	  Lewis’s	  
scholarship	  and	  stories.	  	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  his	  reflections	  on	  a	  few	  distinct	  and	  interrelated	  
aspects	  of	  our	  nature	  as	  creative	  creatures.	  	  I	  address	  his	  comments	  under	  three	  
headings	  that	  name	  significant	  dimensions	  of	  our	  experience	  as	  poetical	  animals:	  
humans	  as	  story-­‐making,	  story-­‐formed,	  and	  meaning-­‐bearing	  creatures.	  	  Attention	  to	  
these	  dimensions	  of	  human	  experience	  informs	  my	  approach	  to	  persons,	  stories,	  and	  
politics	  throughout	  the	  present	  inquiry.	  
To	  start,	  we	  are	  story-­‐making	  creatures.	  	  Around	  the	  time	  of	  his	  deeply	  
influential	  conversations	  on	  imagination	  with	  C.	  S.	  Lewis,	  Tolkien	  writes,	  “The	  incarnate	  
mind,	  the	  tongue,	  and	  the	  tale	  are	  in	  our	  world	  coeval.”88	  	  He	  echoes	  Barfield	  when	  he	  
remarks	  that	  language	  is,	  precisely,	  a	  “fantastic	  device”—an	  instrument	  of	  
imagination.89	  	  As	  he	  puts	  it	  in	  Mythopoeia,	  “trees	  are	  not	  ‘trees,’	  until	  so	  named	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Lewis,	  “The	  Mythopoetic	  Gift	  of	  Rider	  Haggard,”	  On	  Stories,	  100.	  	  Compare	  Tolkien’s	  observation	  in	  “On	  
Fairy	  Stories,”	  that	  mythical	  stories	  talk	  about	  permanent	  and	  fundamental	  features	  of	  the	  human	  
condition.	  
	  
88	  Tolkien,	  “On	  Fairy	  Stories,”	  21-­‐22.	  
	  
89	  Ibid.,	  48.	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seen	  and	  never	  were	  so	  named,	  till	  those	  had	  been	  who	  speech’s	  involuted	  breath	  
unfurled.”90	  	  Lewis	  likewise	  asks,	  “[I]s	  not	  the	  sky	  itself	  a	  myth?”91	  
For	  Tolkien,	  our	  power	  to	  make	  stories—to	  use	  the	  fantastic	  device	  of	  language	  
to	  name	  the	  natural	  world	  or	  to	  weave	  complex	  myths—is	  an	  expression	  of	  our	  
character	  as	  subcreators.	  	  He	  portrays	  humans	  as	  subcreators	  in	  Mythopoeia:	  
The	  heart	  of	  Man	  is	  not	  compound	  of	  lies,	  
but	  draws	  some	  wisdom	  from	  the	  only	  Wise,	  
and	  still	  recalls	  him.	  	  Though	  now	  long	  estranged,	  
Man	  is	  not	  wholly	  lost	  nor	  wholly	  changed.	  
Dis-­‐graced	  he	  may	  be,	  yet	  is	  not	  dethroned,	  
and	  keeps	  the	  rags	  of	  lordship	  once	  he	  owned,	  
his	  world-­‐dominion	  by	  creative	  act:	  
not	  his	  to	  worship	  the	  great	  Artefact,	  
Man,	  Sub-­‐creator,	  the	  refracted	  light	  
through	  whom	  is	  splintered	  from	  a	  single	  White	  
to	  many	  hues,	  and	  endlessly	  combined	  
in	  living	  shapes	  that	  move	  from	  mind	  to	  mind.92	  
	  
Tolkien	  here	  describes	  us	  as	  dis-­‐graced	  subcreators:	  creatures	  who	  deny	  and	  abuse	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  tongue.	  	  Yet,	  he	  concludes,	  “The	  right	  has	  not	  decayed.	  	  We	  make	  still	  by	  
the	  law	  in	  which	  we’re	  made.”93	  	  As	  a	  scholar	  and	  poet,	  Lewis	  eventually	  accepts	  and	  
embodies	  Tolkien’s	  insight:	  “Abusus	  non	  tollit	  usum.	  	  Fantasy	  remains	  a	  human	  right:	  we	  
make	  in	  our	  measure	  and	  in	  our	  derivative	  mode,	  because	  we	  are	  made:	  and	  not	  only	  
made,	  but	  made	  in	  the	  image	  and	  likeness	  of	  a	  Maker.”94	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Tolkien,	  Mythopoeia,	  29-­‐31.	  
	  
91	  Lewis,	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact,”	  142.	  
	  
92	  Tolkien,	  Mythopoeia,	  53-­‐64.	  
	  
93	  Ibid.,	  69-­‐70.	  
	  
94	  Tolkien,	  “On	  Fairy	  Stories,”	  55.	  	  Abuse	  does	  not	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   Our	  character	  as	  story-­‐making	  creatures	  remains	  a	  source	  of	  beauty	  as	  well	  as	  
mystery.	  	  Lewis	  explains	  in	  a	  letter:	  
“Creation”	  as	  applied	  to	  human	  authorship	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  an	  entirely	  
misleading	  term.	  	  We	  re-­‐arrange	  elements	  He	  has	  provided.	  	  There	  is	  not	  a	  
vestige	  of	  real	  creativity	  de	  novo	  in	  us…And	  that	  surely	  is	  why	  our	  works	  (as	  you	  
said)	  never	  mean	  to	  others	  quite	  what	  we	  intended;	  because	  we	  are	  re-­‐
combining	  elements	  made	  by	  Him	  and	  already	  containing	  His	  meanings.	  	  
Because	  of	  those	  divine	  meanings	  in	  our	  materials	  it	  is	  impossible	  that	  we	  
[should]	  ever	  know	  the	  whole	  meanings	  of	  our	  own	  works,	  and	  the	  meaning	  we	  
never	  intended	  may	  be	  the	  best	  and	  truest	  one.	  	  Writing	  a	  book	  is	  much	  less	  like	  
creation	  than	  it	  is	  like	  planting	  a	  garden	  or	  begetting	  a	  child;	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  we	  
are	  only	  entering	  as	  one	  cause	  into	  a	  causal	  stream	  which	  works,	  so	  to	  speak,	  in	  
its	  own	  way.95	  
	  
We	  are	  not	  creators,	  but	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  making	  stories	  out	  of	  the	  materials	  with	  
which	  we	  are	  endowed.	  
	   We	  are	  also	  formed	  by	  stories.	  	  Stories	  have	  the	  power	  to	  expand	  our	  vision	  and	  
experience	  of	  the	  world	  and,	  in	  turn,	  to	  orient	  and	  strengthen	  us	  for	  action	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
For	  most	  of	  us,	  Lewis	  observes,	  the	  pressures	  of	  daily	  routine	  narrows	  our	  experience	  of	  
reality.	  	  Some	  severely	  narrow	  what	  they	  view	  as	  “real	  life.”	  	  Against	  this	  narrowing	  
perspective,	  Lewis	  suggests,	  “what	  they	  call	  ‘real	  life’”	  is	  “perhaps,	  the	  groove	  through	  
some	  far	  wider	  area	  of	  possible	  experience	  to	  which	  our	  senses	  and	  our	  biological,	  
social,	  or	  economic	  interests	  usually	  confine	  us.”96	  	  It	  is	  this	  very	  restriction	  of	  vision	  that	  
art	  helps	  us	  counteract.	  	  With	  the	  insight	  of	  a	  theorist	  and	  craftsman	  Lewis	  writes	  that	  it	  
is	  “one	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  art	  [to]	  present	  what	  the	  narrow	  and	  desperately	  practical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  Letter	  to	  Sister	  Penelope,	  C.S.M.V.,	  20	  February	  1943,	  Letters,	  203-­‐204.	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  C.S.	  Lewis,	  “On	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perspectives	  of	  real	  life	  exclude.”97	  	  Following	  Lewis,	  Anthony	  Esolen	  observes	  that	  
literary	  experience	  can	  relieve	  the	  blinding	  pressures	  of	  daily	  business	  and	  rationalism.	  	  
He	  writes,	  “A	  good	  book	  is	  a	  dangerous	  thing.	  	  It	  carries	  within	  it	  the	  possibility—and	  it	  
is	  only	  a	  possibility—of	  cracking	  open	  the	  shell	  of	  a	  routine	  that	  prevents	  us	  from	  seeing	  
the	  world.”98	  
In	  short,	  stories	  can	  expand	  our	  vision,	  can	  help	  us	  better	  see	  the	  world	  we	  
inhabit.	  	  What	  they	  give	  us	  is	  not	  so	  much	  an	  outlet	  for	  escaping	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
rediscovery.	  	  Sometimes	  a	  story	  takes	  us	  away	  from	  ordinary	  life	  and	  “paradoxically	  
enough,	  strengthens	  our	  relish	  for	  real	  life.”99	  	  The	  best	  stories	  take	  us	  away	  from	  our	  
ordinary	  world	  in	  order	  to	  give	  us	  eyes	  to	  see	  more	  clearly	  what	  it	  is	  and	  can	  be.	  	  “As	  for	  
escapism,	  what	  we	  chiefly	  escape	  is	  the	  illusions	  of	  our	  ordinary	  life.”100	  	  Quality	  stories	  
are	  not	  a	  retreat	  from	  reality,	  but	  a	  means	  of	  rediscovering	  it.	  	  They	  re-­‐enchant	  a	  
disenchanted	  world.	  	  In	  McGrath’s	  account,	  “Lewis	  came	  to	  see	  that	  myths	  possess	  an	  
innate	  capacity	  to	  expand	  the	  consciousness	  and	  imaginations	  of	  their	  readers.	  	  A	  myth	  
awakens	  imaginatively	  a	  longing	  for	  something	  that	  lies	  beyond	  the	  grasp	  of	  reason.”101	  
	   Importantly,	  stories	  have	  the	  capacity	  not	  only	  to	  re-­‐enchant	  the	  world,	  but	  also	  
to	  change	  us	  in	  a	  way	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  act	  in	  the	  world.	  	  “A	  myth	  points,	  for	  each	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  Lewis,	  “On	  Stories,”	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  Esolen,	  Ten	  Ways,	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  Lewis,	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  Lewis,	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reader,	  to	  the	  realm	  he	  lives	  in	  most.	  	  It	  is	  a	  master	  key;	  use	  it	  on	  what	  door	  you	  like.”102	  	  
Stories	  are	  not	  superfluous	  in	  the	  face	  of	  our	  real	  concerns,	  such	  as	  daily	  needs,	  careers,	  
and	  political	  events.	  	  In	  fact,	  Lewis	  contends	  that	  these	  exigencies	  only	  increase	  our	  
need	  for	  stories.	  	  He	  rebuts	  the	  suggestion	  that	  we	  need	  stories	  less	  as	  the	  burdens	  of	  
ordinary	  life	  increase.	  	  To	  those	  who	  think	  stories	  have	  no	  place	  in	  a	  sound	  
contemporary	  education,	  Lewis	  replies:	  “There	  is	  something	  ludicrous	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  so	  
educating	  a	  generation	  which	  is	  born	  to	  Ogpu	  and	  the	  atomic	  bomb.”103	  
Finally,	  we	  are	  meaning-­‐bearing	  creatures.	  	  We	  want	  to	  know	  that	  our	  lives	  
matter.	  	  We	  want	  to	  know	  that	  our	  days	  have	  purpose.	  	  We	  want	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  
work	  of	  our	  hands,	  and	  to	  know	  that	  what	  we	  do	  matters	  to	  others.	  	  Questions	  of	  
politics	  and	  ethics	  begin	  in	  questions	  of	  meaning.	  	  That	  is,	  what	  it	  means	  to	  live	  well	  
together	  depends	  on	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  human	  person	  and	  of	  political	  society.	  	  For	  
Lewis,	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  thinking	  about	  these	  questions	  is	  recognizing	  that	  
morality	  is	  not	  contingent,	  “but	  built	  into	  the	  structure	  of	  reality.”104	  	  Alister	  McGrath	  
similarly	  argues,	  “It	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  appreciated	  that	  Lewis	  supplements	  the	  
classic	  Stoic	  notion	  of	  logos	  spermatikos	  with	  that	  of	  mythos	  spermatikos	  –	  a	  narrative	  
embedded	  within	  the	  deeper	  structures	  of	  the	  created	  order,	  which	  enables,	  shapes,	  
and	  moulds	  the	  construction	  and	  narration	  of	  human	  stories.”105	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  Lewis,	  “Tolkien’s	  Lord	  of	  the	  Rings,”	  85.	  
	  
103	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  “On	  Three	  Ways	  of	  Writing	  for	  Children,”	  On	  Stories,	  39.	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  Cambridge	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  Lewis,	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And	  here	  we	  come	  full	  circle.	  	  McGrath	  makes	  the	  connection	  well:	  
	  
Lewis	  declares	  that	  human	  beings	  construct	  myths	  because	  they	  are	  meant	  to.	  	  
They	  have	  been	  created	  by	  God	  with	  an	  innate	  capacity	  to	  create	  myths	  as	  
echoes	  of	  a	  greater	  story	  or	  ‘story	  of	  a	  larger	  kind.’	  	  In	  that	  human	  beings	  bear	  
God’s	  image,	  human	  beings	  are	  endowed	  with	  the	  Creator’s	  capacity	  to	  create,	  
in	  a	  suitably	  accommodated	  and	  reduced	  manner.106	  
	  
In	  sum,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  our	  meaning	  to	  be	  story-­‐makers	  and	  story-­‐formed.107	  	  Ironically,	  as	  a	  
final	  point,	  one	  weighty	  consequence	  of	  denying	  our	  nature	  as	  story	  creatures	  is	  that	  we	  
fail	  to	  use	  reason	  well:	  we	  fail	  to	  critique	  the	  stories	  we	  actually	  live	  by	  and	  tell,	  and	  fail	  
to	  ask	  whether	  they	  are	  the	  most	  meaningful	  stories	  we	  can	  live	  by.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  the	  dilemma	  of	  intellect	  and	  imagination,	  rationalism	  cuts	  off	  access	  to	  the	  
most	  significant	  questions	  in	  politics—questions	  of	  meaning	  and	  ethics.	  	  In	  response,	  
through	  their	  stories,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  take	  up	  the	  task	  of	  recovering	  the	  
questions	  of	  meaning	  and	  ethics,	  which	  are	  indispensible	  for	  inquiries	  into	  key	  themes	  
of	  politics.	  	  These	  authors	  use	  and	  appeal	  to	  the	  very	  capacities	  of	  poetic	  imagination	  
their	  contemporaries	  deny:	  they	  write	  stories	  to	  deal	  with	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  the	  
human	  experience,	  including	  the	  moral	  dimensions	  of	  politics.	  
Stories	  matter,	  first,	  because	  they	  are	  a	  mode	  of	  uniting	  two	  ways	  of	  knowing—
that	  is,	  knowing	  by	  imagination	  and	  knowing	  by	  reason,	  which	  provide	  access	  to	  
meaning	  and	  truth,	  respectively.	  	  Further,	  and	  critically,	  stories	  matter	  because	  they	  are	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  Cf.	  Lewis,	  “Myth	  Became	  Fact,”	  142:	  “If	  God	  chooses	  to	  be	  mythopoeic	  –	  and	  is	  not	  the	  sky	  itself	  a	  
myth?	  –	  shall	  we	  refuse	  to	  be	  mythopathic?”	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a	  mode	  of	  expressing	  the	  knowledge	  gained	  through	  the	  joined	  working	  of	  imagination	  
and	  reason.	  	  Stories	  uniquely	  unite	  experience	  and	  reflection.	  	  They	  are	  therefore	  
especially	  suitable	  for	  adding	  to	  our	  experience	  and	  provoking	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  moral	  
questions	  we	  encounter.	  	  In	  short,	  as	  Anthony	  Esolen	  writes,	  you	  read	  good	  books,	  
“because	  they	  are	  companions	  who	  will	  tell	  you	  what	  they	  have	  seen	  of	  the	  truth,	  and	  
they	  tell	  you	  in	  a	  way	  you	  will	  not	  soon	  forget.”108	  
Yet,	  stories	  are	  limited.	  	  They	  communicate	  insights,	  but,	  in	  the	  main,	  they	  are	  
restricted	  to	  helping	  us	  see	  what	  their	  authors	  have	  seen.109	  	  Even	  so,	  because	  authors	  
deal	  with	  the	  strange	  material	  of	  reality,	  they	  can	  sometimes	  give	  us	  even	  more	  than	  
they	  themselves	  have	  seen.110	  	  	  Lewis,	  Huxley,	  and	  Orwell	  do	  this	  and	  they	  do	  it	  for	  a	  
decidedly	  political	  purpose,	  addressing	  questions	  and	  themes	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  oppression.	  
In	  his	  essay,	  “Totalitarianism	  and	  Literature,”	  Orwell	  defends	  literature	  as	  an	  
essential	  feature	  of	  human	  experience	  and	  warns	  that	  it	  is	  imperiled	  by	  the	  invasive	  
expansion	  of	  the	  state.111	  	  He	  writes,	  “I	  believe	  that	  literature	  of	  every	  kind,	  from	  the	  
epic	  poem	  to	  the	  critical	  essay	  is	  menaced	  by	  the	  attempt	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  to	  
control	  the	  emotional	  life	  of	  the	  individual.”112	  	  In	  the	  same	  essay	  Orwell	  says,	  “It	  is	  easy	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  Anthony	  Esolen,	  “Read	  Literature	  to	  Learn	  and	  Love	  the	  Truth,”	  Crisis	  Magazine,	  April	  9,	  2014.	  
	  
109	  My	  thanks	  to	  Dr.	  David	  Corey	  for	  drawing	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  point.	  
	  
110	  See	  Lewis,	  Letter	  to	  Sister	  Penelope,	  20	  February	  1943,	  Letters.	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to	  pay	  lip	  service	  to	  the	  orthodoxy	  of	  the	  moment,	  but	  writing	  of	  any	  consequence	  can	  
only	  be	  produced	  when	  a	  man	  feels	  the	  truth	  of	  what	  he	  is	  saying;	  without	  that	  the	  
creative	  impulse	  is	  lacking.”113	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  write	  because	  they	  feel	  the	  
truth	  of	  what	  they	  are	  saying.	  	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow,	  I	  turn	  to	  address	  
themes	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  as	  these	  authors	  present	  them	  to	  us.	  	  In	  the	  next	  
chapter,	  I	  address	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  word.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




INTEGRITY	  OF	  THE	  WORD	  
	  
“[W]ord	  and	  language	  form	  the	  medium	  that	  sustains	  the	  common	  existence	  of	  the	  
human	  spirit	  as	  such.”1	  
	  
-­‐	  Josef	  Pieper	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
My	  purpose	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  survey	  each	  narrative’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  word	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  I	  take	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  word	  as	  my	  
first	  essential	  theme	  because	  the	  word	  is	  the	  special	  human	  means	  of	  communicating	  
about	  reality—of	  describing	  things	  to	  ourselves	  and	  to	  others.	  	  A	  healthy	  use	  of	  the	  
word	  is	  therefore	  basic	  to	  becoming	  accountable	  actors;	  we	  cannot	  give	  account	  
without	  meaningful	  language.	  	  Integrity	  of	  language	  matters	  for	  the	  task	  of	  becoming	  a	  
responsible	  person	  because	  the	  word	  is	  a	  critical	  means	  of	  communication.	  
The	  corruption	  of	  language,	  however,	  has	  long	  concerned	  thoughtful	  men.	  	  As	  
Josef	  Pieper	  sums	  up	  Plato’s	  objection	  to	  the	  Sophists,	  for	  example:	  “corruption	  of	  the	  
word—you	  are	  corrupting	  the	  language!”2	  	  It	  is	  an	  enduring	  and	  present	  temptation	  in	  
the	  human	  experience.	  	  As	  Pieper	  writes,	  the	  corruption	  of	  language	  is	  a	  “timeless	  
temptation	  that	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  history	  has	  always	  required	  man’s	  resistance	  and	  
will	  require	  it	  forever.”3	  	  In	  thinking	  about	  personal	  responsibility	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
integrity	  and	  corruption	  of	  the	  word,	  I	  find	  helpful	  both	  Josef	  Pieper’s	  concise	  reflection	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Josef	  Pieper,	  Abuse	  of	  Language—Abuse	  of	  Power,	  15.	  
	  
2	  Ibid.,	  14.	  
	  
3	  Ibid.,	  8.	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“Abuse	  of	  Language,	  Abuse	  of	  Power,”	  and	  George	  Orwell’s	  shining	  essay	  “Politics	  and	  
the	  English	  Language.”	  
	  
RESPONSIBILITY	  AND	  THE	  INTEGRITY	  OF	  THE	  WORD	  
In	  “Politics	  and	  the	  English	  Language,”	  Orwell	  insists	  that	  language	  matters	  to	  
political	  regeneration	  because	  political	  regeneration	  starts	  with	  seeing,	  thinking,	  and	  
speaking	  clearly	  about	  people	  and	  politics.	  	  Accordingly,	  he	  says,	  the	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  
language	  are	  the	  concern	  of	  every	  person.	  	  In	  his	  words,	  “the	  fight	  against	  bad	  English	  is	  
not	  frivolous	  and	  is	  not	  the	  exclusive	  concern	  of	  professional	  writers.”4	  
Like	  Orwell,	  Josef	  Pieper	  argues	  that	  words	  and	  their	  use	  matter	  to	  everyone	  
because	  words	  are	  a	  special	  means	  of	  understanding	  and	  sharing	  in	  reality.	  	  He	  writes,	  
“Words	  and	  language,	  in	  essence,	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  specific	  or	  specialized	  area;	  they	  
are	  not	  a	  particular	  discipline	  or	  field.”5	  	  Pieper	  continues,	  and	  tells	  us	  something	  Orwell	  
does	  not,	  namely,	  why	  at	  the	  most	  basic	  level	  words	  matters.	  	  In	  his	  description,	  “word	  
and	  language	  form	  the	  medium	  that	  sustains	  the	  common	  existence	  of	  the	  human	  spirit	  
as	  such.”	  	  The	  consequence,	  in	  his	  account,	  is	  that,	  when	  men	  corrupt	  the	  word,	  they	  
affect	  and	  taint	  human	  existence	  itself.6	  
To	  think	  clearly	  about	  the	  corruption	  of	  language,	  we	  first	  have	  to	  think	  about	  
the	  integrity	  of	  language.	  	  Pieper	  describes	  two	  distinct	  and	  related	  aspects	  of	  language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  George	  Orwell,	  “Politics	  and	  the	  English	  Language,”	  Essays,	  955.	  
	  
5	  Pieper,	  Abuse	  of	  Language,	  15.	  
	  
6	  Ibid.,	  15.	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that,	  together,	  constitute	  its	  integrity.	  	  “First,”	  he	  writes,	  “words	  convey	  reality.	  	  We	  
speak	  in	  order	  to	  name	  and	  identify	  something	  that	  is	  real,	  to	  identify	  it	  for	  someone,	  of	  
course—and	  this	  points	  to	  the	  second	  aspect	  in	  question,	  the	  interpersonal	  character	  of	  
human	  speech.”7	  	  In	  short,	  the	  integrity	  of	  language	  consists	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  enable	  us	  
to	  express,	  or	  describe,	  and	  to	  share	  truth	  about	  the	  world.	  	  The	  word	  is	  special	  because	  
it	  is	  by	  the	  word,	  as	  Pieper	  writes,	  that	  we	  can	  “declare	  publicly	  what	  according	  to	  one’s	  
best	  knowledge	  and	  clear	  conscience	  is	  the	  truth	  about	  things.”8	  
	  
CORRUPTION	  OF	  THE	  WORD	  
When	  men	  corrupt	  the	  word,	  in	  turn,	  they	  abuse	  either	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  word	  
to	  convey	  reality,	  or	  the	  interpersonal	  character	  of	  language,	  or	  both.	  	  More	  bluntly,	  we	  
can	  either	  pervert	  language	  into	  an	  instrument	  for	  concealing	  instead	  of	  revealing	  
reality,	  or	  we	  can	  degrade	  language	  into	  an	  instrument	  of	  force,	  or	  both.	  	  The	  man	  who	  
distorts	  language	  to	  manipulate	  a	  person	  rather	  than	  to	  share	  truth	  about	  things	  with	  
him,	  degrades	  that	  person	  and	  himself.	  
Pieper	  highlights	  the	  clear	  yet	  subtle	  connection	  between	  disrespect	  for	  the	  
word	  and	  disrespect	  for	  people:	  
The	  degradation,	  too,	  of	  man	  through	  man,	  alarmingly	  evident	  in	  the	  acts	  of	  
physical	  violence	  committed	  by	  all	  tyrannies	  (concentration	  camps,	  torture),	  has	  
its	  beginning,	  certainly	  much	  less	  alarmingly,	  at	  that	  almost	  imperceptible	  
moment	  when	  the	  word	  loses	  its	  dignity.	  	  The	  dignity	  of	  the	  word,	  to	  be	  sure,	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consists	  in	  this:	  through	  the	  word	  is	  accomplished	  what	  no	  other	  means	  can	  
accomplish,	  namely,	  communication	  based	  on	  reality.9	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  if	  we	  care	  about	  justice	  for	  people	  and	  want	  to	  be	  responsible,	  we	  will	  
care	  about	  the	  integrity	  of	  language—about	  using	  words	  honestly	  and	  clearly.	  
It	  is	  sometimes	  easier	  to	  identify	  abuses	  of	  persons	  than	  to	  identify	  the	  abuses	  of	  
language	  that	  amount	  to	  abuses	  of	  persons.	  	  George	  Orwell	  sees	  this	  tendency.	  	  He	  
writes	  “Politics	  and	  the	  English	  Language”	  to	  help	  us	  see	  and	  act	  to	  correct	  the	  abuse	  of	  
language.	  	  To	  start,	  Orwell	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  integrity	  of	  language	  is	  our	  responsibility.	  	  
Persons	  are	  responsible	  to	  use	  language	  as	  clearly	  as	  possible,	  and	  constantly	  to	  guard	  
against	  abusing	  it.	  	  More	  specifically,	  every	  person	  is	  responsible	  for	  his	  use	  and	  abuse	  
of	  language.	  	  Orwell	  sees	  and	  agrees	  that	  we	  live	  in	  an	  age	  where	  our	  language,	  like	  our	  
culture,	  is	  decaying.	  	  “The	  point,”	  he	  alerts	  us,	  “is	  that	  the	  process	  is	  reversible.”10	  
Orwell’s	  particular	  concern,	  as	  one	  of	  my	  teachers	  in	  high	  school	  phrased	  it	  to	  
me,	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  sloppy	  thought	  and	  sloppy	  language.	  	  He	  writes,	  
A	  man	  may	  take	  to	  drink	  because	  he	  feels	  himself	  a	  failure,	  and	  then	  fail	  all	  the	  
more	  completely	  because	  he	  drinks.	  	  It	  is	  rather	  the	  same	  thing	  that	  is	  happening	  
to	  the	  English	  language.	  	  It	  becomes	  ugly	  and	  inaccurate	  because	  our	  thoughts	  
are	  foolish,	  but	  the	  slovenliness	  of	  our	  language	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  have	  
foolish	  thoughts.11	  
	  
In	  short,	  unclear	  thought	  corrupts	  language	  and	  unclear	  language	  corrupts	  thought.12	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What,	  one	  reasonably	  asks,	  does	  corruption	  of	  the	  word	  look	  like?	  	  In	  his	  essay,	  
Orwell	  gives	  practical	  examples,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  few	  questions	  and	  rules	  to	  sharpen	  one’s	  
thinking	  and	  writing.	  	  His	  specific	  guidelines	  for	  writing	  can	  challenge	  and	  mature	  
anyone	  who	  cares	  to	  improve	  as	  a	  thinker	  and	  communicator.	  	  My	  focus,	  however,	  is	  on	  
Orwell’s	  broader	  critique—his	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  corruption	  of	  language.	  	  He	  summarizes	  
the	  two	  points	  of	  his	  diagnosis:	  “modern	  writing	  at	  its	  worst	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  picking	  
out	  words	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  meaning	  and	  inventing	  images	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  
meaning	  clearer.”13	  
Regarding	  the	  first	  point,	  he	  argues	  that,	  because	  the	  point	  in	  using	  words	  is	  to	  
express	  a	  thought	  clearly,	  “What	  is	  needed	  above	  all	  is	  to	  let	  the	  meaning	  choose	  the	  
word,	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  about.”14	  
Second,	  what	  Orwell	  adds	  (a	  contribution	  my	  earlier	  rationalism	  blinded	  me	  to	  
when	  I	  first	  encountered	  this	  essay)	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  image.15	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  a	  metaphor,	  
he	  explains,	  is	  to	  call	  up	  an	  image	  in	  order	  to	  make	  one’s	  meaning	  clearer	  to	  others.	  	  
Worn	  out	  and	  inadequate	  images	  undermine	  this	  aim.	  	  If	  we	  want	  to	  communicate	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  illuminates	  and	  cements	  what	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  say,	  we	  will	  invent	  images	  that	  
make	  our	  meaning	  clearer.	  
In	  particular,	  Orwell	  calls	  out	  those	  who	  misuse	  and	  obscure	  the	  image,	  the	  most	  
powerful	  form	  of	  the	  word.	  	  Because	  the	  purpose	  of	  metaphor	  is	  to	  call	  up	  an	  image,	  he	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argues,	  a	  person	  who	  mixes	  incompatible	  metaphors	  does	  so	  because	  he	  is	  not	  seeing	  
and	  not	  thinking	  about	  what	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  say.	  	  A	  similar	  move	  is	  to	  use	  words	  to	  
prevent	  others	  from	  seeing	  and	  thinking	  about	  what	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  say.	  	  He	  writes,	  
“People	  are	  imprisoned	  for	  years	  without	  trial,	  or	  shot	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  neck…this	  is	  
called	  elimination	  of	  unreliable	  elements.	  	  Such	  phraseology	  is	  needed	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  
name	  things	  without	  calling	  up	  mental	  pictures	  of	  them.”16	  	  Orwell’s	  insight	  here	  aligns	  
with	  C.S.	  Lewis’s	  warning	  in	  his	  essay,	  “The	  Death	  of	  Words”:	  “And	  when,	  however	  
reverently,	  you	  have	  killed	  a	  word	  you	  have	  also,	  as	  far	  as	  in	  you	  lay,	  blotted	  from	  the	  
human	  mind	  the	  thing	  that	  word	  originally	  stood	  for.	  	  Men	  do	  not	  long	  continue	  to	  think	  
what	  they	  have	  forgotten	  how	  to	  say.”17	  
Throughout	  “Politics	  and	  the	  English	  Language,”	  Orwell’s	  purpose	  is	  to	  consider	  
“language	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  expressing	  and	  not	  for	  concealing	  or	  preventing	  
thought.”18	  	  He	  closes	  with	  a	  reminder	  that	  language	  matters	  supremely	  for	  politics.	  	  
Men	  corrupt	  language	  in	  order	  to	  “make	  lies	  sound	  truthful	  and	  murder	  acceptable	  and	  
to	  give	  an	  appearance	  of	  solidity	  to	  pure	  wind.”19	  	  At	  stake	  in	  our	  choice	  to	  use	  language	  
clearly	  or	  else	  abuse	  it,	  are	  life	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  share	  truth	  with	  one	  another—in	  other	  
words,	  our	  dignity	  as	  humans.	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Before	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  texts,	  I	  want	  to	  mention	  a	  further	  problem	  that	  both	  Josef	  
Pieper	  and	  George	  Orwell	  describe,	  a	  problem	  each	  of	  the	  stories	  highlights:	  the	  threat	  
of	  false	  reality.	  	  As	  Pieper	  notes,	  the	  danger	  of	  false	  reality	  is	  an	  old	  problem,	  and	  one	  to	  
which	  Plato	  is	  sensitive.20	  	  Pieper	  describes	  the	  threat	  of	  false	  reality:	  “the	  place	  of	  
authentic	  reality	  is	  taken	  over	  by	  a	  fictitious	  reality;	  my	  perception	  is	  indeed	  still	  
directed	  toward	  an	  object,	  but	  now	  it	  is	  a	  pseudoreality,	  deceptively	  appearing	  as	  being	  
real,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  almost	  impossible	  any	  more	  to	  discern	  the	  truth.”21	  	  
What	  Plato	  saw	  in	  his	  society,	  Pieper	  sees	  in	  ours.	  	  “For	  the	  general	  public,”	  he	  writes,	  
“is	  being	  reduced	  to	  a	  state	  where	  people	  not	  only	  are	  unable	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  
truth	  but	  also	  become	  unable	  even	  to	  search	  for	  the	  truth	  because	  they	  are	  satisfied	  
with	  deceptions	  and	  trickery	  that	  have	  determined	  their	  convictions,	  satisfied	  with	  a	  
fictitious	  reality	  created	  by	  design	  through	  the	  abuse	  of	  language.”22	  	  The	  danger	  is	  not	  
only	  that	  some	  men	  attempt	  to	  conceal	  the	  truth	  from	  others,	  but	  that	  those	  whose	  
access	  to	  truth	  is	  hindered	  accept	  the	  lies	  they	  are	  given,	  so	  that	  they	  never	  search	  for	  
more.	  
For	  Orwell,	  the	  specific	  feature	  of	  totalitarian	  state	  is	  the	  project	  of	  some	  men	  to	  
impose	  a	  false,	  changeable,	  and	  changing	  reality	  on	  others.	  	  He	  identifies	  a	  totalitarian	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society	  as	  one	  in	  which	  men	  hold	  power	  by	  force	  or	  fraud,	  and	  prohibit	  the	  truthful	  
recording	  of	  facts	  and	  emotional	  sincerity.23	  	  He	  writes,	  
The	  peculiarity	  of	  the	  totalitarian	  state	  is	  that	  though	  it	  controls	  thought,	  it	  
doesn’t	  fix	  it.	  	  It	  sets	  up	  unquestionable	  dogmas	  and	  alters	  them	  day	  by	  day.	  	  It	  
needs	  dogmas,	  because	  it	  needs	  absolute	  obedience	  from	  its	  subjects,	  but	  it	  
can’t	  avoid	  the	  changes,	  which	  are	  dictated	  by	  the	  needs	  of	  power	  politics.	  	  It	  
declares	  itself	  infallible,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  attacks	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  
objective	  truth.24	  
	  
He	  makes	  the	  critique	  again	  in	  a	  later	  essay:	  “What	  is	  new	  in	  totalitarianism	  is	  that	  its	  
doctrines	  are	  not	  only	  unchangeable	  but	  also	  unstable.	  	  They	  have	  to	  be	  accepted	  on	  
pain	  of	  damnation,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  they	  are	  always	  liable	  to	  be	  altered	  at	  a	  
moment’s	  notice.”25	  	  Orwell’s	  critique	  matters	  because,	  on	  his	  diagnosis,	  the	  primary	  
instrument	  of	  some	  men’s	  attempt	  to	  impose	  a	  false	  reality	  on	  others,	  as	  it	  actually	  
plays	  out	  in	  the	  worst	  of	  human	  political	  experience,	  is	  the	  abuse	  of	  language.	  
	  
INTEGRITY	  OF	  LANGUAGE	  IN	  THESE	  STORIES	  
My	  purpose	  in	  the	  introduction	  above	  has	  been	  to	  better	  explain	  in	  what	  sense	  I	  
use	  the	  phrase	  integrity	  of	  language,	  and	  to	  describe	  some	  of	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  
corruption	  of	  language	  and	  false	  reality.	  	  In	  the	  analysis	  of	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  that	  follows,	  I	  show	  how	  select	  characters	  
use	  and	  abuse	  language.	  	  All	  three	  works,	  but	  especially	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  and	  
Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  convey	  far	  more	  about	  the	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  language	  than	  I	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  George	  Orwell,	  “The	  Prevention	  of	  Literature,”	  Essays,	  939.	  
	  
24	  Orwell,	  “Literature	  and	  Totalitarianism,”	  363.	  
	  
25	  Ibid.,	  362	  
	  
	  87	  
discuss.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  look	  along	  with	  these	  authors	  at	  the	  place	  of	  
language	  in	  their	  characters’	  quest	  to	  become	  responsible	  persons	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  specific	  
characters	  and	  to	  closely	  read	  their	  stories.	  	  I	  therefore	  take	  a	  deliberately,	  but	  I	  think	  
not	  unduly,	  narrow	  approach	  to	  the	  texts.	  	  My	  purpose	  is	  primarily	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  
these	  stories	  help	  us	  think	  about	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  word.	  	  For	  each	  story,	  I	  highlight	  
one	  central	  theme	  I	  think	  the	  author	  explores	  with	  exceptional	  insight	  and	  ability.	  	  Thus,	  
in	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  I	  examine	  memory	  and	  language;	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  
literature	  and	  language;	  in	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  reality	  and	  language.	  	  For	  each	  
theme,	  I	  compare	  two	  or	  more	  characters	  as	  they	  deal	  with	  the	  word.	  
	  
MEMORY	  AND	  LANGUAGE	  IN	  NINETEEN	  EIGHTY-­‐FOUR	  
I	  first	  address	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.	  	  A	  notable	  strength	  in	  George	  Orwell’s	  
treatment	  of	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  word	  is	  his	  attention	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  
language	  and	  memory.	  	  I	  want	  to	  look	  along	  with	  Orwell	  by	  following	  his	  character	  
Winston	  Smith	  as	  Winston	  discovers	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  memory,	  
and	  its	  significance	  for	  his	  own	  efforts	  to	  act	  responsibly.	  
	   Winston	  Smith	  works	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Records,	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Truth.	  	  His	  daily	  assignment	  is	  to	  revise	  old	  newspapers	  to	  agree	  with	  whatever	  Party	  
leaders	  claim	  at	  the	  moment.	  	  At	  his	  desk,	  Winston	  is	  one	  of	  thousands	  of	  workers	  who	  
implement	  the	  Party’s	  program	  of	  “rectifying”	  the	  past.26	  	  “This	  process	  of	  continuous	  
alteration,”	  as	  Winston	  knows,	  is	  “applied	  not	  only	  to	  newspapers,	  but	  to	  books,	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  Eighty-­‐Four,	  41-­‐43.	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periodicals,	  pamphlets,	  posters,	  leaflets,	  films,	  sound-­‐tracks,	  cartoons,	  photographs—to	  
every	  kind	  of	  literature	  or	  documentation	  which	  might	  conceivably	  hold	  any	  political	  or	  
ideological	  significance.”27	  	  Winston	  is	  an	  agent	  of	  the	  Party,	  and	  a	  man	  who	  senses	  that	  
memory	  and	  history—that	  is,	  accounts	  of	  what	  men	  have	  done	  and	  loved,	  accounts	  of	  
how	  things	  have	  been—matter.	  
In	  a	  moment	  of	  clarity,	  Winston	  reflects	  that	  his	  work	  is	  further	  removed	  from	  
reality	  than	  forgery	  or	  falsification.	  	  “It	  was	  merely	  the	  substitution	  of	  one	  piece	  of	  
nonsense	  for	  another.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  material	  that	  you	  were	  dealing	  with	  had	  no	  
connection	  to	  anything	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  not	  even	  the	  kind	  of	  connection	  contained	  in	  a	  
direct	  lie.”28	  	  He	  knows	  the	  material	  he	  revises	  has	  been	  revised	  countless	  times	  before.	  	  
A	  change	  is	  not	  a	  change	  from	  fact	  to	  falsity,	  but	  from	  one	  falsity	  to	  another.	  	  Yet	  the	  
problem	  is	  more	  basic	  still.	  	  As	  Winston	  describes	  it,	  “Statistics	  were	  just	  as	  much	  a	  
fantasy	  in	  their	  original	  version	  as	  in	  their	  rectified	  version.”29	  
The	  relationship	  between	  memory	  and	  language	  becomes	  important	  to	  Winston	  
as	  the	  divide	  between	  his	  daily	  work	  and	  his	  desire	  to	  be	  a	  person	  threatens	  to	  destroy	  
him.	  	  The	  reason	  the	  divide	  threatens	  to	  destroy	  Winston	  is	  that	  his	  daily	  work	  denies	  
his	  conscience	  and	  agency.	  	  Critically,	  through	  the	  work	  it	  assigns,	  the	  Party	  rejects	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Ibid.,	  42.	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memory,	  and	  Winston’s	  memory	  in	  particular.	  	  A	  dialogue	  of	  fact,	  doubt,	  and	  sharp	  
critique	  of	  the	  Party,	  and	  consciously	  semi-­‐self-­‐aware	  mind	  games	  plays	  in	  Winston’s	  
mind:	  
The	  Party	  said	  that	  Oceania	  had	  never	  been	  in	  alliance	  with	  Eurasia.	  	  He,	  Winston	  
Smith,	  knew	  that	  Oceania	  had	  been	  in	  alliance	  with	  Eurasia	  as	  short	  a	  time	  as	  
four	  years	  ago.	  	  But	  where	  did	  that	  knowledge	  exist?	  	  Only	  in	  his	  own	  
consciousness,	  which	  in	  any	  case	  must	  soon	  by	  annihilated.	  	  And	  if	  all	  others	  
accepted	  the	  lie	  which	  the	  Party	  imposed—if	  all	  records	  told	  the	  same	  tale—
then	  the	  lie	  passed	  into	  history	  and	  became	  truth.	  	  “Who	  controls	  the	  past,”	  ran	  
the	  Party	  slogan,	  “controls	  the	  future:	  who	  controls	  the	  present	  controls	  the	  
past.”	  	  And	  yet	  the	  past,	  though	  of	  its	  nature	  alterable,	  never	  had	  been	  altered.	  	  
Whatever	  was	  true	  now	  was	  true	  from	  everlasting	  to	  everlasting.	  	  It	  was	  quite	  
simple.	  	  All	  that	  was	  needed	  was	  an	  unending	  series	  of	  victories	  over	  your	  own	  
memory.	  	  “Reality	  control,”	  they	  called	  it:	  in	  Newspeak,	  “doublethink.”30	  
	  
Winston	  becomes	  more	  concerned	  as	  he	  realizes	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  Party’s	  
power	  over	  the	  past	  and	  the	  citizens	  of	  Oceania	  through	  its	  manipulation	  of	  the	  word.	  	  
“The	  past,	  he	  reflected,	  had	  not	  merely	  been	  altered,	  it	  had	  been	  actually	  destroyed.”31	  	  
Winston	  muses	  that	  the	  Party’s	  power	  to	  destroy	  the	  past	  is	  more	  terrifying	  than	  torture	  
and	  death.	  	  “The	  frightening	  thing,”	  he	  thinks	  one	  morning	  during	  exercises,	  “was	  that	  it	  
might	  all	  be	  true.	  	  If	  the	  Party	  could	  thrust	  its	  hand	  into	  the	  past	  and	  say	  of	  this	  or	  that	  
event,	  it	  never	  happened—that,	  surely,	  was	  more	  terrifying	  than	  mere	  torture	  and	  
death.”32	  	  The	  reason	  for	  his	  fear,	  I	  think,	  is	  that	  he	  sees	  that	  the	  Party’s	  power	  over	  
history	  is	  more	  fundamentally	  dehumanizing	  than	  torture	  and	  death.	  	  In	  controlling	  
memory	  and	  language,	  the	  agents	  of	  the	  Party	  exert	  the	  power	  not	  merely	  to	  shape	  the	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events	  of	  one’s	  life,	  but,	  at	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  to	  determine	  the	  meaning	  and	  reality	  of	  
one’s	  life—that	  is,	  to	  say	  what	  one	  has	  done	  and	  loved,	  what	  it	  means,	  and	  finally,	  
whether	  one	  has	  lived	  at	  all.33	  
	   Importantly,	  Winston	  comes	  to	  these	  conclusions	  because	  he	  has	  sustained	  the	  
difficult	  and,	  in	  Oceania,	  self-­‐indicting	  work	  of	  thinking	  about	  and	  remembering	  and	  
questioning	  the	  significance	  of	  memory.	  	  He	  is	  an	  agent	  of	  the	  Party.	  	  He	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
persons	  who	  perform	  the	  task	  he	  finds	  more	  terrifying	  than	  torture	  and	  death.	  	  He	  
carries	  out	  orders	  to	  alter	  history,	  even	  to	  make	  other	  persons	  disappear.	  	  Caught	  in	  the	  
tension	  between	  his	  work	  as	  a	  manipulator	  of	  words,	  and	  a	  person	  who	  sees	  the	  
significance	  of	  human	  accounts,	  Winston	  decides	  to	  risk	  his	  life	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  sanity	  
he	  sometimes	  sees.	  	  “He	  had	  committed—would	  still	  have	  committed,	  even	  if	  he	  had	  
never	  set	  pen	  to	  paper—the	  essential	  crime	  that	  contained	  all	  others	  in	  itself.	  	  
Thoughtcrime,	  they	  called	  it.”34	  	  Because	  he	  knows	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  person’s	  story	  matters,	  
he	  risks	  his	  own	  story.	  	  The	  penalty	  for	  thoughtcrime	  is	  to	  become	  a	  person	  who	  has	  
never	  existed.	  	  Orwell	  writes,	  “Your	  name	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  registers,	  every	  record	  
of	  everything	  you	  had	  ever	  done	  was	  wiped	  out,	  your	  one-­‐time	  existence	  was	  denied	  
and	  then	  forgotten.	  	  You	  were	  abolished,	  annihilated:	  vaporized	  was	  the	  usual	  word.”35	  
Orwell	  starts	  his	  story	  on	  the	  day	  Winston	  starts	  to	  write	  in	  his	  journal.	  	  We	  
follow	  Winston	  as	  he	  discovers	  his	  initial	  motives	  and	  better	  understands	  his	  choice	  to	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  Ibid.,	  171-­‐172	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write.	  	  Most	  basically,	  Winston	  writes	  because	  he	  senses	  that	  words	  and	  a	  reliable	  
record	  of	  men’s	  experiences	  and	  actions	  are	  fundamental	  to	  truthful	  existence	  in	  the	  
world.	  	  His	  immediate	  incentive	  to	  open	  a	  diary	  is	  the	  sense,	  which	  he	  thinks	  might	  have	  
been	  confirmed	  in	  his	  interactions	  with	  two	  persons	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  Records	  
earlier	  in	  the	  day,	  that	  there	  might	  be	  others	  like	  him,	  others	  who	  see	  through	  the	  
Party’s	  lies.36	  	  He	  acts	  on	  this	  incentive	  once	  he	  has	  acquired	  a	  “peculiarly	  beautiful	  
book,”	  and	  discovered	  sufficient	  sanctuary	  in	  a	  corner	  of	  his	  flat,	  at	  a	  desk	  strangely	  
situated	  beyond	  visual	  range	  of	  the	  ever-­‐watching,	  ever-­‐listening	  telescreen.37	  
	   When	  he	  first	  takes	  pen	  to	  paper,	  Winston	  is	  nearly	  overwhelmed	  with	  a	  sense	  
of	  helpless	  disorientation	  and	  inadequacy.	  	  What	  year	  is	  it?	  	  Who	  is	  he	  writing	  for?	  	  How	  
can	  his	  pen	  channel	  the	  “interminable	  restless	  monologue	  that	  had	  been	  running	  inside	  
his	  head,	  literally	  for	  years”?38	  	  Winston	  knows	  his	  words	  will	  not	  crack	  the	  Party’s	  
suffocating	  orthodoxy.	  	  He	  writes	  for	  other	  reasons.	  
He	  writes,	  in	  part,	  to	  put	  down	  the	  swirling	  thoughts,	  the	  raging	  questions,	  to	  
quell	  fears	  of	  what	  he	  might	  do,	  to	  reckon	  with	  himself	  for	  what	  he	  has	  done	  and	  the	  
choices	  he	  is	  making.39	  	  He	  writes,	  in	  part,	  because	  he	  knows	  that	  not	  death	  but	  
annihilation	  awaits	  him.	  	  “The	  diary	  would	  be	  reduced	  to	  ashes	  and	  himself	  to	  vapor.”40	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The	  significance	  of	  this	  fact,	  I	  think,	  is	  that	  death	  is	  still	  part	  of	  a	  story;	  annihilation	  is	  a	  
story	  erased.	  	  Death	  happens	  to	  a	  person;	  annihilation	  makes	  one	  an	  unperson:	  it	  erases	  
one’s	  presence	  and	  actions	  from	  the	  stage	  of	  human	  history.	  	  As	  he	  realizes	  yet	  again	  
later,	  “Whatever	  happened	  you	  vanished,	  and	  neither	  you	  nor	  your	  actions	  were	  ever	  
heard	  from	  again.	  	  You	  were	  lifted	  clean	  out	  of	  the	  stream	  of	  history.”41	  	  Aware	  that	  the	  
past	  has	  been	  annihilated	  and	  that	  he	  will	  be	  annihilated,	  Winston	  writes	  to	  stay	  sane.	  	  
He	  soon	  realizes,	  “It	  was	  not	  by	  making	  yourself	  heard,	  but	  by	  staying	  sane	  that	  you	  
carried	  on	  the	  human	  heritage.”42	  	  He	  writes	  to	  situate	  himself	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  as	  best	  
he	  can	  see	  it,	  against	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  orthodoxy	  those	  in	  power	  impose.	  	  Accordingly,	  
his	  greeting	  runs:	  
“To	  the	  future	  or	  to	  the	  past,	  to	  a	  time	  when	  thought	  is	  free,	  
when	  men	  are	  different	  from	  one	  another	  and	  do	  not	  live	  alone—to	  a	  
time	  when	  truth	  exists	  and	  what	  is	  done	  cannot	  be	  undone:	  
“From	  the	  age	  of	  uniformity,	  from	  the	  age	  of	  solitude,	  from	  the	  
age	  of	  Big	  Brother,	  from	  the	  age	  of	  doublethink—greetings!”43	  
	  
Perhaps	  even	  more	  than	  he	  first	  intends	  or	  knows,	  Winston	  writes	  to	  remember.	  	  
The	  fragments	  he	  commits	  to	  paper	  join	  with	  fragments	  he	  remembers,	  piece	  by	  piece,	  
through	  waking	  thoughts	  as	  well	  as	  dreams.	  	  The	  more	  he	  remembers,	  the	  more	  he	  
knows	  about	  who	  he	  is,	  what	  he	  has	  done,	  what	  he	  desires	  to	  do	  and	  must	  do.	  	  Most	  
fundamentally,	  Winston	  writes	  to	  stay	  human.	  	  He	  cannot	  control	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  
in	  the	  present,	  nor	  can	  he	  make	  his	  words	  matter	  to	  people	  in	  the	  past	  or	  future.	  	  He	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can,	  however,	  do	  his	  best	  to	  stay	  human.	  	  As	  he	  is	  later	  able	  to	  articulate	  it,	  “the	  object	  
[is]	  not	  to	  stay	  alive	  but	  to	  stay	  human.”44	  
Winston	  writes	  as	  he	  thinks:	  in	  English	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  Party	  jargon.	  	  “In	  your	  
heart,”	  his	  colleague	  Syme	  observes,	  “you’d	  prefer	  to	  stick	  to	  Oldspeak,	  with	  all	  its	  
vagueness	  and	  its	  useless	  shades	  of	  meaning.	  	  You	  don’t	  grasp	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  
destruction	  of	  words.”45	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  destruction,	  Syme	  claims,	  is	  that	  it	  constricts	  
language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  enforces	  orthodoxy	  by	  taking	  away	  the	  words	  men	  need	  in	  order	  
to	  think.	  	  “Don’t	  you	  see	  that	  the	  whole	  aim	  of	  Newspeak	  is	  to	  narrow	  the	  range	  of	  
thought.	  	  In	  the	  end	  we	  shall	  make	  thoughtcrime	  literally	  impossible,	  because	  there	  will	  
be	  no	  words	  in	  which	  to	  express	  it.”46	  	  He	  concludes,	  “The	  Revolution	  will	  be	  complete	  
when	  the	  language	  is	  perfect.”47	  
In	  his	  thoughts	  and	  writing,	  against	  the	  mind-­‐shattering	  pressure	  of	  orthodoxy,	  
Winston	  strives	  to	  preserve	  meaningful	  speech.	  	  In	  the	  lunch	  hall	  one	  day,	  he	  watches	  a	  
man,	  the	  kind	  of	  character	  the	  Party	  consistently	  produces,	  spew	  thoughtless	  words.	  	  
“The	  stuff	  that	  was	  coming	  out	  of	  him	  consisted	  of	  words,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  speech	  in	  the	  
true	  sense:	  it	  was	  noise	  uttered	  in	  unconsciousness,	  like	  the	  quacking	  of	  a	  duck.”48	  	  With	  
great	  effort,	  Winston	  tries	  to	  cling	  to	  thoughtful	  words.	  	  Importantly,	  his	  journal	  is	  an	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essential	  link	  between	  his	  memories	  and	  unbidden	  unorthodox	  thoughts,	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  his	  actions,	  on	  the	  other.	  
	   Winston’s	  journal	  provides	  a	  connection	  to	  the	  past	  and	  captures	  the	  internal	  
dissonance	  Winston	  experiences.	  	  It	  is	  a	  foothold	  in	  a	  world	  apart	  from	  the	  Party’s	  
contrived	  world.	  	  Orwell	  tells	  us,	  by	  contrast,	  that	  citizens	  under	  thirty	  are	  sunk	  deep	  
into	  the	  world	  the	  Party	  has	  created.	  	  We	  learn	  that	  people	  over	  thirty	  fear	  their	  
children	  will	  turn	  them	  in	  to	  the	  Thought	  Police	  for	  unorthodoxy.	  	  In	  Orwell’s	  summary,	  
“It	  was	  almost	  normal	  for	  people	  over	  thirty	  to	  be	  frightened	  of	  their	  own	  children.”49	  
The	  Parsons	  children,	  in	  particular,	  embody	  the	  problem	  of	  false	  reality.	  	  They	  
have	  never	  known	  and	  do	  not	  desire	  to	  know	  anything	  but	  life	  as	  the	  Party	  says	  it	  is.	  	  We	  
meet	  the	  children	  early	  in	  Orwell’s	  story,	  and	  in	  two	  subsequent	  scenes.	  	  Orwell	  
introduces	  the	  Parsons	  children	  when	  Winston	  responds	  to	  Mrs.	  Parsons’	  request	  for	  
help	  with	  her	  broken	  sink.50	  	  Winston’s	  observations	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  the	  family’s	  
apartment	  confirm	  that	  the	  nine-­‐year-­‐old	  boy	  and	  seven-­‐year-­‐old	  girl	  are	  entirely	  
absorbed	  in	  the	  Party	  program.	  	  The	  soundtrack	  of	  their	  lives	  is	  the	  military	  music	  of	  the	  
telescreen.	  	  Their	  games	  are	  military	  games.	  	  Their	  primary	  allegiance	  is	  the	  children’s	  
league,	  the	  Spies.	  	  Their	  parents	  and	  peers	  praise	  them	  for	  their	  devotion	  to	  the	  Party.	  	  
As	  Winston	  leaves	  the	  boy	  pelts	  him	  in	  the	  neck	  with	  a	  catapult,	  and	  calls	  him	  a	  traitor.	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   Mr.	  Parsons	  reports	  to	  Winston	  and	  Syme	  that,	  on	  a	  recent	  fieldtrip,	  his	  daughter	  
had	  trailed	  a	  man	  and	  reported	  him	  as	  an	  enemy	  agent.51	  	  “Ah,	  well,”	  Parsons	  boasts,	  
“what	  I	  mean	  to	  say,	  shows	  the	  right	  spirit,	  doesn’t	  it?	  	  Mischievous	  little	  beggars	  they	  
are,	  both	  of	  them,	  but	  talk	  about	  keenness!	  	  All	  they	  think	  about	  is	  the	  Spies,	  and	  the	  
war,	  of	  course.”52	  	  Later,	  after	  he	  has	  been	  arrested	  and	  taken	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Love,	  
Winston	  meets	  Parsons	  in	  his	  prison	  cell.	  
“‘Who	  denounced	  you?’	  said	  Winston.	  
“‘It	  was	  my	  little	  daughter,’	  said	  Parsons	  with	  a	  sort	  of	  doleful	  pride.	  	  ‘She	  
listened	  at	  the	  keyhole.	  	  Heard	  what	  I	  was	  saying,	  and	  nipped	  off	  to	  the	  patrols	  
the	  very	  next	  day.	  	  Pretty	  smart	  for	  a	  nipper	  of	  seven,	  eh?	  	  I	  don’t	  bear	  her	  any	  
grudge	  for	  it.	  	  In	  fact	  I’m	  proud	  of	  her.	  	  It	  shows	  I	  brought	  her	  up	  in	  the	  right	  
spirit,	  anyway.”53	  
	  
The	  Parsons	  children,	  like	  their	  peers	  and	  their	  peers’	  parents,	  are	  cut	  off	  from	  
memory,	  from	  a	  world	  before	  or	  beyond	  the	  Party;	  they	  are	  trained	  to	  see	  all	  doubt	  
toward	  the	  Party	  as	  capital	  offense.	  	  As	  far	  as	  the	  Parsons	  kids	  know,	  reality	  is	  what	  the	  
Party	  says	  it	  is.	  	  They	  do	  not	  question.	  	  Should	  they	  find	  themselves	  with	  questions	  while	  
young	  or,	  like	  Winston,	  when	  they	  are	  grown,	  they	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  shielded	  by	  the	  
intellectual	  and	  visceral	  habits	  the	  Party	  has	  given	  them.	  
	   Those	  who,	  like	  Winston,	  become	  aware	  of	  a	  choice	  between	  the	  changeable	  
and	  changing	  history	  of	  the	  Party,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  history	  confirmed	  by	  
experience,	  memory,	  and	  written	  word,	  on	  the	  other,	  have	  a	  choice.	  	  Orwell	  makes	  it	  
clear	  that,	  somewhere	  along	  the	  way,	  his	  character	  O’Brien	  faced	  the	  same	  choice	  as	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Winston,	  and	  chose	  differently.	  	  O’Brien	  looms,	  a	  shadowy	  figure	  in	  Winston’s	  mind	  as	  
in	  Orwell’s	  pages.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  is	  O’Brien	  who	  personally	  and	  persistently	  assaults	  
Winston’s	  memory,	  sanity,	  and	  affections.	  
	   Memory	  and	  language	  matter,	  Winston	  is	  convinced,	  to	  the	  task	  of	  staying	  
human.	  	  While	  he	  tortures	  Winston,	  O’Brien	  burns	  a	  newspaper	  article	  that	  has	  been	  
crucial	  evidence	  to	  Winston	  that	  the	  Party	  is	  fabricating	  history.	  	  Still,	  Winston	  clings	  to	  
the	  evidence	  of	  memory.	  
“Ashes,”	  [O’Brien]	  said.	  	  “Not	  even	  identifiable	  ashes.	  	  Dust.	  	  It	  does	  not	  
exist.	  	  It	  never	  existed.”	  
	   “But	  it	  did	  exist!	  	  It	  does	  exist!	  	  It	  exists	  in	  memory.	  	  I	  remember	  it.	  	  You	  
remember	  it.”	  
	   “I	  do	  not	  remember	  it,”	  said	  O’Brien.	  
Winston’s	  heart	  sank.	  	  That	  was	  doublethink.	  	  He	  had	  a	  feeling	  of	  deadly	  
helplessness.54	  
	  
O’Brien	  batters	  Winston’s	  mind,	  mocks	  him,	  causes	  him	  to	  doubt	  the	  past,	  memory,	  and	  
the	  present.	  	  “You	  suffer	  from	  a	  defective	  memory,”	  he	  tells	  Winston.55	  	  In	  a	  moment	  of	  
strength,	  Winston	  protests:	  “‘But	  how	  can	  you	  stop	  people	  remembering	  things?’	  cried	  
Winston,	  again	  momentarily	  forgetting	  the	  dial.	  	  ‘It	  is	  involuntary.	  	  It	  is	  outside	  oneself.	  	  
How	  can	  you	  control	  memory?	  	  You	  have	  not	  controlled	  mine!’”56	  
In	  a	  display	  of	  his	  insatiable	  hunger	  for	  control,	  O’Brien	  shatters	  Winston	  in	  mind	  
and	  body.	  	  O’Brien	  holds	  up	  four	  fingers.	  	  “Do	  you	  see	  five	  fingers?”	  	  Winston	  did.	  
He	  saw	  five	  fingers	  and	  there	  was	  no	  deformity.	  	  Then	  everything	  was	  normal	  
again,	  and	  the	  old	  fear,	  the	  hatred	  and	  the	  bewilderment	  came	  crowding	  back	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again.	  	  But	  there	  had	  been	  a	  moment—he	  did	  not	  know	  how	  long,	  thirty	  
seconds,	  perhaps—of	  luminous	  certainty,	  when	  each	  new	  suggestion	  of	  
O’Brien’s	  had	  filled	  up	  a	  patch	  of	  emptiness	  and	  become	  absolute	  truth,	  and	  
when	  two	  and	  two	  could	  have	  been	  three	  as	  easily	  as	  five,	  if	  that	  were	  what	  was	  
needed.57	  
	  
After	  further	  conditioning,	  Winston	  is	  allowed	  a	  season	  of	  recovery.	  	  He	  writes	  again.	  	  
This	  time,	  he	  copies	  down	  Party	  slogans.58	  	  Before	  long,	  however,	  he	  falls	  into	  a	  reverie	  
and	  cries	  out	  for	  Julia.	  	  “Julia!	  	  Julia!	  	  Julia,	  my	  love!	  Julia!”59	  	  After	  Winston’s	  outburst,	  
O’Brien	  says	  to	  him,	  “You	  are	  improving.	  	  Intellectually	  there	  is	  very	  little	  wrong	  with	  
you.	  	  It	  is	  only	  emotionally	  that	  you	  have	  failed	  to	  make	  progress.”60	  	  He	  assigns	  Winston	  
to	  Room	  101.	  	  There	  he	  proceeds	  to	  shatter	  Winston’s	  heart	  by	  forcing	  Winston	  to	  
betray	  Julia.61	  
Winston	  is	  released	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Love.	  	  He	  does	  not	  write	  anymore.	  	  
Orwell	  shows	  us	  a	  beaten	  Winston	  sitting	  at	  the	  Chestnut	  Tree	  Café.	  	  “Uncalled,	  a	  
memory	  floated	  into	  his	  mind.”62	  	  He	  remembers	  a	  day	  when	  he	  played	  and	  laughed	  
happily	  with	  his	  mother	  and	  little	  sister.	  	  “He	  pushed	  the	  memory	  out	  of	  his	  mind.	  	  It	  
was	  a	  false	  memory.	  	  He	  was	  troubled	  by	  false	  memories	  occasionally.”63	  	  Even	  after	  the	  
worst	  of	  his	  physical	  and	  mental	  torture,	  Winston’s	  memory	  remains.	  	  Only	  now	  he	  has	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been	  beaten	  into	  denying	  it.	  	  Soon	  after,	  Orwell	  writes,	  Winston	  feels	  the	  “long-­‐hoped-­‐
for	  bullet	  [entering]	  his	  brain…He	  had	  won	  the	  victory	  over	  himself.	  	  He	  loved	  Big	  
Brother.”64	  	  He	  knew	  the	  Party	  would	  beat	  him.	  	  He	  knew	  the	  Party	  would	  destroy	  his	  
memory	  and	  words.	  	  Orwell	  makes	  us	  see	  Winston	  defeated,	  bludgeoned	  beyond	  
recognition.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  gives	  us	  another	  opportunity	  and	  reason	  not	  to	  become	  
O’Brien.	  
	  
LITERATURE	  AND	  LANGUAGE	  IN	  BRAVE	  NEW	  WORLD	  
Aldous	  Huxley	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  language	  throughout	  Brave	  New	  World,	  
particularly	  through	  his	  focus	  on	  literature.	  	  He	  shows	  that	  literature	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  
provide	  experiences	  and	  transmit	  traditions	  that	  threaten	  a	  society’s	  contrived	  morality.	  	  
We	  can	  better	  understand	  Huxley’s	  view	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  literature	  by	  examining	  
his	  portrayal	  of	  the	  hazard	  it	  presents	  to	  the	  World	  State	  and	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  for	  his	  
major	  characters.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  literature,	  persons,	  and	  their	  political	  
society	  features	  prominently	  in	  Brave	  New	  World.	  	  Early	  in	  the	  work,	  Huxley	  shows	  the	  
World	  State’s	  initiative	  in	  conditioning	  its	  citizens,	  in	  part,	  significantly,	  by	  controlling	  
their	  access	  to	  literature.	  	  Throughout,	  we	  watch	  as	  three	  important	  characters,	  Lenina	  
Crowne,	  Helmholtz	  Watson,	  and	  John	  the	  Savage,	  interact	  with	  literature	  and	  questions	  
of	  meaning.	  	  Finally,	  in	  the	  capstone	  conversations	  with	  World	  Controller	  Mustapha	  
Mond,	  we	  learn	  why	  conditioning	  and	  control	  regarding	  literature	  are	  priorities	  in	  the	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World	  State.	  	  In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  I	  sketch	  these	  three	  portrayals	  of	  the	  
significance	  of	  literature	  and	  language	  in	  turn.	  
Controllers	  in	  the	  World	  State	  aim	  to	  keep	  citizens	  safe	  from	  books.	  	  They	  ensure	  
that	  citizens’	  access	  to	  literature	  is	  circumscribed	  and	  censored.	  	  The	  novel	  opens	  with	  a	  
tour	  of	  the	  Central	  London	  Hatchery	  and	  Conditioning	  Centre,	  where	  new	  people	  are	  
bioengineered	  according	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  men	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  World	  State.	  	  As	  our	  
tour	  guide,	  Mr.	  Foster,	  proudly	  informs	  a	  group	  of	  students,	  the	  facility	  produces,	  “So	  
many	  individuals,	  of	  such	  and	  such	  quality,”	  to	  meet	  quotas	  set	  by	  the	  Predestinators.65	  	  
Huxley	  initiates	  us	  into	  the	  World	  State	  with	  a	  detailed	  tour	  of	  the	  biotech	  processes	  for	  
ectogenic	  reproduction	  and	  prenatal	  social	  conditioning.	  	  We	  follow	  the	  young	  students	  
as	  they	  take	  instruction	  from	  the	  Director	  of	  Hatcheries	  and	  Conditioning.	  	  Moving	  from	  
room	  to	  room,	  they	  observe	  workers	  as	  they	  fertilize	  and	  multiply	  embryos,	  and	  then	  
condition	  the	  embryos	  for	  caste,	  occupation,	  and	  climate.	  	  Bioengineering	  is	  key	  to	  
achieving	  the	  World	  State’s	  goals:	  Community,	  Identity,	  and	  Stability.	  
Bioengineering,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  most	  important	  element	  of	  conditioning.	  	  
Instead,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  intense	  social	  conditioning	  in	  the	  World	  State	  focuses	  on	  
books	  and	  botany—that	  is,	  on	  literature	  and	  natural	  beauty.	  	  The	  reason	  Huxley	  shows,	  I	  
think,	  is	  that	  attraction	  to	  books	  and	  flowers	  rises	  from	  an	  innate	  desire	  for	  meaning	  
and	  beauty.	  	  I	  follow	  Huxley’s	  focus	  on	  books,	  as	  I	  consider	  the	  broader	  topics	  of	  
language	  and	  literature.	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Early	  in	  the	  narrative,	  we	  learn	  the	  World	  State’s	  reasons	  for	  vigilant	  control	  of	  
literature:	  reading	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  the	  Community’s	  time	  and	  threatens	  to	  decondition	  
biologically-­‐,	  hypnopaedically-­‐,	  and	  socially-­‐instilled	  reflexes.66	  	  Official	  policy	  on	  books	  
includes	  a	  ban	  on	  unapproved	  literature,	  conditioning	  for	  certain	  infants,	  restrictions	  on	  
resources	  available	  to	  school	  children,	  and	  a	  firm	  but	  gentle	  pressure	  on	  citizens’	  daily	  
habits.	  	  Members	  of	  lower	  castes	  are	  conditioned	  for	  a	  total	  aversion	  to	  books,	  while	  
members	  of	  higher	  castes	  are	  allowed	  certain	  books,	  at	  limited	  times.	  
The	  Director	  guides	  his	  students	  to	  the	  Neo-­‐Pavlovian	  Conditioning	  Rooms	  in	  the	  
Infant	  Nurseries,	  where	  nurses	  subject	  lower-­‐caste	  infants	  to	  psychologically	  and	  
physically	  painful	  conditioning.	  	  The	  nurses	  set	  out	  bowls	  of	  roses	  and	  bright,	  inviting	  
nursery	  books,	  and	  then	  return	  with	  a	  group	  of	  Delta	  eight-­‐month-­‐olds.	  	  In	  the	  sun-­‐filled	  
room,	  the	  babies	  crawl	  toward	  the	  roses	  and	  books.	  	  As	  they	  reach	  for	  their	  colorful	  
pages	  and	  petals,	  the	  Director	  orders	  the	  Head	  Nurse	  to	  press	  a	  small	  lever.	  	  “There	  was	  
a	  violent	  explosion.	  	  Shriller	  and	  ever	  shriller,	  a	  siren	  shrieked.	  	  Alarms	  bells	  maddeningly	  
sounded.”67	  	  He	  makes	  a	  second	  command.	  	  Electric	  shocks	  liven	  the	  nursery	  floor.	  	  
After	  a	  few	  minutes,	  the	  Director	  ends	  the	  treatment.	  	  “The	  explosions	  ceased,	  the	  bells	  
stopped	  ringing,	  the	  shriek	  of	  the	  siren	  died	  down	  from	  tone	  to	  tone	  into	  silence.	  	  The	  
stiffly	  twitching	  bodies	  relaxed,	  and	  what	  had	  become	  the	  sob	  and	  yelp	  of	  infant	  
maniacs	  broadened	  out	  once	  more	  into	  a	  normal	  howl	  of	  ordinary	  terror.”68	  	  Painfully,	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the	  infants	  learn:	  “Books	  and	  loud	  noises,	  flowers	  and	  electric	  shocks—already	  in	  the	  
infant	  mind	  these	  couples	  were	  compromisingly	  linked;	  and	  after	  two	  hundred	  
repetitions	  of	  the	  same	  or	  a	  similar	  lesson	  would	  be	  wedded	  indissolubly.”69	  	  Pleased,	  
the	  Director	  declares,	  “They’ll	  be	  safe	  from	  books	  and	  botany	  all	  their	  lives.”70	  
For	  members	  of	  upper-­‐castes,	  school	  administrators	  ensure	  that	  students	  have	  
access	  only	  to	  reference	  books.	  	  “If	  our	  young	  people	  need	  distraction,	  they	  can	  get	  it	  at	  
the	  feelies.	  	  We	  don’t	  encourage	  them	  to	  indulge	  in	  any	  solitary	  amusements.”71	  
If	  the	  World	  State’s	  conditioning	  counters	  one’s	  inclination	  to	  enjoy	  literature	  
and	  nature,	  a	  web	  of	  explicit	  as	  well	  as	  almost	  imperceptible	  mandates	  help	  prevent	  
deconditioning.	  	  Should	  a	  shaft	  of	  interest	  pierce	  the	  lessons	  instilled	  by	  loud	  noises,	  
electric	  shocks,	  and	  socialization,	  a	  citizen	  would	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  secure	  texts,	  time,	  
and	  a	  place	  to	  read.	  	  State	  officials	  have	  banned	  certain	  works,	  including	  history,	  
theology,	  sacred	  texts,	  and	  poetry.72	  	  More	  generally,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  day	  in	  the	  
World	  State	  prevents	  anyone	  from	  being	  alone	  accidentally.73	  	  At	  least,	  the	  person	  who	  
attempts	  to	  gain	  solitude	  is	  likely	  to	  provoke	  warnings	  against	  unorthodoxy	  from	  others.	  	  
Between	  entertainment	  and	  Solidarity	  Services,	  compelled	  group-­‐time	  fills	  all	  out	  of	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work	  hours.	  	  In	  the	  World	  State,	  literacy	  within	  prescribed	  boundaries	  is	  strictly	  for	  
information,	  entertainment,	  and	  compliance.	  
Officials	  carefully	  keep	  people	  from	  unapproved	  literature.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note,	  however,	  that	  Huxley	  shows	  that	  the	  conditioners	  cannot	  wholly	  eradicate	  every	  
person’s	  love	  of	  literature	  and	  nature.	  	  The	  most	  they	  can	  do	  before	  birth	  is	  to	  severely	  
retard	  development.	  	  Yet	  Huxley	  implies	  that	  even	  persons	  whom	  conditioners	  order	  
retarded	  to	  the	  point	  of	  minimal	  capacity	  possess	  a	  love	  of	  beauty.	  	  He	  has	  us	  observe,	  
for	  example,	  the	  Epsilon-­‐Minus	  Semi-­‐Moron	  who	  runs	  the	  lift,	  as	  the	  moron	  glimpses	  a	  
glorious	  day.	  	  “‘Oh,	  roof!’	  he	  repeated	  in	  a	  voice	  of	  rapture.	  	  He	  was	  as	  though	  suddenly	  
and	  joyfully	  awakened	  from	  a	  dark	  annihilating	  stupor.	  	  ‘Roof!’”74	  	  In	  the	  end,	  despite	  all	  
official	  efforts	  toward	  prenatal	  and	  decanted	  members	  of	  the	  World	  State	  alike	  (that	  is,	  
toward	  persons	  yet	  to	  be	  and	  already	  born),	  solitude	  and	  significance	  inevitably	  tempt	  
individuals.	  
To	  better	  understand	  Huxley’s	  portrayal	  of	  the	  effects	  and	  limits	  of	  conditioning,	  
and	  the	  place	  of	  language	  and	  literature,	  we	  can	  contrast	  three	  of	  his	  characters.	  	  My	  
aim	  in	  comparing	  Lenina	  Crowne,	  Helmholtz	  Watson,	  and	  John	  the	  Savage,	  is	  to	  
highlight	  Huxley’s	  insights	  into	  the	  role	  of	  language	  and	  literature	  for	  different	  
characters	  as	  they	  think,	  love,	  and	  act	  in	  the	  brave	  new	  world.	  
Lenina	  Crowne	  practices	  orthodox	  consumption	  of	  information	  and	  sensational	  
entertainment.	  	  She	  consumes	  texts	  for	  information,	  and	  poetry	  and	  music	  for	  
sensation.	  	  She	  is	  suspicious	  of	  Bernard	  Marx’s	  penchant	  for	  solitude,	  and	  will	  have	  none	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of	  it	  herself.	  	  On	  a	  date	  with	  Bernard,	  Lenina	  is	  “appalled	  by	  the	  rushing	  emptiness	  of	  
the	  night”	  and	  tries	  to	  fend	  it	  off.	  	  “Let’s	  turn	  on	  the	  radio.	  	  Quick!”75	  	  When	  she’s	  happy,	  
or	  trying	  to	  seduce	  the	  Savage,	  Lenina	  wields	  the	  poetry	  of	  the	  feelies:	  
Hug	  me	  till	  you	  drug	  me,	  honey;	  
Kiss	  me	  till	  I’m	  in	  a	  coma:	  
Hug	  me,	  honey,	  snuggly	  bunny;	  
Love’s	  as	  good	  as	  soma.76	  
	  
Lenina	  believes	  time	  is	  for	  wasting,	  and	  soma	  for	  filling	  time.77	  	  When	  she’s	  down,	  she	  
follows	  hypnopaedic	  wisdom:	  “one	  cubic	  centimetre	  cures	  ten	  gloomy	  sentiments.”78	  
Perhaps	  the	  greatest	  consequence	  for	  Lenina	  is	  that	  the	  voice	  she	  has	  is	  not	  her	  
own.	  	  In	  all	  she	  says	  and	  does,	  she	  expresses	  the	  prejudices	  her	  nurses,	  teachers,	  and	  
peers	  have	  conditioned	  her	  to	  have,	  according	  to	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  State.	  	  Is	  her	  mind	  
merely	  “Suggestions	  from	  the	  State”?	  	  Is	  her	  mind,	  as	  the	  Director	  says,	  entirely	  the	  
product	  of	  sleep-­‐taught	  wisdom:	  “The	  mind	  that	  judges	  and	  desires	  and	  decides—made	  
up	  of	  these	  suggestions”?79	  
To	  be	  sure,	  Lenina	  has	  cause	  to	  question	  these	  Suggestions	  from	  the	  State.	  	  
Besides	  Bernard’s	  constant	  challenges	  to	  orthodoxy,	  she	  has	  her	  own	  childhood	  
experience	  of	  questioning	  awareness	  of	  sleep-­‐teaching	  and,	  a	  distinct	  experience,	  
memory	  of	  that	  initial	  doubt.	  	  Huxley	  writes,	  “Lenina	  remembered	  her	  first	  shock	  of	  fear	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and	  surprise;	  her	  speculations	  through	  half	  a	  wakeful	  hour;	  and	  then,	  under	  the	  
influence	  of	  those	  endless	  repetitions,	  the	  gradual	  soothing	  of	  her	  mind,	  the	  soothing,	  
the	  smoothing,	  the	  stealthy	  creeping	  of	  sleep.”80	  	  Against	  these	  doubts,	  as	  Huxley	  
describes	  it,	  Lenina	  strives	  “to	  preserve	  her	  incomprehension	  intact.”81	  	  To	  the	  best	  of	  
the	  conditioners’	  ability,	  then,	  and	  to	  the	  best	  of	  her	  own	  ability,	  Lenina’s	  mind	  is	  
“Suggestions	  from	  the	  State.”	  	  And	  still,	  despite	  her	  conditioning,	  Lenina	  has	  unorthodox	  
attachments	  and	  longings.82	  	  She	  is	  attached	  first	  to	  Foster,	  and	  then,	  apparently	  
unshakably,	  to	  John.	  	  Her	  desire	  for	  the	  Savage,	  moreover,	  is	  intensified	  by	  John’s	  own	  
literature-­‐sustained	  self-­‐restraint,	  which	  I	  describe	  below.	  
Helmholtz	  Watson	  conducts	  a	  frustrated	  quest	  for	  meaning.	  	  He	  and	  John	  the	  
Savage	  have	  similar	  questions	  about	  meaning,	  but	  contrasting	  experiences	  with	  
language	  and	  poetry.	  	  Their	  stories	  yield	  connected	  and	  distinct	  insights.	  
	   Handsome	  and	  intellectually	  able,	  Watson	  is	  Bernard	  Marx’s	  friend,	  and	  a	  
professor	  at	  the	  College	  of	  Emotional	  Engineering.	  	  Like	  Bernard,	  he	  is	  different.	  	  “That	  
which	  had	  made	  Helmholtz	  so	  uncomfortably	  aware	  of	  being	  himself	  and	  all	  alone	  was	  
too	  much	  ability.	  	  What	  the	  two	  men	  shared	  was	  the	  knowledge	  that	  they	  were	  
individuals.”83	  	  Unlike	  Bernard,	  however,	  Helmholtz	  is	  disturbed	  by	  a	  peculiar	  hunger.	  	  
He	  is	  discontent.	  	  “Really,	  and	  at	  the	  bottom,”	  in	  Huxley’s	  description,	  “he	  was	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interested	  in	  something	  else.	  	  But	  in	  what?	  	  In	  what?”84	  	  By	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  World	  
State,	  Helmholtz’s	  dissatisfaction	  is	  inexplicable.	  	  He	  is	  smart,	  handsome,	  confident,	  a	  
capable	  teacher;	  women	  want	  him;	  and	  he	  is	  remarkably	  good	  at	  his	  work	  as	  an	  
emotional	  engineer.	  	  For	  all	  that,	  he	  harbors	  a	  deep	  frustration	  he	  can	  barely	  articulate.	  	  
“I’m	  thinking,”	  he	  says	  to	  Bernard,	  “of	  a	  queer	  feeling	  I	  sometimes	  get,	  a	  feeling	  that	  I’ve	  
got	  something	  important	  to	  say	  and	  the	  power	  to	  say	  it—only	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  it	  is,	  
and	  I	  can’t	  make	  any	  use	  of	  the	  power.”85	  	  The	  trouble,	  as	  far	  as	  he	  can	  say,	  is	  that	  his	  
writing	  is	  not	  satisfying.	  	  “If	  there	  was	  some	  different	  way	  of	  writing…Or	  else	  something	  
to	  write	  about…”	  	  After	  a	  moment	  of	  reflection,	  he	  summarizes	  his	  dissatisfaction	  for	  
Bernard.	  	  “It’s	  not	  enough	  for	  the	  phrases	  to	  be	  good;	  what	  you	  make	  with	  them	  ought	  
to	  be	  good	  too.”86	  
Helmholtz	  Watson	  longs	  for	  purpose.	  	  More	  than	  the	  technical	  excellence	  he	  
already	  possesses,	  he	  wants	  meaningful	  words	  formed	  by	  significant	  experiences.	  	  
Helmholtz	  knows	  the	  potential	  of	  language.	  	  “Words,”	  as	  he	  says,	  “can	  be	  like	  X-­‐rays,	  if	  
you	  use	  them	  properly—they’ll	  go	  through	  anything.	  	  You	  read	  and	  you’re	  pierced.”87	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  knows	  that	  descriptions	  of	  empty	  experiences	  fall	  short	  of	  the	  
meaningful	  communication	  he	  desires.	  	  Exasperated,	  he	  presses,	  “But	  what	  on	  earth’s	  
the	  good	  of	  being	  pierced	  by	  an	  article	  about	  a	  Community	  Sing,	  or	  the	  latest	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improvement	  in	  scent	  organs?”88	  	  Finally,	  he	  comes	  to	  the	  crucial	  question	  that	  burdens	  
him	  as	  he	  tries	  to	  fulfill	  the	  duties	  of	  an	  emotional	  engineer:	  “Can	  you	  say	  something	  
about	  nothing?”89	  	  Helmholtz	  wants	  purpose	  and	  power	  for	  his	  words	  and	  work.	  
Experience	  teaches	  Helmholtz	  that	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  meaningful	  writing	  is	  
meaningful	  experience.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  his	  experiment	  in	  solitude	  that	  enables	  him	  to	  
feel	  the	  full	  weight	  of	  his	  own	  discontent.90	  	  A	  two-­‐week	  withdrawal	  from	  his	  normal	  
routine	  of	  faculty	  meetings	  and	  women	  produces	  effects	  he	  can	  initially	  identify	  only	  as	  
“odd…very	  odd.”91	  	  Solitude	  unsettles	  him.	  	  Before	  long,	  he	  attempts	  to	  give	  words	  to	  
his	  experience.	  	  On	  his	  own	  time,	  he	  authors	  a	  few	  rhymes	  on	  the	  theme.	  
Events	  turn	  for	  Helmholtz	  when	  he	  decides	  to	  share	  his	  work	  with	  students	  in	  his	  
course	  of	  Advanced	  Emotional	  Engineering	  for	  Third	  Year	  Students.	  	  He	  uses	  the	  rhymes	  
to	  illustrate	  a	  point	  in	  class	  and	  to	  see	  whether	  he	  can	  provoke	  in	  his	  students	  similar	  
feelings	  of	  being	  alone.92	  	  His	  unorthodox	  move	  provokes	  unsurprising	  results,	  and	  he	  
finds	  himself	  in	  conflict	  with	  his	  Principal.	  	  In	  the	  process,	  however,	  he	  realizes	  an	  
unanticipated	  reward.	  	  “I	  feel,”	  he	  later	  confides	  in	  Bernard,	  “as	  though	  I	  were	  just	  
beginning	  to	  have	  something	  to	  write	  about.”93	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Eventually,	  Helmholtz	  shares	  his	  rhymes	  with	  John.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  Savage	  
treats	  Helmholtz	  to	  a	  few	  verses	  by	  Shakespeare	  on	  solitude.	  The	  poet’s	  words	  pierce	  
Helmholtz.	  	  He	  responds	  strongly	  to	  the	  words	  as	  they	  express	  and	  affirm	  his	  own	  
experience.94	  
Helmholtz’s	  experiment	  in	  solitude	  enables	  him	  to	  see	  with	  unexpected	  clarity	  
his	  dissatisfaction.	  	  Yet	  he	  remains	  blind.	  	  He	  asks	  time	  and	  again	  what	  might	  be	  worth	  
writing	  about,	  but	  cannot	  see	  a	  satisfactory	  answer.	  	  This	  thoroughly	  conditioned	  
emotional	  engineer	  is	  stuck	  looking	  at	  things	  from	  the	  outside.	  	  Helmholtz’s	  experience	  
of	  what	  is	  significant	  in	  Shakespeare,	  which	  provokes	  in	  him	  a	  strong	  emotional	  
response,	  does	  not	  match	  his	  description	  of	  what	  is	  significant	  in	  Shakespeare.	  	  He	  
admires	  Shakespeare	  for	  excellence	  in	  engineering	  emotion,	  which	  echoes	  his	  
description	  of	  his	  own	  highest	  aspirations.95	  	  In	  short,	  Helmholtz	  quests	  for	  meaning	  but	  
confuses	  the	  task	  of	  engineering	  certain	  emotions,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  with	  the	  task	  of	  
giving	  adequate	  words	  to	  human	  experiences,	  on	  the	  other.	  
Helmholtz’s	  confusion	  is	  evident:	  he	  gets	  the	  question	  wrong.	  	  “Why	  was	  that	  old	  
fellow	  such	  a	  marvellous	  propaganda	  technician?	  	  Because	  he	  had	  so	  many	  insane,	  
excruciating	  things	  to	  get	  excited	  about.	  	  You’ve	  got	  to	  be	  hurt	  and	  upset;	  otherwise	  you	  
can’t	  think	  of	  the	  really	  good,	  penetrating,	  X-­‐rayish	  phrases.”96	  	  Helmholtz	  looks	  for	  
meaningful	  experiences,	  but	  cannot	  see—precisely,	  fails	  to	  see—the	  one	  example	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available	  to	  him	  in	  the	  Savage’s	  passion.97	  	  He	  is	  left	  frustrated.	  	  As	  he	  later	  says	  to	  John	  
and	  Mustapha	  Mond,	  “[I]t	  is	  idiotic.	  	  Writing	  when	  there’s	  nothing	  to	  say.”98	  
When	  he	  earns	  exile	  to	  an	  island	  for	  individuals,	  Helmholtz	  knows	  enough	  to	  
choose	  a	  tempestuous	  isle	  for	  himself.	  	  Still,	  he	  cannot	  fathom	  the	  reality	  that	  significant	  
experiences	  come	  in	  relationship	  with	  others	  and	  in	  response	  to	  experiences	  not	  wholly	  
ours	  to	  control.	  	  His	  instilled	  prejudices	  and	  practices	  blind	  him	  to	  the	  experiences	  most	  
worth	  living	  and	  writing	  about.	  	  He	  misses	  important	  insights	  because	  he	  conceives	  
potentially	  meaningful	  experience	  entirely	  in	  terms	  of	  solitary	  experience.	  	  Worse,	  he	  
conceives	  his	  goal	  as	  excellence	  in	  engineering	  emotional	  responses.	  	  Helmholtz	  misses	  
the	  point	  of	  piercing	  language.	  	  He	  knows	  there	  must	  be	  a	  purpose,	  some	  right	  use	  of	  
language.	  	  But	  he	  never	  sees	  beyond	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  Emotional	  Engineer.	  	  He	  wants	  to	  
be	  a	  good	  Emotional	  Engineer	  more	  than	  he	  wants	  to	  live	  a	  life	  worth	  writing	  about.	  
Huxley	  demonstrates	  the	  power	  of	  poetry	  in	  the	  Savage’s	  story.	  	  His	  use	  of	  
Shakespeare’s	  poetry	  in	  the	  Savage’s	  story	  is	  more	  than	  a	  stylistic	  motif.	  	  Rather,	  he	  
shows	  through	  John’s	  experience	  and	  interaction	  with	  Shakespeare	  that	  literature	  has	  
the	  capacity	  to	  motivate	  and	  constrain	  John’s	  thoughts,	  affections,	  and	  actions.	  	  In	  
contrast	  to	  Helmholtz	  and	  other	  citizens	  of	  the	  World	  State,	  the	  Savage	  suffers	  a	  range	  
of	  meaningful	  experiences.	  	  For	  John,	  born	  outside	  the	  stable	  world,	  life	  is	  full	  of	  
experiences	  of	  passion,	  affection,	  abuse,	  anger,	  awe,	  humiliation,	  longing,	  disgust,	  
helplessness,	  penitence,	  and	  anticipation—in	  short,	  something	  to	  write	  about.	  	  We	  learn	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about	  many	  of	  these	  experiences	  when	  he	  recollects	  them	  at	  Bernard’s	  request.	  	  For	  
conditioned	  citizens	  of	  the	  World	  State,	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  write	  about	  because	  the	  
state	  protects	  members	  of	  the	  brave	  new	  world,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  from	  experiences	  like	  
the	  Savage’s.	  
John	  finds	  in	  literature	  words	  that	  affirm,	  expand,	  and	  illuminate	  his	  experiences.	  	  
The	  poetry	  becomes	  a	  source	  of	  significance	  that	  John	  continually	  revisits,	  and	  which	  
returns	  to	  him.	  	  John	  remembers	  and	  reflects	  on	  Shakespeare’s	  words	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
shapes	  him	  as	  he	  journeys	  and	  matures.	  	  Huxley	  describes	  the	  poetry	  as	  words	  that	  sing	  
and	  thunder,	  and,	  by	  turns,	  visit	  and	  invite	  John.99	  	  Shakespeare’s	  lines	  sometimes	  
motivate	  and	  sometimes	  console	  him.	  	  Throughout,	  Huxley	  shows	  that	  the	  poetry	  has	  a	  
decisive	  role	  in	  John’s	  journey.	  	  Here	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  survey	  key	  moments	  where	  Savage	  
interacts	  with	  the	  poetry.	  	  My	  point	  is	  not	  to	  catalog	  Huxley’s	  use	  of	  Shakespeare	  in	  
Brave	  New	  World.	  	  Rather,	  I	  want	  to	  highlight	  the	  active	  role	  the	  poetry	  plays	  in	  forming	  
John’s	  character	  and	  his	  experience	  of	  the	  world.	  
After	  John’s	  mother	  Linda	  teaches	  John	  basic	  words,	  she	  gives	  him	  her	  old	  
manual	  on	  The	  Chemical	  and	  Bacteriological	  Conditioning	  of	  the	  Embryo.	  Practical	  
Instructions	  for	  Beta	  Embryo-­‐Store	  Workers.	  	  He	  becomes	  competent	  at	  deciphering	  the	  
words,	  but	  wants	  to	  know	  what	  they	  mean;	  Linda	  has	  no	  satisfying	  response.100	  	  When	  
John	  is	  about	  twelve,	  his	  mother	  presents	  him	  with	  a	  copy	  of	  The	  Complete	  Works	  of	  
William	  Shakespeare.	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Huxley’s	  depiction	  of	  John’s	  introduction	  to	  Shakespeare	  is	  significant.	  	  In	  this	  
episode,	  we	  watch	  John	  discover	  that	  the	  words	  are	  meaningful	  for	  him.	  	  They	  speak	  to	  
his	  present	  situation	  and,	  importantly,	  give	  him	  vision	  and	  compel	  him	  to	  act.	  
When	  he	  first	  meets	  Shakespeare’s	  works,	  John	  turns	  to	  a	  passage	  opaque	  to	  
him	  yet	  evocative	  of	  the	  lewd	  relationship	  between	  Linda	  and	  Popé.	  	  As	  he	  reads,	  the	  
words	  work	  on	  him.	  	  “The	  strange	  words	  rolled	  through	  his	  mind;	  rumbled,	  like	  the	  
drums	  at	  the	  summer	  dances,	  if	  the	  drums	  could	  have	  spoken;	  like	  the	  men	  singing	  the	  
Corn	  Song,	  beautiful,	  beautiful,	  so	  that	  you	  cried.”101	  	  The	  passage	  affects	  him	  like	  his	  
elderly	  Indian	  mentor’s	  magic,	  but	  he	  finds	  it	  “better	  than	  Mitsima’s	  magic,	  because	  it	  
meant	  more,	  because	  it	  talked	  to	  him;	  talked	  wonderfully	  and	  only	  half-­‐understandably,	  
a	  terrible,	  beautiful	  magic,”	  about	  Linda’s	  affair	  with	  Popé.102	  	  In	  Shakespeare,	  John	  
discovers	  words	  more	  adequate	  to	  his	  world	  than	  any	  he	  has	  known.	  	  Though	  the	  full	  
meaning	  of	  the	  poetry	  eludes	  him,	  it	  strengthens	  his	  vision	  and	  directs	  his	  passions.	  
The	  words	  are	  potent.	  	  “[T]heir	  magic,”	  Huxley	  writes,	  “was	  strong	  and	  went	  on	  
rumbling	  in	  his	  head,	  and	  somehow	  it	  was	  as	  though	  he	  had	  never	  really	  hated	  Popé	  
before;	  never	  really	  hated	  him	  because	  he	  had	  never	  been	  able	  to	  say	  how	  much	  he	  
hated	  him.	  	  But	  now	  he	  had	  these	  words,	  these	  words	  like	  drums	  and	  singing	  and	  
magic.”103	  	  As	  the	  poetry	  enables	  him	  to	  express	  his	  previously	  inarticulate	  disgust	  at	  
Linda	  and	  Popé’s	  affair,	  it	  moves	  him	  action.	  	  “The	  magic	  was	  on	  his	  side,	  the	  magic	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explained	  and	  gave	  orders.”104	  	  Moved	  by	  hatred	  and	  disgust,	  the	  Savage	  strikes	  his	  
mother’s	  lover.	  	  While	  Popé	  thwarts	  his	  attack,	  John	  has	  indelibly	  experienced	  the	  
power	  of	  literature	  to	  shatter	  the	  status	  quo.	  
Shakespeare’s	  works	  stay	  with	  the	  young	  man	  as	  his	  passion	  for	  Lenina	  develops.	  	  
While	  John	  watches	  Lenina	  in	  her	  soma-­‐shrouded	  sleep	  one	  day,	  the	  poetry	  comes	  to	  
describe	  her	  beauty,	  and	  to	  keep	  him	  from	  violating	  her	  in	  his	  desire	  for	  her.105	  	  Later,	  
after	  an	  unsettling	  evening	  at	  the	  feelies,	  which	  he	  judges	  base	  and	  ignoble,	  Savage	  
returns	  to	  Othello.106	  	  Lenina’s	  appreciation	  for	  the	  lewd	  entertainment	  of	  the	  feelies	  
leaves	  John	  “obscurely	  terrified	  lest	  she	  should	  cease	  to	  be	  something	  he	  could	  feel	  
himself	  unworthy	  of.”107	  	  In	  another	  scene,	  he	  imagines	  himself	  and	  Lenina	  as	  Romeo	  
and	  Juliet.108	  	  As	  John’s	  affection	  for	  Lenina	  and	  her	  desire	  for	  him	  grows,	  she	  surprises	  
him	  with	  a	  visit.	  	  He	  professes	  his	  admiration,	  and	  eventually	  his	  love,	  in	  the	  poet’s	  
language.109	  	  When	  Lenina	  subsequently	  tries	  to	  seduce	  him	  with	  her	  kisses	  and	  
embrace,	  his	  conscience	  “thunder[s]	  poetically.”110	  	  Betrayed	  and	  disgusted,	  he	  forces	  
her	  off	  himself	  and	  passionately	  censures	  her	  with	  Shakespeare’s	  words.111	  	  When	  she	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  112	  
retreats	  to	  the	  bathroom	  to	  re-­‐clothe	  herself,	  he	  strides	  in	  the	  next	  room,	  “marching,	  
marching	  to	  the	  drums	  and	  music	  of	  magical	  words.”112	  
Shakespeare’s	  poetry,	  in	  particular	  the	  lines	  that	  gives	  the	  story	  its	  title,	  
accompanies	  John	  on	  his	  expedition	  into	  the	  World	  State.	  	  Soon	  after	  they	  meet	  on	  the	  
Reservation,	  Bernard	  Marx	  asks	  the	  Savage	  to	  explain	  more	  of	  his	  life—a	  life	  which	  
Bernard	  says	  is	  “almost	  inconceivable”	  because	  it	  includes	  “[a]	  mother,	  and	  all	  this	  dirt,	  
and	  old	  age,	  and	  disease…”113	  	  After	  the	  Savage	  relates	  his	  memories	  and	  reflections,	  
Bernard	  invites	  him	  to	  London.	  	  In	  glad	  anticipation	  of	  visiting	  the	  Other	  Place	  his	  
mother	  has	  described	  in	  her	  stories,	  John	  breaks	  out	  in	  Miranda’s	  lines:	  “O	  wonder!	  	  
How	  many	  goodly	  creatures	  are	  there	  here!	  	  How	  beauteous	  mankind	  is!	  	  O	  brave	  new	  
world,	  that	  has	  such	  people	  in	  it.”114	  
However,	  John’s	  introduction	  to	  London	  quickly	  turns	  his	  eagerness	  for	  the	  
Other	  World	  into	  disgust.	  	  He	  finds	  repulsive	  the	  uniformity	  of	  Bokanovsky	  groups,	  
batches	  of	  citizens	  produced	  exactly	  alike	  to	  meet	  quotas	  in	  the	  World	  State.115	  	  
Miranda’s	  lines	  come	  again.	  	  Huxley	  writes,	  “‘O	  brave	  new	  world…’	  	  By	  some	  malice	  of	  
his	  memory	  the	  Savage	  found	  himself	  repeating	  Miranda’s	  words.	  	  ‘O	  brave	  new	  world	  
that	  has	  such	  people	  in	  it.”116	  	  Later,	  near	  a	  breaking	  point,	  John	  reels	  before	  the	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  113	  
mystery	  of	  Linda’s	  death,	  and	  is	  struck	  again	  by	  the	  standardization	  of	  Bokanovsky	  
groups.	  	  Their	  uniformity	  denies	  unique	  personality	  and	  so	  defiles	  his	  mother’s	  death.	  	  
At	  that	  moment,	  the	  poetry	  returns.	  	  “The	  singing	  words	  mocked	  him	  derisively.	  	  ‘How	  
beauteous	  mankind	  is!	  	  O	  brave	  new	  world…’”117	  
Suddenly,	  the	  words	  revisit	  him,	  with	  a	  new	  sound	  this	  time.	  	  Huxley	  describes	  
the	  transformation:	  
In	  his	  mind	  the	  singing	  words	  seemed	  to	  change	  their	  tone.	  	  They	  had	  mocked	  
him	  through	  his	  misery	  and	  remorse,	  mocked	  him	  with	  how	  hideous	  a	  note	  of	  
cynical	  derision!	  	  Fiendishly	  laughing,	  they	  had	  insisted	  on	  the	  low	  squalor,	  the	  
nauseous	  ugliness	  of	  the	  nightmare.	  	  Now,	  suddenly,	  they	  trumpeted	  a	  call	  to	  
arms.	  	  “O	  brave	  new	  world!”	  	  Miranda	  was	  proclaiming	  the	  possibility	  of	  
loveliness,	  the	  possibility	  of	  transforming	  even	  the	  nightmare	  into	  something	  
fine	  and	  noble.	  	  “O	  brave	  new	  world!”	  	  It	  was	  a	  challenge,	  a	  command.118	  
	  
The	  command	  gives	  him	  vision	  and	  initiative:	  “Linda	  had	  been	  a	  slave,	  Linda	  had	  died;	  
others	  should	  live	  in	  freedom,	  and	  the	  world	  be	  made	  beautiful.	  	  A	  reparation,	  a	  duty.	  	  
And	  suddenly	  it	  was	  luminously	  clear	  to	  the	  Savage	  what	  he	  must	  do;	  it	  was	  as	  though	  a	  
shutter	  had	  been	  opened,	  a	  curtain	  drawn	  back.”119	  
	   Motivated	  by	  the	  command	  he	  finds	  in	  Miranda’s	  words,	  the	  Savage	  disrupts	  the	  
routine	  end-­‐of-­‐workday	  dismissal	  and	  soma	  distribution,	  proclaiming,	  “I	  come	  to	  bring	  
you	  freedom.”120	  	  Helmholtz	  Watson	  and	  Bernard	  Marx	  make	  their	  respective	  
contributions	  to	  John’s	  protest.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  World	  State	  do	  not	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understand	  what	  John	  means	  by	  “freedom.”	  	  After	  their	  riot	  is	  subdued,	  the	  Savage,	  
Helmholtz,	  and	  Bernard	  end	  up	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  World	  Controller	  Mustapha	  
Mond.	  
	   Naturally,	  John	  and	  Helmholtz	  have	  questions	  for	  Mond	  about	  the	  role	  of	  books	  
and	  writing	  in	  the	  World	  State.	  	  Through	  their	  culminating	  conversation,	  Huxley	  explores	  
the	  place	  of	  literature	  in	  a	  stable	  world.	  	  The	  Savage	  asks	  Mond	  why	  Shakespeare	  is	  
prohibited	  in	  the	  World	  State.121	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  conversation,	  Mond	  explains	  
that	  a	  ban	  on	  books	  helps	  to	  make	  passionless	  people.	  	  The	  controllers	  want	  a	  stable	  
world,	  and	  passion	  entails	  instability.	  	  Old	  things	  and	  beautiful	  things	  are	  too	  appealing	  
to	  be	  safe.	  	  Mond	  says,	  “Beauty’s	  attractive,	  and	  we	  don’t	  want	  people	  to	  be	  attracted	  
by	  old	  things.	  	  We	  want	  them	  to	  like	  the	  new	  ones.”122	  	  The	  controllers’	  bet	  is	  that	  
passionless	  people	  cannot	  understand,	  much	  less	  write,	  stories	  of	  great	  love,	  loss,	  
longing,	  achievement,	  or	  hope.	  
The	  new	  entertainment	  aims	  to	  stir	  emotion	  without	  appealing	  to	  any	  lasting	  
allegiance	  or	  affection.	  	  Emotional	  engineers	  in	  the	  brave	  new	  world	  work	  with	  nothing.	  	  
As	  far	  as	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  World	  State	  can	  manage	  it,	  entertainment	  audiences	  have	  
almost	  no	  significant	  experiences—no	  suffering,	  no	  devotion,	  no	  longing,	  no	  
unpredictability.	  	  There	  is	  literally	  nothing	  to	  write	  about.	  	  “You	  can’t	  make	  flivvers	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





without	  steel—and	  you	  can’t	  make	  tragedies	  without	  social	  instability.”123	  	  The	  
emotional	  engineer’s	  task,	  accordingly,	  is	  to	  manufacture	  sensations,	  shallow	  and	  short-­‐
lived.	  	  	  
The	  ban	  on	  books,	  then,	  helps	  to	  protect	  the	  stable	  world.	  	  More	  fundamentally,	  
it	  hedges	  the	  contrived	  standards	  of	  the	  World	  State.	  	  Faithful	  love	  becomes	  obscenity	  
in	  a	  world	  where	  mutual	  objectification	  and	  mutual	  use	  trump	  mutual	  sacrifice	  and	  
mutual	  satisfaction	  as	  the	  mysterious	  reward	  of	  human	  relationship.	  	  Faithful	  love—and	  
all	  that	  goes	  with	  it—violates	  the	  contrived	  morality	  of	  a	  stable	  world.	  	  The	  prohibited	  
books	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  stable	  world	  because	  they	  transmit	  traditions	  of	  theology,	  arts,	  
and	  sciences.	  	  More	  dangerously,	  the	  prohibited	  books	  give	  experiences	  that	  could	  form	  
or	  motivate	  people	  toward	  initiative	  and	  action	  in	  the	  world—the	  greatest	  threats	  to	  
stability.	  	  Mond	  explains	  that	  even	  a	  factory	  run	  by	  “separate	  and	  unrelated	  individuals	  
of	  good	  heredity	  and	  conditioned	  so	  as	  to	  be	  capable	  (within	  limits)	  of	  making	  a	  free	  
choice	  and	  assuming	  responsibilities”	  is	  a	  disaster	  waiting	  to	  happen.124	  	  Why	  would	  any	  
stability-­‐loving	  controller	  ever	  want	  to	  encourage	  people	  to	  make	  choices	  and	  act?	  	  Why	  
would	  he	  ever	  allow	  them	  to	  be	  introduced	  to	  works	  that	  risk	  stirring	  their	  hearts	  or	  
revealing	  beauty,	  sacrifice,	  and	  courage	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  others?	  
In	  summary,	  the	  controllers’	  ban	  on	  books,	  and	  encouragement	  of	  collective	  
forgetfulness,	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  separate	  persons	  from	  literature	  because	  books	  are	  an	  
especially	  significant	  source	  for	  capturing	  and	  illuminating	  meaning	  in	  human	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experience.	  	  Literature	  and	  truthful	  language	  are	  sources	  and	  signs	  of	  meanings	  that	  run	  
counter	  to	  the	  meaning,	  for	  individual	  lives	  and	  political	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  that	  the	  
controllers	  of	  the	  World	  State	  want	  to	  establish.	  	  Literature,	  like	  physical	  or	  intellectual	  
difference,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  make	  us	  aware	  of	  our	  distinct	  personalities.	  	  And,	  from	  
the	  perspective	  of	  proponents	  of	  a	  stable	  world,	  the	  effects	  of	  time	  spent	  alone	  with	  a	  
book	  are	  even	  worse:	  solitude	  means	  time	  and	  space	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  discovery	  that	  
one	  is	  a	  distinct	  person	  with	  potential,	  weaknesses,	  thoughts,	  and	  longings.	  	  To	  be	  
conditioned	  is	  to	  be	  cut	  down	  to	  fit	  and	  further	  a	  stable	  society.	  	  Stories	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  introduce	  great	  loves,	  great	  trials,	  great	  tragedies,	  comedies,	  and	  fairy	  tales.	  	  
In	  short,	  literature	  poses	  a	  risk	  of	  deconditioning—of	  “cracking	  open	  the	  shell	  of	  a	  
routine	  that	  prevents	  us	  from	  seeing	  the	  world,”	  as	  Esolen	  puts	  it.125	  	  By	  turns	  stories	  
can	  magnify	  and	  mold	  our	  longings	  and	  form	  our	  actions	  in	  the	  world.	  
Through	  his	  journey,	  John	  the	  Savage	  has	  learned	  that	  “social	  instability”	  is	  an	  
inadequate	  name	  for	  human	  experiences	  far	  more	  wonderful	  and	  frightening	  than	  the	  
people	  of	  the	  brave	  new	  world	  have	  imagined.	  	  As	  Huxley	  makes	  clear	  in	  a	  brilliant	  
passage	  in	  which	  Mond	  gives	  a	  group	  of	  students	  a	  history	  lesson	  and	  then	  again	  in	  the	  
culminating	  scenes	  of	  the	  book,	  the	  social	  instability	  controllers	  fear	  means	  a	  man	  and	  
woman	  in	  love,	  a	  mother	  feeding	  her	  children,	  little	  ones	  at	  play,	  and	  all	  the	  tears	  and	  
labor	  that	  caring	  for	  bodies	  and	  souls	  requires.	  	  It	  means	  suffering	  because	  some	  things	  
are	  worth	  it.	  	  It	  means	  days	  of	  lament	  as	  well	  as	  days	  of	  laughter.	  	  It	  means	  lament	  
heavier	  for	  the	  laughter,	  and	  laughter	  sweeter	  for	  the	  lament.	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John	  wants	  real	  happiness,	  and	  knows	  it	  must	  entail	  suffering	  and	  sorrow.	  	  “But	  I	  
don’t	  want	  comfort,”	  he	  says	  to	  Mond,	  “I	  want	  God,	  I	  want	  poetry,	  I	  want	  real	  danger,	  I	  
want	  freedom,	  I	  want	  goodness.	  	  I	  want	  sin.”126	  	  John	  knows	  that	  the	  effort	  to	  prevent	  
social	  instability	  undermines	  the	  best	  human	  attempts	  at	  the	  less	  certain,	  more	  
rewarding	  kind	  of	  surety	  persons	  can	  try	  to	  create	  between	  one	  another.	  	  John	  
comprehends,	  in	  an	  experiential,	  participatory	  way,	  the	  piercing	  and	  formative	  potential	  
of	  poetry.	  	  Because	  he	  suffers	  and	  resists,	  he	  interacts	  the	  poetry	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  
inaccessible	  to	  most	  citizens	  of	  the	  World	  State,	  even	  including	  Helmholtz.127	  	  In	  all,	  
Aldous	  Huxley	  shows	  through	  his	  characters	  John,	  Lenina,	  and	  Helmholtz	  that	  literature	  
has	  this	  transformative	  potential.	  
	  
LANGUAGE	  AND	  REALITY	  IN	  THAT	  HIDEOUS	  STRENGTH	  
I	  focus	  on	  Lewis’s	  characters	  Mark	  Studdock,	  a	  young	  man	  who	  wants	  to	  move	  
up	  in	  the	  academic	  world,	  and	  John	  Wither,	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  the	  National	  Institute	  
for	  Co-­‐ordinated	  Experiments.	  	  Lewis	  shows	  us	  how	  the	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  the	  word	  
become	  daily	  decisions	  through	  Mark’s	  journey	  and	  interactions	  with	  Wither.	  	  
Throughout	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  especially	  when	  he	  deals	  with	  language,	  Lewis	  
plays	  with	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Tower	  of	  Babel.	  	  Here	  I	  want	  mainly	  to	  focus	  on	  Mark’s	  
journey,	  and	  then	  pay	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  events	  in	  language	  he	  witnesses	  as	  the	  
story	  climaxes.	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Mark	  Studdock’s	  worst	  fear	  is	  to	  live	  as	  an	  “outsider.”128	  	  He	  thrives	  when	  he	  
thinks	  those	  at	  the	  center	  of	  power	  want	  him	  there,	  too.129	  	  As	  he	  tries	  to	  secure	  a	  new	  
job	  at	  the	  National	  Institute	  for	  Co-­‐ordinated	  Experiments,	  Mark	  sacrifices	  honest	  
thought	  and	  clear	  language	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  power.	  	  As	  we	  follow	  Mark	  in	  his	  first	  days	  at	  
the	  Institute,	  we	  see	  that	  he	  faces	  men	  in	  positions	  of	  power	  whose	  duplicitous	  use	  of	  
language	  is	  hard	  to	  recognize	  and	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  confront	  or	  escape.	  	  In	  
particular,	  the	  young	  man	  is	  not	  prepared	  for	  his	  first	  attempts	  to	  learn	  something	  from	  
John	  Wither.	  	  Mark	  wants	  to	  know	  what	  his	  role	  at	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  will	  be.	  	  As	  he	  tries	  to	  find	  
out,	  we	  learn	  that	  Wither	  uses	  more	  words	  to	  say	  less	  than	  any	  other	  character	  in	  the	  
book.	  
Wither	  answers	  Mark	  with	  jargon,	  flattery,	  and	  ambiguity.	  	  After	  a	  few	  attempts,	  
Mark	  realizes	  that	  he	  has	  a	  choice	  between	  finding	  the	  truth	  about	  his	  role	  at	  the	  
N.I.C.E.,	  and	  risking	  losing	  that	  role	  altogether.	  
Mark	  did	  not	  ask	  again	  in	  so	  many	  words	  what	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  wanted	  him	  to	  
do…partly	  because	  a	  perfectly	  distinct	  question	  would	  have	  sounded	  a	  crudity	  in	  
that	  room—a	  crudity	  which	  might	  suddenly	  exclude	  him	  from	  the	  warm	  and	  
almost	  drugged	  atmosphere	  of	  vague,	  and	  yet	  heavily	  important,	  confidence	  in	  
which	  he	  was	  gradually	  being	  enfolded.130	  
	  
Wither	  bends	  words	  until	  they	  are	  meaningless,	  and	  lures	  Mark	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  acceptance.	  	  Witness	  one	  of	  Mark	  and	  Wither’s	  maddening	  exchanges:	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“Well,”	  said	  Mr.	  Wither	  in	  a	  voice	  so	  low	  and	  rich	  that	  it	  was	  almost	  a	  sigh,	  “I	  am	  
very	  glad	  you	  have	  raised	  this	  issue	  now	  in	  a	  quite	  informal	  way.	  	  Obviously	  
neither	  you	  nor	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  commit	  ourselves,	  in	  this	  room,	  in	  any	  sense	  
which	  was	  at	  all	  injurious	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Committee.	  	  I	  quite	  understand	  
your	  motives	  and—er—respect	  them.	  	  We	  are	  not,	  of	  course,	  speaking	  of	  an	  
Appointment	  in	  the	  quasi-­‐technical	  sense	  of	  the	  term;	  it	  would	  be	  improper	  for	  
both	  of	  us	  (though,	  you	  may	  well	  remind	  me,	  in	  different	  ways)	  to	  do	  so—or	  at	  
least	  it	  might	  lead	  to	  certain	  inconveniences.	  	  But	  I	  think	  I	  can	  most	  definitely	  
assure	  you	  that	  nobody	  wants	  to	  force	  you	  into	  any	  kind	  of	  straight	  waistcoat	  or	  
bed	  of	  Procrustes.	  	  We	  do	  not	  really	  think,	  among	  ourselves,	  in	  terms	  of	  strictly	  
demarcated	  functions,	  of	  course.	  	  I	  take	  it	  that	  men	  like	  you	  and	  men	  are—well,	  
to	  put	  it	  frankly,	  hardly	  in	  the	  habit	  of	  using	  concepts	  of	  that	  type.	  	  Everyone	  in	  
the	  Institute	  feels	  that	  his	  own	  work	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  departmental	  contribution	  
to	  an	  end	  already	  defined	  as	  a	  moment	  or	  grade	  in	  the	  progressive	  self-­‐definition	  
of	  an	  organic	  whole.”	  
	   And	  Mark	  said—God	  forgive	  him,	  for	  he	  was	  young	  and	  shy	  and	  vain	  and	  
timid,	  all	  in	  one—“I	  do	  think	  that	  is	  so	  important.	  	  The	  elasticity	  of	  your	  
organization	  is	  one	  of	  the	  things	  that	  attracts	  me.”131	  
	  
Engaging	  with	  Wither’s	  intentionally	  meaningless	  words	  is	  both	  unproductive	  and	  
formative	  for	  Mark.	  
	   Elasticity,	  pointedly	  and	  frustratingly	  reflected	  in	  Wither’s	  language,	  is	  a	  core	  
principle	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  	  The	  Institute	  is	  an	  absorbing,	  boundless	  entity	  whose	  creators	  
refuse	  to	  recognize	  boundaries,	  for	  themselves	  or	  for	  others.	  	  Its	  directors	  intend	  to	  
entirely	  draw	  in	  and	  program	  initiates.	  	  Their	  aim	  in	  society	  is	  unlimited	  re-­‐making	  of	  
persons	  and	  social	  institutions.	  	  They	  know	  the	  key	  to	  success	  in	  achieving	  the	  Institute’s	  
all-­‐absorbing	  purpose	  is	  to	  refuse	  to	  name	  that	  purpose.	  	  To	  the	  point,	  Wither	  later	  
affirms	  his	  desire	  to	  entirely	  embrace	  Mark	  in	  the	  arms	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  “Of	  course,”	  
he	  says,	  “nothing	  is	  so	  much	  to	  be	  desired	  as	  the	  greatest	  possible	  unity.	  	  You	  will	  not	  
suspect	  me	  of	  under-­‐rating	  that	  aspect	  of	  our	  orders.	  	  Any	  fresh	  individual	  brought	  into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  Ibid.,	  52-­‐53.	  
	  
	  120	  
that	  unity	  would	  be	  a	  source	  of	  the	  most	  intense	  satisfaction	  to—ah—all	  concerned.	  	  I	  
desire	  the	  closest	  possible	  bond.	  	  I	  would	  welcome	  an	  interpenetration	  of	  personalities	  
so	  close,	  so	  irrevocable,	  that	  it	  almost	  transcends	  individuality.	  	  You	  need	  not	  doubt	  that	  
I	  would	  open	  my	  arms	  to	  receive—to	  absorb—to	  assimilate	  this	  young	  man.”132	  
Meanwhile,	  Mark	  wants	  to	  know	  what	  his	  job	  is,	  and	  Wither	  only	  blathers.	  	  Mark	  
becomes	  helpless	  and	  hungrier	  for	  acceptance.	  	  Eventually,	  he	  gives	  up	  trying	  to	  make	  
Wither	  explain	  his	  duties	  at	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  	  “After	  that,”	  Lewis	  writes,	  “he	  had	  no	  further	  
chance	  of	  bringing	  the	  Director	  to	  the	  point	  and	  whenever	  the	  slow,	  gentle	  voice	  ceased	  
he	  found	  himself	  answering	  it	  in	  its	  own	  style,	  and	  apparently	  helpless	  to	  do	  otherwise	  
despite	  the	  torturing	  recurrence	  of	  the	  question,	  ‘What	  are	  we	  both	  talking	  about?’”133	  	  
Rather	  than	  calling	  out	  Wither	  for	  his	  nonsense,	  Mark	  learns	  to	  use	  words	  with	  skillful	  
ambiguity.134	  
	   One	  particularly	  harmful	  habit	  Mark	  cultivates	  is	  his	  own	  use	  of	  jargon.	  	  Unaware	  
of	  his	  practice,	  he	  uses	  a	  language	  that	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  reality	  he	  thinks	  he	  is	  describing.	  	  
Mark’s	  education,	  Lewis	  writes,	  
had	  had	  the	  curious	  effect	  of	  making	  things	  that	  he	  read	  and	  wrote	  more	  real	  to	  
him	  than	  things	  he	  saw.	  	  Statistics	  about	  agricultural	  laborers	  were	  the	  
substance;	  any	  real	  ditcher,	  ploughman,	  or	  farmer’s	  boy,	  was	  the	  shadow.	  	  
Though	  he	  had	  never	  noticed	  it	  himself,	  he	  had	  a	  great	  reluctance,	  in	  his	  work,	  
ever	  to	  use	  such	  words	  as	  “man”	  or	  “woman.”	  	  He	  preferred	  to	  write	  about	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“vocational	  groups,”	  “elements,”	  “classes”	  and	  “populations”:	  for,	  in	  his	  own	  
way,	  he	  believed	  as	  firmly	  as	  any	  mystic	  in	  the	  superior	  reality	  of	  the	  things	  that	  
are	  not	  seen.135	  
	  
His	  abstracted	  vocabulary	  makes	  him	  think	  he	  sees	  things	  that	  are	  not	  real	  and,	  at	  the	  
same	  time,	  fail	  to	  see	  the	  realities	  before	  his	  face.	  
Gleaming	  promises	  of	  power	  lead	  Mark	  to	  do	  worse	  things	  with	  words	  than	  
merely	  maintaining	  subservient	  silence	  and	  using	  distorting	  jargon.	  	  Before	  long,	  he	  is	  
lying	  to	  himself.	  	  Moreover,	  he	  plans	  to	  deceive	  his	  wife	  Jane.	  	  Full	  of	  worry	  about	  his	  
precarious	  position	  at	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  Mark	  imagines	  the	  confident	  report	  he	  will	  give	  to	  
Jane	  when	  he	  returns	  to	  her.	  	  Lewis	  writes,	  “This	  imaginary	  speech	  of	  his	  own	  gradually	  
drove	  out	  of	  his	  mind	  the	  real	  experiences	  he	  had	  undergone.	  	  Those	  real	  experiences	  of	  
misgivings	  and	  uneasiness…”136	  	  Mark’s	  self-­‐deceptions	  are	  essential	  to	  his	  attempts	  to	  
navigate	  obstacles	  to	  success	  at	  the	  Institute.	  
More	  and	  more,	  Mark	  uses	  words	  to	  uphold	  the	  pretend	  world	  he	  has	  built	  for	  
himself.	  	  He	  can	  sustain	  that	  world	  only	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  no	  one	  else	  to	  witness	  the	  
pandering	  relationships	  and	  conversations	  he	  sees	  as	  necessary	  to	  his	  success.	  	  Yet,	  
Lewis	  writes,	  	  
it	  is	  only	  justice	  both	  to	  Mark	  and	  to	  Jane	  to	  record	  that	  he	  would	  have	  found	  it	  
impossible	  to	  conduct	  in	  her	  hearing	  any	  one	  of	  the	  hundred	  conversations	  
which	  his	  life	  at	  Belbury	  involved.	  	  Her	  mere	  presence	  would	  have	  made	  all	  the	  
laughter	  of	  the	  Inner	  Ring	  sound	  metallic,	  unreal;	  and	  what	  he	  now	  regarded	  as	  
common	  prudence	  would	  seem	  to	  her,	  and	  through	  her	  to	  himself,	  mere	  flattery,	  
back-­‐biting	  and	  toad-­‐eating.	  	  Jane	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  Belbury	  would	  turn	  the	  whole	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of	  Belbury	  into	  a	  vast	  vulgarity,	  flashy	  and	  yet	  furtive.	  	  His	  mind	  sickened	  at	  the	  
thought	  of	  trying	  to	  teach	  Jane	  that	  she	  must	  help	  to	  keep	  Wither	  in	  a	  good	  
temper	  and	  must	  play	  up	  to	  Fairy	  Hardcastle.137	  
	  
Mark	  has	  built	  the	  world	  in	  which	  he	  now	  lives	  through	  countless	  conversations	  and	  
subservient	  silences.	  	  To	  engage	  in	  those	  conversations	  requires	  constant	  willing	  self-­‐
deception	  and	  trained	  choice	  not	  to	  notice	  or	  remember	  the	  lies.	  	  He	  knows	  Jane’s	  mere	  
presence	  will	  burn	  the	  comfortable	  fog	  of	  professional	  confidentiality	  that	  N.I.C.E.	  
members	  prefer	  to	  keep.	  	  He	  knows	  he	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  maintain	  his	  part	  in	  the	  
subservience	  and	  mutual	  deception	  that	  characterize	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  if	  Jane	  is	  there	  to	  
watch	  and	  listen,	  too.	  
	   Once	  Mark	  learns	  to	  lie	  easily	  to	  himself,	  he	  agrees	  to	  lie	  to	  the	  public.	  	  One	  
evening,	  members	  of	  the	  inner	  ring	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  ask	  Mark	  to	  write	  reports	  of	  an	  
event—a	  planned	  public	  emergency	  that	  will	  allow	  the	  Institute	  to	  claim	  police	  
powers—before	  it	  happens.	  	  At	  first,	  Mark	  is	  confused.	  	  Lord	  Feverstone	  encourages	  
him:	  
“You	  surely	  don’t	  need	  to	  wait	  for	  a	  thing	  to	  happen	  before	  you	  tell	  the	  
story	  of	  it!”138	  
“‘Well,	  I	  admit,’	  said	  Mark,	  and	  his	  face	  was	  full	  of	  laughter,	  ‘I	  had	  a	  
prejudice	  for	  doing	  so,	  not	  living	  in	  Mr.	  Dunne’s	  sort	  of	  time	  nor	  in	  looking-­‐glass	  
land.”139	  
	  
Without	  further	  pause,	  Mark	  agrees	  to	  write	  the	  false	  reports.	  	  “This	  was	  the	  first	  thing	  
Mark	  had	  been	  asked	  to	  do	  which	  he	  himself,	  before	  he	  did	  it,	  clearly	  knew	  to	  be	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criminal.	  	  But	  the	  moment	  of	  his	  consent	  almost	  escaped	  his	  notice;	  certainly,	  there	  was	  
no	  struggle,	  no	  sense	  of	  turning	  a	  corner.”140	  	  Mark’s	  moment	  of	  choice,	  writes	  Lewis,	  
“slipped	  past	  in	  a	  chatter	  of	  laughter,	  of	  that	  intimate	  laughter	  between	  fellow	  
professionals,	  which	  of	  all	  earthly	  powers	  is	  strongest	  to	  make	  men	  do	  very	  bad	  things	  
before	  they	  are	  yet,	  individually,	  very	  bad	  men.”141	  	  His	  constant	  pursuit	  is	  power,	  and	  
he	  hardly	  notices	  his	  desire	  intoxicates	  and	  threatens	  to	  poison	  him.	  	  
The	  job	  becomes	  more	  agreeable	  as	  Mark	  works.142	  	  Lewis	  describes	  the	  young	  
man’s	  lines	  of	  argument	  to	  justify	  his	  work	  to	  himself.	  	  He	  quickly	  becomes	  invested	  in	  
his	  made-­‐up	  reports.	  	  “And	  anyway,	  the	  thing	  was	  a	  kind	  of	  joke.”143	  	  Besides,	  he	  
considers	  the	  task	  a	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  future	  success	  and	  security.	  	  Moreover,	  he	  tells	  
himself,	  “It	  wasn’t	  as	  if	  he	  was	  taken	  in	  by	  the	  articles	  himself…And	  anyway,	  if	  he	  didn’t	  
do	  it,	  someone	  else	  would.”	  	  As	  he	  writes,	  Mark	  feels	  himself	  coming	  closer	  to	  the	  
power	  he	  wants.	  
And	  all	  the	  while	  the	  child	  inside	  him	  whispered	  how	  splendid	  and	  how	  
triumphantly	  grown	  up	  it	  was	  to	  be	  sitting	  like	  this,	  so	  full	  of	  alcohol	  and	  yet	  not	  
drunk,	  writing	  (with	  his	  tongue	  in	  his	  cheek)	  articles	  for	  great	  newspapers,	  
against	  time,	  “with	  the	  printer’s	  devil	  at	  the	  door”	  and	  all	  the	  inner	  ring	  of	  the	  
N.I.C.E.	  depending	  on	  him,	  and	  nobody	  ever	  again	  having	  the	  least	  right	  to	  
consider	  him	  a	  nonentity	  or	  cipher.144	  
	  












What	  Mark	  knew	  about	  truthful	  reporting	  before	  he	  wrote	  the	  articles	  for	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  
was	  that	  to	  make	  up	  history	  is	  to	  say	  that	  events,	  and	  actions,	  and	  what	  actually	  
happens	  do	  not	  matter.	  	  He	  sacrifices	  his	  unexamined	  but	  better	  prejudice	  toward	  
telling	  the	  truth	  about	  human	  affairs	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  place	  in	  the	  Institute’s	  inner	  
circle.	  
In	  a	  conversation	  in	  his	  college	  rooms,	  Dr.	  Dimble	  confronts	  Mark	  about	  his	  
scramble	  to	  power	  in	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  	  “For	  one	  moment,”	  writes	  Lewis,	  “the	  first	  for	  many	  
years,	  Mark	  saw	  himself	  exactly	  as	  a	  man	  like	  Dimble	  saw	  him.	  	  It	  almost	  took	  his	  breath	  
away.”145	  	  When	  the	  young	  man	  insists	  he	  is	  trustworthy,	  Dimble	  presses	  him,	  “You?”	  	  
The	  professor’s	  question	  rips	  through	  the	  false	  image	  of	  himself	  Mark	  carries.	  	  Dimble’s	  
question	  makes	  Mark	  see	  himself	  as	  he	  is.	  	  It	  shreds	  the	  fantasies	  of	  power	  and	  esoteric	  
knowledge	  Mark	  entertains—fantasies	  he	  guards	  from	  challenge	  because	  by	  avoiding	  
anyone	  outside	  the	  tight	  circle	  at	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  
Furthermore,	  Dimble	  confronts	  Mark	  about	  N.I.C.E.	  takeover	  of	  the	  newspapers.	  	  
“Do	  you	  suppose	  that	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  you	  have	  control	  over	  every	  paper	  in	  the	  
country	  except	  one?”146	  	  Before	  long,	  Mark	  is	  arrested	  and	  taken	  into	  the	  Objective	  
Room	  of	  the	  Nice.	  	  There	  he	  learns	  that	  words	  matter,	  and	  can	  be	  used	  rightly	  or	  
wrongly.	  	  Rather	  than	  detail	  his	  time	  in	  the	  Objective	  Room	  here,	  I	  want	  to	  skip	  forward	  
to	  a	  climactic	  event	  Mark	  witnesses	  upon	  his	  escape.	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On	  the	  night	  of	  Mark’s	  escape,	  Belbury,	  home	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  is	  scheduled	  to	  host	  
a	  grand	  banquet.	  	  During	  the	  banquet,	  nearly	  all	  the	  dinner	  guests’	  language	  becomes	  
confused.	  	  The	  curse	  of	  Babel	  descends	  upon	  all	  who	  have	  distorted	  language	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  power.	  	  Above	  the	  din	  and	  frenzy	  of	  gibberish,	  Lewis	  brings	  Merlin	  in	  to	  shout,	  
“Qui	  Verbum	  Dei	  contempserunt,	  eis	  auferetur	  etiam	  verbum	  hominis.”147	  	  Translated,	  
“They	  that	  have	  despised	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  from	  them	  shall	  the	  word	  of	  man	  also	  be	  
taken	  away.”	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  banquet	  at	  Belbury	  that	  unfolded	  just	  prior	  at	  St.	  Anne’s.	  	  
There,	  speech	  is	  not	  confused,	  but	  instead	  becomes	  clearer,	  full	  of	  high	  humor,	  more	  
beautiful.	  	  The	  company	  at	  St.	  Anne’s	  played	  with	  words—“If	  not	  plays	  upon	  words,	  yet	  
certainly	  plays	  upon	  thoughts,	  paradoxes,	  fancies,	  anecdotes,	  theories	  laughingly	  
advanced	  yet	  (on	  consideration)	  well	  worth	  taking	  seriously,	  had	  flowed	  from	  them	  and	  
over	  them	  with	  dazzling	  prodigality.”148	  	  They	  witness	  “the	  very	  heart	  of	  language,	  [the]	  
white-­‐hot	  furnace	  of	  essential	  speech.”	  	  The	  ugly	  clamor	  and	  confusion	  at	  Belbury	  
contrast	  the	  beautiful	  clarity	  and	  wit	  of	  conversation	  at	  St.	  Anne’s.	  	  Through	  these	  
events,	  Lewis	  evokes	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  living	  and	  active	  word.	  
It	  is	  the	  same	  appreciation	  of	  language	  he	  draws	  out	  of	  readers	  who	  witness	  Dr.	  
Dimble	  speaking	  the	  Great	  Tongue	  earlier	  in	  the	  story.	  	  When	  he	  speaks,	  “great	  syllables	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of	  words	  that	  sounded	  like	  castles	  came	  out	  of	  his	  mouth.	  	  Jane	  felt	  her	  heart	  leap	  and	  
quiver	  at	  them.”149	  	  Lewis	  continues,	  
The	  voice	  did	  not	  sound	  like	  Dimble’s	  own:	  it	  was	  as	  if	  the	  words	  spoke	  
themselves	  through	  him	  from	  some	  strong	  place	  at	  a	  distance—or	  as	  if	  they	  
were	  not	  words	  at	  all	  but	  present	  operations	  of	  God,	  the	  planets,	  and	  the	  
Pendragon.	  	  For	  this	  was	  the	  language	  spoken	  before	  the	  Fall	  and	  beyond	  the	  
Moon	  and	  the	  meanings	  were	  not	  given	  to	  the	  syllables	  by	  chance,	  or	  skill,	  or	  
long	  tradition,	  but	  truly	  inherent	  in	  them	  as	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  great	  Sun	  is	  
inherent	  in	  the	  little	  waterdrop.	  	  This	  was	  Language	  herself,	  as	  she	  first	  sprang	  at	  
Maledil’s	  bidding	  out	  of	  the	  molten	  quick-­‐silver	  of	  the	  star	  called	  Mercury	  on	  
Earth,	  but	  Viritrilbia	  in	  Deep	  Heaven.150	  
	  
Lewis’s	  understanding	  of	  language	  is	  important	  because	  he	  recognizes	  that	  language	  has	  
the	  capacity	  to	  communicate	  reality—indeed,	  that	  essential	  language	  communicates	  
reality.	  
	   Words	  are	  essential	  to	  accountability.	  	  An	  understanding	  of	  oneself	  as	  a	  person	  
capable	  of	  and	  motivated	  to	  act	  is	  essential	  to	  becoming	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  who	  can	  
answer	  for	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  his	  actions.	  	  The	  process	  of	  developing	  this	  understanding	  
is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.
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INTEGRITY	  OF	  THE	  HUMAN	  PERSON	  
	  
“Thus,	  skidding	  violently	  from	  one	  side	  to	  the	  other,	  his	  youth	  approached	  the	  moment	  
at	  which	  he	  would	  begin	  to	  be	  a	  person.”1	  
	  
-­‐	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  describing	  Mark	  Studdock’s	  choice	  
	  
	  
“But	  if	  the	  object	  was	  not	  to	  stay	  alive	  but	  to	  stay	  human,	  what	  difference	  did	  it	  make?”2	  
	  




My	  intent	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  better	  see	  how	  select	  characters	  in	  Brave	  New	  
World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  develop,	  or	  fail	  to	  develop,	  a	  
sense	  of	  their	  individuality	  and	  come	  to	  know	  what	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  	  In	  each	  story,	  we	  
watch	  as	  certain	  characters	  gain	  and	  act	  on	  a	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  accountable	  to	  a	  
standard	  of	  conduct,	  which	  stands	  independent	  of	  them	  and	  of	  those	  who	  attempt	  to	  
coerce	  their	  actions.	  	  What	  moves	  these	  characters?	  	  What	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  
characters	  that,	  on	  the	  whole,	  lack	  integrity?	  	  Or,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  better	  to	  ask,	  what	  
distinguishes	  the	  moments	  in	  which	  these	  characters	  demonstrate	  integrity	  from	  the	  
moments	  in	  which	  they	  are	  overwhelmed	  or	  owned	  by	  other	  people,	  allegiances,	  or	  
affections?	  
	   The	  theme	  of	  personal	  integrity	  has	  a	  key	  place	  in	  a	  study	  in	  political	  science	  
because	  we	  are	  especially	  interested	  in	  personal	  agency	  and	  action.	  	  To	  start,	  some	  of	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  That	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the	  most	  insightful	  students	  of	  politics	  in	  the	  modern	  era	  make	  it	  a	  point	  to	  remind	  us	  
that	  politics	  is	  made	  not	  by	  forces	  or	  times	  but	  by	  the	  mysterious	  intersection	  of	  agency	  
and	  unpredictability	  in	  human	  affairs.	  
Tocqueville,	  for	  example,	  warns	  against	  the	  temptation,	  particularly	  strong	  in	  our	  
democratic	  moment,	  to	  believe	  that	  human	  affairs	  are	  “not	  voluntary	  and	  that,	  without	  
knowing	  it,	  societies	  obey	  a	  superior,	  dominating	  force.”3	  	  Against	  this	  doctrine	  of	  
fatality,	  he	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  harder	  task	  for	  those	  who	  write	  about	  events	  is	  to	  tell	  
readers	  “how	  [a	  nation]	  could	  have	  acted	  to	  take	  a	  better	  route.”4	  	  Hannah	  Arendt	  
similarly	  focuses	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  personal	  agency.	  	  Like	  Aristotle	  and	  Alasdair	  
MacIntyre,	  she	  balances	  the	  insight	  that	  men	  can	  act	  freely	  with	  the	  corollary	  insight	  
that	  human	  action	  is	  unpredictable.	  	  She	  writes:	  
Man’s	  inability	  to	  rely	  on	  himself	  or	  to	  have	  complete	  faith	  in	  himself	  (which	  is	  
the	  same	  thing)	  is	  the	  price	  human	  beings	  pay	  for	  freedom;	  and	  the	  impossibility	  
of	  remaining	  unique	  masters	  of	  what	  they	  do,	  of	  knowing	  its	  consequences	  and	  
relying	  upon	  the	  future,	  is	  the	  price	  they	  pay	  for	  plurality	  and	  reality,	  for	  the	  joy	  
of	  inhabiting	  together	  with	  others	  a	  world	  whose	  reality	  is	  guaranteed	  for	  each	  
by	  the	  presence	  of	  all.5	  
	  
Finally,	  Arendt’s	  contemporary	  Eric	  Voegelin	  connects	  the	  insight	  into	  personal	  agency	  
to	  everyman’s	  situation.	  	  He	  says	  bluntly,	  “No	  one	  is	  obliged	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  spiritual	  
crisis	  of	  a	  society;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  everyone	  is	  obliged	  to	  avoid	  this	  folly	  and	  live	  his	  life	  
in	  order.”6	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The	  insight	  into	  personal	  agency	  which	  Tocqueville,	  Arendt,	  and	  Voegelin	  relay	  
further	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  as	  twin	  dangers	  both	  self-­‐assured	  progressivism	  and	  fearful	  
golden-­‐ageism.	  	  To	  be	  convicted	  of	  inevitable	  progress	  or	  to	  be	  convicted	  of	  inevitable	  
decline	  are	  the	  same	  thing.	  	  The	  man	  who	  draws	  a	  line	  that	  runs	  up-­‐and-­‐up	  on	  a	  
trajectory	  of	  unstoppable	  progress	  and	  the	  man	  who	  draws	  a	  line	  that	  runs	  into	  the	  dirt	  
are	  alike	  blind	  to	  the	  essential	  truth	  that	  human	  agents	  make	  human	  events.	  
The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  these	  thinkers	  invite	  us	  to	  see,	  as	  they	  do,	  that	  personal	  
integrity	  matters.	  	  If	  people	  make	  politics,	  it	  matters	  that	  and	  how	  people	  come	  to	  know	  
and	  use	  their	  agency.	  
Following	  this	  same	  insight,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  draw	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  
difficult,	  formative	  quest	  for	  personal	  integrity.	  	  In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  I	  compare	  
and	  contrast	  key	  figures	  from	  their	  novels.	  	  Before	  I	  turn	  to	  examine	  the	  stories,	  
however,	  I	  should	  say	  more	  about	  the	  quality	  I	  am	  looking	  for.	  	  What	  is	  integrity?	  	  As	  a	  
starting	  point,	  I	  offer	  a	  description,	  rather	  than	  definition,	  to	  highlight	  a	  few	  features	  of	  
the	  quality	  I	  want	  to	  observe	  and	  analyze	  through	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell’s	  stories.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  basic	  aspect	  of	  integrity	  is	  individuality.	  	  Critically,	  by	  
individuality	  I	  mean	  understanding	  oneself	  as	  a	  personal	  but	  not	  autonomous	  agent.	  	  In	  
all	  three	  stories,	  the	  characters	  with	  the	  strongest	  sense	  of	  individuality	  are,	  
distinctively,	  not	  the	  most	  autonomous.	  	  More	  than	  simply	  seeing	  oneself	  as	  an	  
individual,	  integrity	  consistently	  entails	  acting	  to	  fulfill	  the	  requirements	  of	  
accountability	  as	  one	  becomes	  aware	  of	  them.	  	  Furthermore,	  integrity	  is	  not	  a	  solely	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intellectual,	  or	  solely	  emotional,	  or	  solely	  physical	  quality.	  	  Instead,	  it	  entails	  aligning	  
one’s	  mind,	  soul,	  and	  body,	  together,	  toward	  the	  same	  goal.	  
One	  gains	  integrity	  by	  acting	  with	  clarity	  toward	  a	  purpose—a	  capacity	  that	  
requires	  reflection	  and	  practice	  over	  time.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  integrity	  is	  a	  quality	  one	  
develops	  over	  time	  means	  that	  one	  sees	  oneself	  as	  a	  person	  with	  dignity	  and	  
responsibilities	  more	  or	  less	  clearly	  at	  various	  points,	  and	  that	  ones	  knows	  what	  to	  do	  
better	  or	  worse	  at	  various	  points,	  and	  that	  one	  manages	  to	  act	  more	  or	  less	  consistently	  
at	  various	  points.	  
Integrity	  is	  risky.	  	  The	  man	  who	  attempts	  to	  orient	  himself	  toward	  specific	  goals	  
and	  to	  act	  consistently	  often	  finds	  himself	  in	  conflict	  with	  persons	  who	  reject	  his	  chosen	  
goals	  and	  refuse	  to	  acknowledge	  limits	  to	  their	  own	  power.	  	  A	  fair	  description	  of	  
integrity,	  therefore,	  must	  also	  remind	  us	  that	  people	  do	  not	  act	  in	  a	  void.	  	  We	  live,	  as	  
MacIntyre	  says,	  “upon	  a	  stage	  we	  did	  not	  design”	  and	  “find	  ourselves	  part	  of	  an	  action	  
that	  was	  not	  of	  our	  making.”7	  	  In	  the	  texts	  before	  us,	  as	  in	  our	  lives,	  actors	  exist	  in	  
relationships,	  environments,	  and	  circumstances,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  not	  theirs	  to	  choose	  
or	  change.	  	  One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  narrative,	  as	  Chapter	  2	  shows,	  is	  its	  capacity	  to	  
convey	  the	  complexity	  of	  human	  experience.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  stories	  in	  this	  study,	  like	  
real	  life,	  invite	  us	  to	  attend	  to	  a	  significant	  and	  recurrent	  question:	  how	  far	  are	  we	  
responsible	  for	  our	  conduct?	  	  Aristotle,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  1	  above,	  broaches	  the	  
reality	  of	  constraint	  and	  coercion.	  	  Elie	  Wiesel	  likewise	  calls	  our	  attention	  to	  those	  
realities.	  	  He	  speaks	  from	  the	  far	  side	  of	  an	  extreme	  experience	  of	  mental,	  spiritual,	  and	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physical	  coercion.	  	  He	  writes,	  “I	  shall	  never	  forgive	  myself…Nor	  shall	  I	  ever	  forgive	  the	  
world	  for	  having	  pushed	  me	  against	  the	  wall,	  for	  having	  turned	  me	  into	  a	  stranger,	  for	  
having	  awakened	  in	  me	  the	  basest,	  most	  primitive	  instincts.”8	  	  These	  men	  raise	  the	  
question:	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  each	  of	  us	  accountable	  for	  his	  own	  integrity?	  
In	  summary,	  for	  now,	  I	  want	  to	  say	  that	  to	  possess	  personal	  integrity	  is	  to	  
recognize	  oneself	  as	  an	  individual—a	  distinct	  though	  not	  autonomous	  agent,	  capable	  of	  
knowing,	  willing,	  and	  loving—and	  to	  act	  to	  align	  one’s	  soul	  and	  body,	  toward	  a	  clear	  
purpose.	  	  But	  developing	  integrity	  in	  one’s	  person	  is	  a	  journey,	  not	  a	  linear	  trajectory.	  	  It	  
is	  an	  effort	  in	  which	  one	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  both	  strengthened	  and	  shattered,	  at	  different	  
points,	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  and	  the	  events	  one	  encounters,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  one’s	  own	  
choices	  and	  actions.	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  examine	  the	  theme	  of	  personal	  integrity	  as	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  
Orwell	  present	  it	  in	  their	  stories.	  	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  compare	  and	  contrast	  select	  characters	  
from	  each	  narrative.	  	  What	  I	  want	  to	  know	  is	  how	  they	  come	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  
persons,	  to	  gain	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose,	  and	  to	  act	  toward	  their	  aims.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  
examine	  the	  lust	  for	  the	  inner	  ring	  as	  the	  challenge	  to	  Mark	  Studdock’s	  integrity	  in	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength,	  restlessness	  as	  the	  challenge	  to	  integrity	  for	  members	  of	  the	  World	  
State	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  and	  personal	  violation	  as	  the	  challenge	  to	  Winston	  Smith’s	  
integrity	  in	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.	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THE	  INNER	  RING	  AND	  INTEGRITY	  IN	  THAT	  HIDEOUS	  STRENGTH	  
Mark	  Studdock	  arrives	  at	  adulthood	  with	  one	  aim:	  esoteric	  knowledge.	  	  During	  
his	  initiation	  to	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  however,	  he	  becomes	  conflicted	  within	  and	  realizes	  that	  he	  
must	  choose	  the	  man	  he	  will	  be.	  	  Some	  of	  Mark’s	  most	  significant	  moments,	  as	  he	  sees	  
and	  weighs	  his	  choice,	  occur	  in	  exchanges	  with	  Professor	  Augustus	  Frost	  and	  Dr.	  Cecil	  
Dimble.	  	  Mark’s	  character	  is	  important	  for	  the	  choices	  we	  see	  him	  making;	  Frost	  and	  
Dimble	  are	  important	  for	  the	  choices	  they	  have	  made.	  	  The	  two	  older	  men	  chose	  their	  
allegiances	  long	  ago.	  	  In	  the	  years	  since,	  each	  has	  become	  deeply	  marked	  by	  his	  choice.	  	  
Critically,	  Frost	  and	  Dimble	  have	  aligned	  themselves	  to	  mortally	  opposed	  sides	  of	  a	  
cosmic	  conflict.	  	  Those	  two	  sides	  now	  fight	  for	  Mark’s	  heart	  and	  mind.	  	  A	  comparison	  of	  
these	  three	  men	  and	  their	  paths	  illuminates	  the	  theme	  of	  integrity.	  
Dr.	  Augustus	  Frost,	  who	  appears	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  early	  on,	  
plays	  his	  most	  important	  moments	  in	  the	  story	  when	  he	  attempts	  to	  complete	  Mark’s	  
initiation	  into	  the	  Institute.	  	  Like	  Wither,	  Frost	  is	  a	  full	  initiate	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.9	  	  He	  brings	  
Mark	  to	  the	  Objective	  Room,	  a	  disproportionate	  room	  in	  which	  he	  directs	  Mark	  to	  
various	  pointless	  and	  degraded	  activities.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  an	  external	  standard	  of	  value,	  
Frost	  informs	  Mark,	  is	  simply	  a	  consequence	  of	  one’s	  emotive	  desire	  to	  live.	  	  He	  rejects	  a	  
“means-­‐and-­‐end	  pattern	  of	  thought	  which	  descends	  from	  Aristotle.”10	  	  Instead	  he	  
promises	  Mark,	  “When	  you	  have	  obtained	  real	  objectivity	  you	  will	  recognize,	  not	  some	  
motives,	  but	  all	  motives	  as	  merely	  animal,	  subjective	  epiphenomena.”	  	  Frost	  makes	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explicit	  what	  implications	  his	  philosophy	  has	  for	  Mark.	  	  He	  tells	  Mark	  he	  must	  undergo	  
training	  in	  objectivity	  “to	  eliminate	  from	  your	  mind	  one	  by	  one	  the	  things	  you	  have	  
hitherto	  regarded	  as	  grounds	  for	  action.	  	  It	  is	  like	  killing	  a	  nerve.	  	  That	  whole	  system	  of	  
instinctive	  preferences,	  whatever	  ethical,	  aesthetic,	  or	  logical	  disguise	  they	  wear,	  is	  to	  
be	  simply	  destroyed.”11	  
Deep	  into	  Frost’s	  attempt	  to	  complete	  his	  initiation,	  Mark	  finally	  understands	  his	  
choice.	  	  He	  sees	  that	  Frost	  offers	  him	  “objectivity—the	  process	  whereby	  all	  specifically	  
human	  reactions	  were	  killed	  in	  a	  man.”12	  	  The	  end	  of	  this	  training,	  writes	  Lewis,	  is	  to	  
perfect	  one	  in	  “the	  asceticism	  of	  anti-­‐Nature.”	  	  Mark	  realizes	  that	  Frost	  and	  Wither	  	  
were,	  in	  a	  sense,	  playing	  quite	  fair	  with	  him—offering	  him	  the	  very	  same	  
initiation	  through	  which	  they	  themselves	  had	  passed	  and	  which	  had	  divided	  
them	  from	  humanity,	  distending	  and	  dissipating	  Wither	  into	  a	  shapeless	  ruin	  
while	  it	  condensed	  and	  sharpened	  Frost	  into	  the	  hard,	  bright,	  little	  needle	  that	  
he	  now	  was.13	  
	  
Once	  Frost	  had	  been	  in	  Studdock’s	  position,	  and	  he	  had	  chosen	  power.	  
Besides	  his	  efforts	  toward	  Mark’s	  initiation,	  Frost’s	  character	  is	  most	  fully	  
revealed	  shortly	  after	  he	  leaves	  off	  his	  attempts	  to	  coerce	  Mark,	  in	  his	  death.	  	  We	  hear	  
Frost’s	  thoughts	  as	  he	  nears	  death:	  “There	  were	  not,	  and	  must	  not	  be,	  such	  things	  as	  
men.”14	  	  Frost’s	  last	  thoughts	  echo	  Wither’s.	  	  John	  Wither	  “had	  willed	  with	  his	  whole	  
heart	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  reality	  and	  no	  truth,	  and	  now	  even	  the	  imminence	  of	  his	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own	  ruin	  could	  not	  wake	  him.”15	  	  Driven	  to	  suicide,	  Frost	  “piled	  all	  the	  inflammables	  he	  
could	  think	  of	  into	  the	  Objective	  Room.”16	  	  Once	  he	  has	  locked	  himself	  in	  the	  room	  and	  
is	  about	  to	  end	  his	  life,	  he	  is	  allowed	  to	  reconsider	  his	  convictions	  on	  human	  nature	  and	  
personal	  responsibility:	  
Not	  till	  then	  did	  his	  controllers	  allow	  him	  to	  suspect	  that	  death	  itself	  might	  not	  
after	  all	  cure	  the	  illusion	  of	  being	  a	  soul—nay,	  might	  prove	  the	  entry	  into	  a	  world	  
where	  that	  illusion	  raged	  infinite	  and	  unchecked…He	  became	  able	  to	  know	  (and	  
simultaneously	  refused	  the	  knowledge)	  that	  he	  had	  been	  wrong	  from	  the	  
beginning,	  that	  souls	  and	  personal	  responsibility	  existed.	  	  He	  half	  saw,	  he	  wholly	  
hated…With	  one	  supreme	  effort,	  he	  flung	  himself	  back	  into	  his	  illusion.17	  
	  
Augustus	  Frost	  lived	  his	  life	  in	  allegiance	  to	  the	  hope	  that	  persons	  and	  responsibility,	  
including	  himself	  and	  his	  own	  actions,	  were	  not	  real.	  
Long	  ago,	  Dr.	  Cecil	  Dimble	  committed	  himself	  to	  choose	  right	  over	  power.	  	  A	  
fellow	  of	  Northumberland,	  Dimble	  had	  been	  a	  tutor	  to	  Mark’s	  wife,	  Jane.18	  	  He	  is	  a	  
mature	  man	  who	  knows	  his	  allegiances.	  	  Dr.	  Dimble	  knows	  and	  loves	  Arthurian	  
literature	  and	  the	  history	  of	  Britain,	  and	  has	  a	  fine	  capacity	  for	  wonder.19	  	  Even	  more	  
importantly,	  he	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  question	  himself,	  to	  examine	  his	  own	  passions	  and	  
actions.	  	  Dimble’s	  character	  is	  perhaps	  best	  revealed	  in	  a	  conversation	  he	  has	  with	  
Mark.	  	  When	  Mark	  arrives	  at	  Dr.	  Dimble’s	  rooms	  at	  Northumberland,	  the	  professor,	  
writes	  Lewis,	  is	  shocked	  by	  the	  change	  he	  sees	  in	  Mark.	  	  “Studdock’s	  face…had	  grown	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fatter	  and	  paler	  and	  there	  was	  a	  new	  vulgarity	  in	  the	  expression.”20	  	  Unmoved	  by	  all	  
Mark’s	  pomp	  and	  bluster,	  Dimble	  remains	  honest	  and	  respectful	  toward	  him.	  	  He	  firmly	  
questions	  Mark’s	  assumptions	  about	  Mark’s	  own	  character	  and	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  Dr.	  Dimble	  knows	  he	  struggles	  to	  be	  charitable	  toward	  Mark.	  	  
When	  the	  young	  man	  insists	  that	  the	  professor	  dislikes	  him,	  “Dimble	  was	  silent.”	  	  Mark’s	  
shaft,	  Lewis	  writes,	  “had	  gone	  home.	  	  Dimble’s	  conscience	  had	  for	  years	  accused	  him	  of	  
a	  lack	  of	  charity	  towards	  Studdock	  and	  he	  had	  struggled	  to	  amend	  it:	  he	  was	  struggling	  
now.”21	  	  Throughout	  their	  conversation	  the	  professor	  wrestles	  an	  intense	  temptation.	  	  
“Dimble	  was	  simply	  trying	  very	  hard	  not	  to	  hate,	  not	  to	  despise,	  above	  all,	  not	  to	  enjoy	  
hating	  and	  despising,	  and	  he	  had	  no	  idea	  of	  the	  fixed	  severity	  which	  this	  effort	  gave	  to	  
his	  face.”22	  	  In	  Dimble’s	  character,	  Lewis	  shows	  a	  wise	  man	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  
confluence	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  motives	  that	  inform	  his	  actions.	  
The	  professor	  becomes	  genuinely	  angry	  and	  tries	  to	  cut	  through	  Studdock’s	  
pretense	  and	  whining.23	  	  “‘Stop	  talking	  nonsense!’	  said	  Dimble.	  	  ‘Stop	  posturing	  and	  
acting,	  if	  only	  for	  a	  minute.	  	  Who	  are	  you	  to	  talk	  like	  that?	  	  They	  have	  corrupted	  better	  
men	  than	  you	  or	  me	  before	  now.’”24	  	  When	  Mark	  says	  he	  will	  leave	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  Dimble	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promises	  to	  help	  him	  if	  he	  is	  serious.25	  	  He	  wants	  Mark	  to	  choose	  the	  right	  alliance,	  but	  
cannot	  coerce	  him.	  	  He	  is	  firm,	  but	  not	  forceful,	  “I	  am	  offering	  you	  a	  way	  back	  into	  the	  
human	  family.”26	  
Alone	  after	  his	  conversation	  with	  Mark,	  the	  elderly	  professor	  questions	  himself:	  
“Did	  I	  give	  way	  to	  my	  temper?	  	  Was	  I	  self-­‐righteous?	  	  Did	  I	  tell	  him	  as	  much	  as	  I	  dared?”	  	  
He	  probes	  his	  own	  motives	  more	  deeply:	  “Did	  you	  fail	  to	  make	  things	  clear	  just	  because	  
you	  really	  wanted	  not	  to?	  	  Just	  wanted	  to	  hurt	  and	  humiliate?	  	  To	  enjoy	  your	  own	  self-­‐
righteousness?	  	  Is	  there	  a	  whole	  Belbury	  inside	  you	  too?”27	  	  Throughout,	  Dimble	  is	  
manly	  and	  humble,	  courageous	  and	  self-­‐controlled.	  
	   As	  he	  journeys	  deeper	  into	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  Mark	  Studdock	  discovers	  that	  he	  must	  
make	  a	  choice	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  man	  he	  will	  become.	  	  The	  very	  thought	  of	  acting	  toward	  
something	  other	  than	  his	  lust	  for	  the	  inner	  circle	  unsettles	  him.	  	  “For,”	  as	  Lewis	  writes,	  
“Mark	  liked	  to	  be	  liked.”28	  	  During	  his	  re-­‐training	  in	  the	  Objective	  Room,	  Mark	  
recognizes	  his	  own	  position	  in	  Frost’s	  philosophy.	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  fear-­‐filled	  and	  
painful	  internal	  conflict,	  Mark	  begins	  to	  gain	  clarity.	  	  Lewis	  writes,	  “The	  knowledge	  that	  
his	  own	  assumptions	  led	  to	  Frost’s	  position,	  combined	  with	  what	  he	  saw	  in	  Frost’s	  face	  
and	  what	  he	  had	  experienced	  in	  this	  very	  cell,	  effected	  a	  complete	  conversion.	  	  All	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Ibid.	  
	  
26	  Ibid.,	  220.	  
	  
27	  Ibid.,	  221.	  
	  
28	  Ibid.,	  215.	  
	  
	  137	  
philosophers	  and	  evangelists	  in	  the	  world	  might	  not	  have	  done	  the	  job	  so	  neatly.”29	  	  
Mark	  sees	  what	  Frost	  has	  become	  and	  wants	  to	  be	  a	  better	  man.	  	  Lewis	  portrays	  the	  
moments	  of	  his	  choice	  beautifully:	  
Whether	  because	  he	  had	  already	  survived	  the	  attack,	  or	  because	  the	  imminence	  
of	  death	  had	  drawn	  the	  tooth	  of	  his	  lifelong	  desire	  for	  the	  esoteric,	  or	  because	  
he	  had	  (in	  a	  fashion)	  called	  very	  urgently	  for	  help,	  the	  built	  and	  painted	  
perversity	  of	  the	  room	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  him	  aware,	  as	  he	  had	  never	  
been	  before,	  of	  the	  room’s	  opposite.	  	  As	  the	  desert	  first	  teaches	  men	  to	  love	  
water,	  or	  as	  absence	  first	  reveals	  affection,	  there	  rose	  up	  against	  the	  background	  
of	  the	  sour	  and	  the	  crooked	  some	  kind	  of	  vision	  of	  the	  sweet	  and	  the	  straight.	  	  
Something	  else—something	  he	  vaguely	  called	  the	  “Normal”—apparently	  existed.	  	  
He	  had	  never	  thought	  about	  it	  before.	  	  But	  there	  it	  was—solid,	  massive,	  with	  a	  
shape	  of	  its	  own,	  almost	  like	  something	  you	  could	  touch,	  or	  eat,	  or	  fall	  in	  love	  
with…He	  was	  not	  thinking	  in	  moral	  terms	  at	  all;	  or	  else	  (what	  is	  much	  the	  same	  
thing)	  he	  was	  having	  his	  first	  deeply	  moral	  experience.”	  	  He	  was	  choosing	  a	  side:	  
the	  Normal.30	  
	  
In	  the	  moment	  of	  his	  choice,	  Mark	  rejects	  his	  lust	  for	  secret	  knowledge	  and	  the	  power	  it	  
promises.	  	  He	  abandons	  the	  path	  he	  thought	  would	  surely	  bring	  him	  to	  success.	  	  The	  
moments	  of	  his	  choice	  are	  at	  once	  excruciating	  and	  freeing.	  
	  	  In	  the	  Objective	  Room,	  Mark	  gains	  clarity,	  but	  not	  the	  kind	  Frost	  intends.	  	  “And	  
day	  by	  day,”	  Lewis	  tells	  us,	  “as	  the	  process	  went	  on,	  that	  idea	  of	  the	  Straight	  or	  the	  
Normal	  which	  had	  occurred	  to	  him	  during	  his	  first	  visit	  to	  this	  room,	  grew	  stronger	  and	  
more	  solid	  in	  his	  mind	  until	  it	  had	  become	  a	  kind	  of	  mountain.”	  	  Before,	  “he	  had	  always	  
thought…[ideas]	  were	  things	  inside	  one’s	  own	  head.”31	  	  His	  exposure	  to	  the	  Crooked	  
finally	  convinces	  him	  otherwise.	  	  As	  Lewis	  describes	  it,	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[N]ow,	  when	  [Mark’s]	  head	  was	  continually	  attacked	  and	  often	  completely	  filled	  
with	  the	  clinging	  corruption	  of	  the	  training,	  this	  Idea	  towered	  up	  above	  him—
something	  which	  obviously	  existed	  quite	  independent	  of	  himself	  and	  had	  hard	  
rock	  surfaces	  which	  would	  not	  give,	  surfaces	  he	  could	  cling	  to.32	  
	  
Mark	  saw	  what	  Frost	  had	  become.	  	  He	  discovers	  what	  Dimble	  and	  the	  company	  at	  St.	  
Anne’s	  are	  for.	  	  Through	  intense	  conflict,	  he	  aligns	  himself	  with	  the	  Normal	  against	  the	  
Crooked.	  	  Mark	  had	  committed	  himself	  to	  choose	  the	  delight	  of	  the	  real	  and	  the	  right	  
over	  the	  pleasure	  of	  power.	  	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  consider	  three	  of	  Huxley’s	  characters	  who,	  
like	  Mark,	  must	  decide	  who	  they	  will	  become.	  
	  
RESTLESSNESS	  AND	  INTEGRITY	  IN	  BRAVE	  NEW	  WORLD	  
	   In	  this	  section,	  I	  compare	  three	  of	  Aldous	  Huxley’s	  characters	  in	  Brave	  New	  
World	  as	  they	  variously	  pursue	  or	  refuse	  opportunities	  to	  gain	  integrity.	  	  One	  could	  
conduct	  a	  similar	  analysis	  of	  John	  the	  Savage,	  his	  mother	  Linda,	  and	  Mustapha	  Mond.	  	  
For	  this	  analysis,	  however,	  I’ve	  chosen	  Bernard	  Marx,	  Lenina	  Crowne,	  and	  Helmholtz	  
Watson.	  	  Huxley	  presents	  these	  characters	  with	  special	  attention	  to	  their	  very	  different	  
responses	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  personal	  integrity.	  
I	  start	  my	  inquiry	  with	  Bernard	  Marx,	  whose	  struggle	  for	  integrity	  Huxley	  
highlights	  throughout.	  	  Next,	  I	  contrast	  his	  character	  with	  Lenina	  Crowne’s.	  	  Lenina	  is	  a	  
high	  caste	  member	  who	  has	  at	  least	  as	  many	  opportunities	  as	  Bernard	  to	  gain	  integrity,	  
but	  who	  consistently	  refuses	  these	  opportunities.	  	  Finally,	  I	  compare	  Bernard	  with	  his	  
friend	  Helmholtz	  Watson,	  a	  man	  who	  strives	  to	  know	  himself	  and	  act	  accordingly.	  




	   Bernard	  Marx’s	  quest	  for	  integrity	  distinguishes	  him	  among	  the	  characters	  in	  
Brave	  New	  World.	  	  Bernard	  is	  different,	  isolated,	  and	  unsatisfied	  with	  the	  goals	  and	  
rewards	  of	  his	  life	  as	  an	  upper-­‐caste	  citizen	  of	  the	  World	  State.	  	  His	  story	  draws	  my	  
attention	  because	  he	  finds	  conflict	  both	  in	  himself	  and	  between	  himself	  and	  the	  people	  
and	  aims	  of	  his	  society,	  and	  undertakes	  a	  faltering	  but	  persistent	  quest	  for	  personal	  
integrity.	  
When	  we	  meet	  him,	  Bernard	  lacks	  integrity,	  and	  feels	  his	  lack.	  	  He	  says	  to	  
himself,	  “I	  am	  I,	  and	  wish	  I	  wasn’t.”33	  	  Slowly,	  Bernard	  becomes	  aware—inconsistently	  
but	  effectively	  aware—that	  he	  doesn’t	  know	  who	  he	  is	  or	  what	  he	  is	  about.	  	  He	  is	  
painfully	  self-­‐absorbed.	  	  Bernard’s	  “self-­‐consciousness,”	  writes	  Huxley,	  “was	  acute	  and	  
distressing.”	  	  Ever	  unstable,	  he	  wavers	  between	  arrogance,	  a	  too-­‐high	  estimation	  of	  
himself,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  self-­‐pity,	  a	  sulking,	  too-­‐low	  estimation	  of	  
himself.	  
Critically,	  Bernard	  becomes	  increasingly	  dissatisfied	  with	  his	  lack	  of	  purpose	  and	  
weak	  resolve,	  and	  with	  the	  World	  State’s	  promises	  of	  satisfaction	  through	  collective	  
spirituality	  and	  sensuality.	  	  Already,	  his	  physical	  inferiority	  to	  most	  members	  of	  his	  caste	  
make	  him	  an	  outsider.34	  	  Bernard’s	  want	  of	  integrity	  and	  identity	  exacerbates	  his	  sense	  
of	  alienation	  and	  loneliness.	  	  Huxley	  describes	  Bernard’s	  growing	  frustration	  after	  an	  
unsatisfying	  Solidarity	  Service:	  he	  comes	  starved	  and	  leaves	  worse—“more	  isolated	  by	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reason	  of	  his	  unreplenished	  emptiness,	  his	  dead	  satiety.”35	  	  More	  and	  more,	  he	  finds	  
himself,	  “Separate	  and	  unatoned,	  while	  the	  others	  were	  being	  fused	  into	  the	  Greater	  
Being;	  alone	  even	  in	  Morgana’s	  embrace—much	  more	  alone,	  indeed,	  more	  hopelessly	  
himself	  than	  he	  had	  even	  been	  in	  his	  life	  before.”36	  
Unlike	  most	  of	  the	  men	  around	  him,	  Bernard	  recognizes	  Hatcheries	  worker	  
Lenina	  Crowne	  as	  a	  person,	  even	  though	  she	  doesn’t	  see	  herself	  that	  way.	  	  “Bernard	  
ground	  his	  teeth.	  	  ‘Have	  here	  her,	  have	  her	  there.	  	  Like	  mutton.’”37	  	  One	  evening,	  the	  
two	  go	  on	  a	  date.	  	  Their	  conversation	  soon	  reveals	  their	  quite	  different	  ideas	  and	  
intentions	  about	  integrity.	  	  When	  Bernard	  proposes	  that	  they	  walk	  and	  talk	  for	  the	  
evening,	  Lenina	  balks.	  	  She	  finds	  his	  suggestion	  terribly	  boring,	  and	  instead	  takes	  him	  
out	  to	  socialize	  with	  a	  crowd	  gathered	  around	  wrestling	  and	  soma	  sundaes.	  	  When	  she	  
presses	  him	  take	  a	  soma	  sundae,	  he	  replies,	  “I’d	  rather	  be	  myself…Myself	  and	  nasty.	  	  
Not	  somebody	  else,	  however	  jolly.”38	  
Later	  that	  night,	  as	  their	  helicopter	  hangs	  over	  crashing	  waves,	  beneath	  a	  bright	  
moon,	  Bernard	  makes	  unorthodox	  confidences	  in	  Lenina.	  	  He	  shuts	  off	  the	  radio,	  despite	  
Lenina’s	  protest,	  and	  looks	  out	  on	  the	  sky	  and	  sea	  in	  silence.	  
“I	  want	  to	  look	  at	  the	  sea	  in	  peace,”	  he	  said.	  	  “One	  can’t	  even	  look	  with	  
that	  beastly	  noise	  going	  on.”	  
“But	  [the	  radio	  is]	  lovely.	  	  And	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  look.”	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“But	  I	  do,”	  he	  insisted.	  	  “It	  makes	  me	  feel	  as	  though…”	  he	  hesitated,	  
searching	  for	  words	  with	  which	  to	  express	  himself,	  “as	  though	  I	  were	  more	  me,	  if	  
you	  see	  what	  I	  mean.	  	  More	  on	  my	  own,	  not	  so	  completely	  a	  part	  of	  something	  
else.	  	  Not	  just	  a	  cell	  in	  the	  social	  body.	  	  Doesn’t	  it	  make	  you	  feel	  like	  that,	  
Lenina?”39	  	  	  
	  
Notably,	  his	  reflection	  provokes	  Lenina	  immediately	  to	  tears:	  
“It’s	  horrible,	  it’s	  horrible,”	  she	  kept	  repeating.	  	  “And	  how	  can	  you	  talk	  like	  that	  
about	  not	  wanting	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  social	  body?	  	  After	  all,	  every	  one	  works	  for	  
every	  one	  else.	  	  We	  can’t	  do	  without	  any	  one…”40	  
	  
When	  Lenina	  reminds	  him	  that	  even	  members	  of	  the	  lowest	  caste	  are	  useful	  to	  society,	  
he	  retorts	  with	  a	  plea	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  unique	  personality.	  
“Yes,	  I	  know,”	  said	  Bernard	  derisively.	  	  “‘Even	  Epsilons	  are	  useful’!	  	  So	  am	  I.	  	  And	  I	  
damned	  well	  wish	  I	  weren’t.”41	  
	  
	   Lenina	  encounters	  opportunities	  to	  recognize	  herself	  as	  an	  individual,	  to	  choose	  
her	  aims,	  and	  to	  act	  toward	  those	  goals.	  	  Her	  responses	  strikingly	  contrast	  with	  Bernard	  
and	  Helmholtz’s	  choices.	  	  By	  habit	  and	  by	  choice,	  she	  refuses	  the	  risk	  of	  becoming	  a	  
person.	  	  When	  suffering	  comes,	  she	  consistently	  checks	  out	  with	  soma.	  	  When	  solitude	  
threatens,	  she	  reaches	  for	  the	  radio.	  	  Suffering,	  silence,	  and	  friendship	  terrify	  her.	  	  
In	  another	  scene	  from	  Lenina	  and	  Bernard’s	  night	  out,	  Lenina	  willingly	  maintains	  
her	  lack	  of	  integrity.	  	  As	  their	  helicopter	  hovers,	  Bernard	  gives	  her	  a	  chance	  to	  get	  to	  
know	  him	  better	  and	  to	  reveal	  herself	  as	  more	  than	  merely	  a	  body	  with	  desires.	  
“I	  thought	  we’d	  be	  more…more	  together	  here—with	  nothing	  but	  the	  sea	  
and	  moon.	  	  More	  together	  than	  in	  that	  crowd,	  or	  even	  in	  my	  rooms.	  	  Do	  you	  
understand	  that?”42	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“I	  don’t	  understand	  anything,”	  she	  said	  with	  decision,	  determined	  to	  
preserve	  her	  incomprehension	  intact.”43	  
	  
With	  a	  quick	  smile	  and	  eyes	  full	  of	  “puzzled	  anxiety,”	  Lenina	  consciously	  turns	  down	  the	  
invitation	  to	  integrity.	  	  	  
	   Consistently,	  Lenina	  plays	  for	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  World	  State,	  and,	  on	  the	  
whole,	  she	  is	  satisfied	  with	  its	  rewards.	  	  She	  chooses	  to	  be	  infantile,	  and	  allows	  others	  to	  
treat	  her	  “as	  though	  she	  were	  a	  bit	  of	  meat.”44	  	  The	  Savage’s	  self-­‐restraint	  strengthens	  
her	  attraction	  to	  him.	  	  Lenina	  eventually	  discovers	  that	  she	  has	  developed	  an	  
unshakable	  attachment	  to	  him.45	  	  Still,	  she	  refuses	  to	  act	  on	  her	  dissatisfaction.	  	  Instead,	  
typically,	  she	  takes	  soma	  and	  follows	  the	  Arch-­‐Community-­‐Songster.46	  
	   Unlike	  Lenina,	  Bernard	  wants	  and	  tries	  to	  become	  an	  individual	  with	  purpose.	  	  
He	  is	  an	  ordinary	  man,	  failing,	  but	  sometimes	  brave	  and	  sometimes	  trying.	  	  Alone	  with	  
Lenina,	  Bernard	  boldly	  questions	  the	  program	  the	  World	  State’s	  directors	  have	  set	  for	  
people	  like	  himself:	  “Adults	  intellectually	  and	  during	  working	  hours,	  [but	  infants]	  where	  
feeling	  and	  desire	  are	  concerned.”47	  	  He	  confides	  to	  Lenina,	  “It	  suddenly	  struck	  me	  the	  
other	  day…that	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  be	  an	  adult	  all	  the	  time.”	  	  Bernard	  continues	  his	  
experiments	  with	  activities	  he	  thinks	  might	  cultivate	  his	  own	  maturity.	  	  To	  that	  end,	  he	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enjoys	  solitude,	  continues	  his	  friendship	  with	  Helmholtz,	  and	  plans	  a	  trip	  to	  see	  the	  
Indian	  Reservation	  at	  Malpais.	  	  Just	  before	  his	  trip,	  Bernard	  braces	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  
Director	  of	  Hatcheries	  and	  Conditioning.	  	  He	  needs	  to	  claim	  his	  travel	  permit,	  and	  
expects	  the	  Director’s	  disapproval.	  
To	  be	  sure,	  the	  Director	  warns	  Bernard.	  	  He	  claims	  that	  he	  has	  authority	  to	  
redirect	  Bernard’s	  activities	  outside	  of	  work	  hours	  because	  Bernard’s	  unorthodoxy	  will	  
reflect	  poorly	  on	  the	  Center	  for	  Hatcheries	  and	  Conditioning.	  	  “My	  workers	  must	  be	  
above	  suspicion,	  particularly	  those	  of	  the	  highest	  castes,”	  he	  admonishes.48	  	  “Alphas	  are	  
so	  conditioned	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  infantile	  in	  their	  emotional	  behaviour.	  	  But	  
that	  is	  all	  the	  more	  reason	  for	  their	  making	  a	  special	  effort	  to	  conform.	  	  It	  is	  their	  duty	  to	  
be	  infantile,	  even	  against	  their	  inclination.”	  
The	  directors	  of	  the	  World	  State	  want	  citizens	  melded	  into	  unity,	  stable	  and	  
passive.	  	  The	  citizen	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  individuality,	  purpose,	  and	  agency	  threatens	  the	  
legitimacy	  and	  order	  of	  the	  World	  State.	  	  As	  the	  Director	  later	  explains,	  “Unorthodoxy	  
threatens	  more	  than	  the	  life	  of	  a	  mere	  individual;	  it	  strikes	  at	  Society	  itself.”49	  
What,	  then,	  are	  the	  key	  moments	  for	  Bernard	  Marx?	  	  For	  most	  of	  his	  story,	  his	  
flashes	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  come	  as	  moments	  of	  shame	  after	  the	  fact,	  rather	  than	  
moments	  of	  reflection	  or	  self-­‐restraint	  before	  he	  talks	  or	  acts.50	  	  Bernard	  wants	  to	  be	  
brave	  and	  experience	  life	  as	  he	  encounters	  it,	  but	  he	  often	  disappoints	  himself.	  	  The	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  Ibid.,	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shame	  he	  feels	  for	  his	  failures	  motivates	  him	  to	  redouble	  his	  efforts	  “to	  show	  himself	  
strong	  and	  unorthodox.”51	  
While	  Bernard	  is	  largely	  anxious	  and	  fearful	  throughout,	  certain	  moments	  
become	  key	  junctures	  as	  he	  strives	  for	  integrity,	  takes	  risks,	  and	  refuses	  the	  more	  
comfortable	  path	  of	  compliance.52	  	  His	  first	  attempts	  at	  solitude	  are	  especially	  
noteworthy	  in	  light	  of	  his	  weakness.	  	  Early	  in	  the	  story,	  blushing	  yet	  brave,	  he	  
recommends	  a	  quiet	  walk	  and	  talk	  to	  Lenina.53	  	  Near	  the	  end,	  he	  is	  scared	  and	  
pretending	  to	  help	  John	  and	  Helmholtz	  at	  the	  Park	  Lane	  Hospital	  riot.	  	  While	  he	  can	  
barely	  keep	  himself	  from	  running	  away,	  he	  finally	  chooses	  to	  remain	  loyal	  to	  the	  Savage	  
and	  Watson.54	  	  When	  he	  is	  assigned	  to	  an	  island,	  he	  faces	  his	  destiny	  with	  “determined	  
resignation.”55	  	  As	  he	  prepares	  to	  depart,	  he	  apologizes	  to	  John	  for	  his	  cowardly	  actions,	  
and	  receives	  John’s	  forgiveness.	  	  Huxley	  writes,	  
“And	  by	  the	  way,	  John,”	  he	  continued,	  leaning	  forward	  in	  his	  chair	  and	  
laying	  a	  hand	  on	  the	  Savage’s	  knee,	  “I	  want	  to	  say	  how	  sorry	  I	  am	  about	  
everything	  that	  happened	  yesterday.”	  	  He	  blushed.	  	  “How	  ashamed,”	  he	  went	  
on,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  unsteadiness	  in	  his	  voice,	  “how	  really…”	  
The	  Savage	  cut	  him	  short	  and,	  taking	  his	  hand	  affectionately	  pressed	  it.56	  
	  
Bernard	  becomes	  more	  courageous	  as	  he	  conducts	  an	  often	  weak	  but	  nobly	  persistent	  
fight	  to	  be	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  society	  whose	  members	  deny	  distinction.	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The	  interaction	  and	  contrast	  between	  Huxley’s	  characters	  Bernard	  Marx	  and	  
Helmholtz	  Watson,	  in	  particular,	  illuminates	  the	  importance	  of	  friendship	  in	  the	  quest	  
for	  personal	  integrity.	  	  When	  we	  meet	  him,	  Helmholtz	  is	  a	  man	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose,	  
and	  a	  few	  important	  questions.	  	  Huxley	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  much	  about	  Helmholtz’s	  earlier	  
experiences.	  	  As	  we	  watch	  him,	  however,	  we	  see	  that	  he	  is	  reflective	  and	  takes	  risks.57	  	  
He	  cultivates	  habits	  that	  distinguish	  him	  as	  a	  thoughtful	  actor.	  	  When	  he	  realizes	  his	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  activities	  and	  rewards	  that	  belong	  to	  his	  station	  in	  the	  World	  
State,	  he	  pauses	  to	  reevaluate	  his	  own	  goals	  and	  actions.	  	  He	  searches	  for	  more	  
satisfying	  purposes	  for	  his	  work	  and	  life.58	  
Throughout	  his	  friendship	  with	  Bernard,	  we	  see	  Helmholtz	  cringe	  for	  his	  friend’s	  
weak	  character.	  	  He	  is	  ashamed	  for	  Bernard’s	  self-­‐pity	  and	  wishes	  Bernard	  would	  “show	  
a	  little	  more	  pride.”59	  	  He	  hates	  Bernard’s	  alternating	  boasting	  and	  self-­‐loathing,	  and	  his	  
habit	  of	  exaggerating	  his	  boldness	  and	  presence	  of	  mind	  to	  himself	  and	  to	  others	  after	  
the	  event.	  	  “He	  hated	  these	  things—just	  because	  he	  liked	  Bernard.”60	  	  By	  turns,	  Bernard	  
recognizes,	  admires,	  and	  resents	  Helmholtz’s	  integrity.	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  his	  rise	  to	  fame	  
(by	  association	  with	  the	  Savage),	  Bernard	  initiates	  a	  major	  rift	  with	  Helmholtz.	  	  When	  
Bernard	  subsequently	  realizes	  his	  error,	  Helmholtz	  restores	  him	  to	  friendship	  without	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reproach.61	  	  Instead	  of	  receiving	  Helmholtz’s	  forgiveness	  with	  gratitude,	  Bernard	  reacts	  
with	  a	  mix	  of	  pleasure	  and	  annoyance.	  	  Huxley	  writes,	  
Touched,	  Bernard	  felt	  himself	  at	  the	  same	  time	  humiliated	  by	  this	  
magnanimity—a	  magnanimity	  the	  more	  extraordinary	  and	  therefore	  more	  
humiliating	  in	  that	  it	  owed	  nothing	  to	  soma	  and	  everything	  to	  Helmholtz’s	  
character.	  	  It	  was	  the	  Helmholtz	  of	  daily	  life	  who	  forgot	  and	  forgave,	  not	  the	  
Helmholtz	  of	  the	  half-­‐gramme	  holiday.62	  
	  
Bernard’s	  volatile	  reactions	  to	  Helmholtz	  come	  out	  of	  his	  own	  conflicted	  character	  and	  
imbalanced	  estimate	  of	  himself.	  	  Helmholtz,	  by	  contrast,	  maintains	  a	  usually	  balanced	  
evaluation	  of	  himself.	  
Eventually,	  Watson’s	  actions	  get	  him	  a	  ticket	  to	  an	  island.	  	  After	  joining	  the	  
Savage	  in	  the	  riot	  at	  Park	  Lane	  Hospital,	  he	  is	  brought	  before	  Mond.	  	  Helmholtz	  listens	  
as	  the	  Controller	  describes	  his	  assignment	  to	  an	  island	  for	  individuals.	  	  For	  people	  who	  
know	  themselves	  as	  persons,	  being	  sent	  to	  an	  island,	  Mond	  says,	  is	  a	  reward.	  	  An	  island,	  
he	  says,	  offers,	  
the	  most	  interesting	  set	  of	  men	  and	  women	  to	  be	  found	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
All	  the	  people	  who,	  for	  one	  reason	  or	  another	  have	  got	  too	  self-­‐consciously	  
individual	  to	  fit	  into	  community	  life.	  	  All	  the	  people	  who	  aren’t	  satisfied	  with	  
orthodoxy,	  who’ve	  got	  independent	  ideas	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Every	  one,	  in	  a	  word,	  
who’s	  any	  one.63	  
	  
Unlike	  Lenina,	  Bernard	  and	  Helmholtz	  know	  themselves	  as	  individuals	  and	  
hunger	  for	  purpose,	  and	  attend	  to	  that	  hunger.	  	  As	  Huxley	  has	  World	  Controller	  
Mustapha	  Mond	  explain,	  purpose	  is	  a	  dangerous	  concept.	  	  Mond	  writes	  across	  the	  front	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page	  of	  a	  paper	  he	  deems	  unsafe	  for	  publication,	  “The	  author’s	  mathematical	  treatment	  
of	  the	  conception	  of	  purpose	  is	  novel	  and	  highly	  ingenious,	  but	  heretical	  and,	  so	  far	  as	  
the	  present	  social	  order	  is	  concerned,	  dangerous	  and	  potentially	  subversive.	  	  Not	  to	  be	  
published.”	  	  He	  considers	  the	  work	  excellent;	  it	  simply	  articulates	  an	  unacceptably	  
potent	  truth.	  	  Huxley	  lets	  us	  in	  on	  the	  Controller’s	  thoughts:	  
But	  once	  you	  began	  admitting	  explanations	  in	  terms	  of	  purpose—well,	  you	  didn’t	  
know	  what	  the	  result	  might	  be.	  	  It	  was	  the	  sort	  of	  idea	  that	  might	  easily	  
decondition	  the	  more	  unsettled	  minds	  among	  the	  higher	  castes—make	  them	  
lose	  their	  faith	  in	  happiness	  as	  the	  Sovereign	  Good	  and	  take	  to	  believing,	  instead,	  
that	  the	  goal	  was	  somewhere	  beyond,	  somewhere	  outside	  the	  present	  human	  
sphere;	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  life	  was	  not	  the	  maintenance	  of	  well-­‐being,	  but	  
some	  intensification	  and	  refining	  of	  consciousness,	  some	  enlargement	  of	  
knowledge.	  	  Which	  was,	  the	  Controller	  reflected,	  quite	  possibly	  true.	  	  But	  not,	  in	  
the	  present	  circumstance,	  admissible.64	  
	  
The	  longing	  for	  purpose	  motivates	  the	  quest	  for	  integrity.	  	  Mond	  does	  all	  he	  can	  to	  keep	  
citizens	  from	  naming	  or	  seeking	  to	  satisfy	  that	  longing.	  
Lastly,	  there	  is	  one	  particularly	  noteworthy	  feature	  of	  Huxley’s	  treatment	  of	  
integrity.	  	  Namely,	  Huxley	  portrays	  characters	  that	  strive	  for	  integrity	  as	  characters	  that	  
have	  friends.	  	  The	  persons	  who	  recognize	  themselves	  as	  individuals,	  distinct	  from	  the	  
social	  body,	  have	  friends.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  closing	  scenes,	  Huxley	  highlights	  friendship	  as	  
the	  mark	  of	  Bernard,	  Helmholtz,	  and	  John’s	  growth	  as	  persons.	  	  These	  three	  characters	  
form	  friendships	  with	  one	  another	  that	  strengthen	  and	  stabilize	  one	  another.	  	  By	  
contrast,	  Lenina	  lacks	  friendship—she	  likes	  to	  be	  in	  a	  crowd,	  but	  avoids	  meaningful	  
conversation.	  	  She	  does	  not	  know	  others	  and	  she	  does	  not	  know	  herself.	  	  Thus	  Huxley	  
highlights	  the	  point	  that	  integrity	  is	  an	  undertaking	  best	  accomplished	  with	  friends.	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Winston	  Smith,	  Orwell’s	  hero,	  to	  whom	  I	  next	  turn,	  must	  navigate	  a	  world	  of	  terrifying	  
uncertainty	  and	  distrust	  as	  he	  struggles	  for	  integrity.	  
	  
VIOLATION	  AND	  INTEGRITY	  IN	  NINETEEN	  EIGHTY-­‐FOUR	  
Like	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  George	  Orwell	  places	  his	  hero	  inside	  the	  organization	  that	  holds	  
political	  power.	  	  Like	  Lewis’s	  character	  Mark,	  Orwell’s	  hero	  Winston	  Smith	  undergoes	  
severe	  manipulation	  and	  coercion	  by	  agents	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  Orwell,	  however,	  gives	  a	  
more	  sustained	  and	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  personal	  violation.	  	  My	  intent	  
in	  this	  section	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  risk	  and	  demands	  of	  the	  task	  of	  personal	  integrity	  by	  
following	  Winston	  Smith’s	  journey.	  	  I	  contrast	  Winston	  with	  his	  neighbor,	  Comrade	  
Parsons,	  and	  his	  interrogator,	  O’Brien,	  in	  their	  responses	  to	  the	  unbounded	  claims	  of	  
the	  Party’s	  orthodoxy.	  
First,	  I	  describe	  Winston’s	  conduct	  in	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  orthodoxy	  the	  
Party	  imposes,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  his	  own	  experience,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Winston	  lives	  in	  
a	  regime	  that	  compels	  cooperation	  and	  disallows	  individual	  identity	  and	  initiative.	  	  He	  
struggles	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  Party	  orthodoxy	  as	  it	  conflicts	  with	  and	  the	  claims	  of	  his	  
own	  common	  sense.	  	  An	  ordinary	  man	  set	  apart	  by	  his	  thoughtfulness,	  Winston	  tries	  to	  
maintain	  his	  identity	  as	  a	  person	  capable	  of	  thought,	  affection,	  and	  action.	  
Orwell	  describes	  Winston’s	  repeated,	  intense	  experience	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  
the	  Party’s	  contrived	  reality	  and	  the	  evidence	  of	  his	  own	  memory	  and	  senses.	  	  He	  
experiences	  the	  force	  of	  Party	  orthodoxy	  as	  an	  invasion	  of	  his	  person:	  “It	  was	  as	  though	  
some	  huge	  force	  were	  pressing	  down	  upon	  you—something	  that	  penetrated	  inside	  your	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skull,	  battering	  against	  your	  brain,	  frightening	  you	  out	  of	  your	  beliefs,	  persuading	  you,	  
almost,	  to	  deny	  the	  evidence	  of	  your	  senses.”65	  	  The	  absorbing	  force	  of	  Party	  orthodoxy	  
violates	  Winston’s	  mind	  and	  affections.	  
In	  one	  disturbingly	  well-­‐written	  scene,	  Orwell	  shows	  the	  Party’s	  reach	  into	  
Winston’s	  thoughts	  and	  passions.	  	  As	  Winston	  writes	  in	  his	  diary,	  he	  recollects	  the	  
morning’s	  Two	  Minutes	  Hate,	  the	  daily	  ritual	  that	  stokes	  Department	  workers	  to	  a	  
frenzy	  of	  screeching	  hatred.	  	  For	  Winston,	  “The	  horrible	  thing	  about	  the	  Two	  Minutes	  
Hate	  was	  not	  that	  one	  was	  obliged	  to	  act	  a	  part,	  but	  that	  is	  was	  impossible	  to	  avoid	  
joining	  in.”66	  	  The	  Hate	  plunges	  him	  into	  the	  crowd’s	  furor	  against	  his	  will,	  and	  subjects	  
his	  soul	  to	  adore	  Big	  Brother.	  	  It	  fuels	  a	  passion	  he	  manages	  to	  turn,	  for	  a	  brief	  moment,	  
against	  Big	  Brother,	  and	  then,	  in	  an	  instant,	  wrenches	  him	  back	  into	  affection	  for	  the	  
dictator.	  	  The	  Hate	  plays	  on	  the	  orthodoxy	  that	  haunts	  Winston’s	  soul,	  the	  orthodoxy	  
that	  makes	  Emmanuel	  Goldstein,	  leader	  of	  the	  clandestine	  resistance	  to	  the	  regime,	  
seem	  “capable	  by	  the	  mere	  power	  of	  his	  voice	  of	  wrecking	  the	  structure	  of	  
civilization.”67	  	  Through	  Winston’s	  memory,	  Orwell	  recreates	  the	  experience	  of	  
emotional	  manipulation	  with	  piercing	  accuracy.	  
In	  another	  scene,	  Orwell	  represents	  the	  Party’s	  invasive	  force	  in	  a	  description	  of	  
a	  picture	  of	  Big	  Brother	  staring	  at	  Winston	  from	  the	  frontispiece	  of	  a	  history	  book.	  	  “It	  
was	  as	  though	  some	  huge	  force	  were	  pressing	  down	  upon	  you—something	  that	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penetrated	  inside	  your	  skull,	  battering	  against	  your	  brain,	  frightening	  you	  out	  of	  your	  
beliefs,	  persuading	  you,	  almost,	  to	  deny	  the	  evidence	  of	  your	  senses.”68	  	  Worse—and	  
the	  reality	  that	  highlights	  Winston’s	  courage	  in	  choosing	  to	  resist	  the	  regime—is	  his	  
unshakeable	  awareness	  that,	  ultimately,	  the	  Party	  will	  shatter	  him.	  	  He	  knows	  the	  force	  
that	  penetrates	  his	  skull	  will	  destroy	  his	  mind.	  	  “In	  the	  end	  the	  Party	  would	  announce	  
that	  two	  and	  two	  made	  five,	  and	  you	  would	  have	  to	  believe	  it.”	  	  	  
Winston	  grasps	  the	  Party’s	  fundamental	  opposition	  to	  the	  common	  world—the	  
world	  we	  can	  discover	  and	  discuss	  together.	  	  “Not	  merely	  the	  validity	  of	  experience,	  but	  
the	  very	  existence	  of	  external	  reality,	  was	  tacitly	  denied	  by	  their	  philosophy.	  	  The	  heresy	  
of	  heresies	  was	  common	  sense.”69	  	  The	  Party’s	  power	  and	  persistent	  denial	  of	  the	  reality	  
he	  knows	  torment	  Winston.	  	  His	  assurance	  that	  two	  and	  two	  make	  four	  melts	  into	  
certainty	  that	  the	  Party	  will	  make	  him	  believe	  that	  two	  and	  two	  make	  five.	  	  His	  next	  
thought	  thrusts	  him	  into	  the	  most	  disturbing	  and	  overwhelming	  part	  of	  the	  cycle	  of	  
manipulation:	  “And	  what	  was	  terrifying	  was	  not	  that	  they	  would	  kill	  you	  for	  thinking	  
otherwise,	  but	  that	  they	  might	  be	  right.”70	  
Two	  irreconcilable	  narratives	  pull	  a	  man	  born	  into	  a	  world	  that	  the	  Party	  claims	  is	  
a	  world	  without	  history.	  	  “The	  Party	  told	  you	  to	  reject	  the	  evidence	  of	  your	  eyes	  and	  
ears.	  	  It	  was	  their	  final,	  most	  essential	  command.”71	  	  Against	  this	  command,	  Winston’s	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courage	  surges.	  	  His	  is	  the	  brave	  resistance	  of	  an	  ordinary	  man,	  faltering	  but	  trying.	  	  
“They	  were	  wrong	  and	  he	  was	  right.	  	  The	  obvious,	  the	  silly	  and	  the	  true	  had	  got	  to	  be	  
defended.”72	  	  In	  Winston’s	  inner	  turmoil,	  Orwell	  shows	  us	  how	  the	  Party	  violates	  
Winston’s	  mind	  in	  a	  relentless	  effort	  to	  compel	  submission	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  those	  who	  
give	  orders	  in	  Oceania.	  
	   The	  Party	  molds	  men	  into	  masses	  by	  making	  solitude	  impossible	  and	  atomization	  
inescapable.	  	  Winston	  reflects	  on	  the	  Party’s	  near	  total	  violation	  of	  personal	  boundaries.	  	  
“Asleep	  or	  awake,	  working	  or	  eating,	  indoors	  or	  out	  of	  doors,	  in	  the	  bath	  or	  in	  bed—no	  
escape.	  	  Nothing	  was	  your	  own	  except	  the	  few	  cubic	  centimeters	  inside	  your	  skull.”73	  	  
For	  the	  Party,	  isolation	  is	  key	  to	  manipulation.	  	  Orwell	  describes	  the	  “locked	  loneliness”	  
in	  which	  Winston	  lives.74	  	  He	  writes,	  
In	  principle	  a	  Party	  member	  had	  no	  spare	  time,	  and	  was	  never	  alone	  except	  in	  
bed.	  	  It	  was	  assumed	  that	  when	  he	  was	  not	  working,	  eating	  or	  sleeping	  he	  would	  
be	  taking	  part	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  communal	  recreation:	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  
suggested	  a	  taste	  for	  solitude,	  even	  to	  go	  for	  a	  walk	  by	  yourself,	  was	  always	  
slightly	  dangerous.	  	  There	  was	  a	  word	  for	  it	  in	  Newspeak:	  ownlife,	  it	  was	  called,	  
meaning	  individualism	  and	  eccentricity.75	  
	  
Atomization,	  as	  Winston	  senses,	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  integrity.	  	  He	  resists	  being	  sunk	  into	  the	  
shouting,	  suffering	  mass.	  	  Instead,	  Winston	  discovers	  that	  his	  task	  is	  to	  stay	  human.	  	  He	  
makes	  choices,	  on	  his	  own	  and	  in	  relationship	  with	  Julia,	  to	  resist	  the	  Party’s	  orthodoxy	  
in	  favor	  of	  his	  own	  common	  sense	  and	  experience.	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As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Outer	  Party	  who	  yet	  strives	  to	  be	  a	  person,	  Winston	  Smith	  
experiences	  a	  tension	  that	  tears	  at	  his	  soul,	  wearies	  his	  mind,	  and	  exhausts	  his	  body.	  	  	  As	  
his	  story	  continues,	  Winston	  sees	  that,	  
What	  was	  happening	  was	  only	  the	  working-­‐out	  of	  a	  process	  that	  had	  started	  
years	  ago.	  	  The	  first	  step	  had	  been	  a	  secret,	  involuntary	  thought,	  the	  second	  had	  
been	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  diary.	  	  He	  had	  moved	  from	  thoughts	  to	  words,	  and	  now	  
from	  words	  to	  actions.	  	  The	  last	  step	  was	  something	  that	  would	  happen	  in	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Love.	  	  He	  had	  accepted	  it.	  	  The	  end	  was	  contained	  in	  the	  beginning.76	  
	  
In	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  Party	  and	  reality	  as	  he	  knows	  it,	  Winston	  
realizes,	  as	  previously	  noted,	  that	  “the	  object	  was	  not	  to	  stay	  alive	  but	  to	  stay	  human.”77	  	  
Winston	  chooses	  integrity,	  knowing	  as	  he	  chooses	  that	  it	  will	  cost	  him	  his	  life.	  
Winston’s	  neighbor	  Parsons,	  by	  contrast,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  experience	  any	  
conflict	  between	  his	  own	  thoughts	  and	  the	  Party’s	  demands—at	  least,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  
reader	  can	  see,	  not	  in	  any	  way	  that	  compels	  him	  to	  act	  against	  the	  regime.	  	  Since	  
boyhood,	  Parsons	  has	  unreflectively	  calibrated	  himself	  to	  the	  goals	  the	  Party	  sets	  for	  
people	  like	  him;	  he	  has	  been	  absorbed,	  by	  turns,	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Spies,	  the	  Youth	  
League,	  the	  Sports	  Committee,	  the	  Community	  Center,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Truth.	  	  At	  
thirty-­‐five,	  he	  is	  a	  “fattish	  but	  active	  man	  of	  paralyzing	  stupidity,	  a	  mass	  of	  imbecile	  
enthusiasms—one	  of	  those	  on	  whom,	  more	  even	  than	  on	  the	  Thought	  Police,	  the	  
stability	  of	  the	  Party	  depended.”78	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At	  lunch	  in	  the	  canteen	  one	  day,	  Parsons	  listens	  to	  of	  the	  Party’s	  broadcast	  of	  its	  
latest	  achievements	  with	  “gaping	  solemnity”	  and	  “edified	  boredom.”79	  	  Winston	  looks	  
around	  to	  see	  if	  everyone	  around	  him	  will	  accept	  the	  Party’s	  claims,	  which	  clearly	  
contradict	  its	  pledges	  the	  previous	  day.	  	  Orwell	  writes,	  “Parsons	  swallowed	  it	  easily,	  with	  
the	  stupidity	  of	  an	  animal.”80	  	  Parsons	  excels	  in	  thoughtless	  compliance,	  but	  lacks	  the	  
qualities	  of	  a	  citizen.	  	  Citizenship	  requires	  initiative,	  healthy	  independence,	  and	  concern	  
for	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  others.	  	  The	  Party,	  however,	  does	  not	  require	  thought	  and	  care.	  	  
Rather,	  as	  Winston’s	  observations	  confirm,	  the	  Party	  whittles	  away	  at	  its	  subjects’	  
capacity	  to	  think	  and	  care,	  so	  that,	  with	  nothing	  else	  to	  live	  and	  die	  for,	  they	  are	  more	  
easily	  absorbed	  into	  the	  Party’s	  aims.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  Party	  politicizes	  everything	  but	  
undermines	  citizenship.81	  	  Worse,	  still,	  in	  the	  process	  the	  Party	  deadens	  in	  most	  of	  its	  
subjects	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  toward	  any	  goal	  save	  those	  it	  establishes.	  
	   Eventually,	  the	  Thought	  Police	  capture	  Winston.	  	  Through	  a	  program	  of	  physical	  
torture	  and	  emotional	  and	  intellectual	  manipulation,	  O’Brien	  works	  to	  break	  Winston.	  	  
In	  particular,	  O’Brien	  attacks	  Winston’s	  capacity	  to	  recollect	  what	  he	  has	  seen	  and	  done.	  	  
“How	  can	  you	  control	  memory?”	  Winston	  protests	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  strength.	  	  “You	  have	  
not	  controlled	  mine!”82	  	  Ruthlessly,	  O’Brien	  hammers	  away	  at	  Winston’s	  confidence	  in	  
the	  world	  of	  common	  sense.	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You	  believe	  that	  reality	  is	  something	  objective,	  external,	  existing	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  
You	  also	  believe	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  reality	  is	  self-­‐evident…Whatever	  the	  Party	  
holds	  to	  be	  truth,	  is	  truth.	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  see	  reality	  except	  by	  looking	  
through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Party.	  	  That	  is	  the	  fact	  you	  have	  got	  to	  re-­‐learn,	  Winston.	  	  
It	  needs	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐destruction,	  and	  effort	  of	  the	  will.83	  
	  
Winston	  strives	  for	  integrity.	  	  O’Brien	  demands	  self-­‐destruction	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  Party.	  	  
He	  demands	  that	  Winston	  lose	  himself	  to	  the	  Party	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  power—because	  the	  
Party,	  he	  says,	  is	  greater	  and	  more	  enduring	  than	  any	  one	  person.	  	  Like	  Winston,	  O’Brien	  
had	  a	  choice.	  	  He	  chose	  power.	  
	   In	  torment,	  Winston	  struggles	  for	  his	  sanity.	  	  “What	  could	  you	  do,	  thought	  
Winston,	  against	  the	  lunatic	  who	  is	  more	  intelligent	  than	  yourself,	  who	  gives	  your	  
arguments	  a	  fair	  hearing	  and	  then	  simply	  persists	  in	  his	  lunacy?”84	  	  O’Brien	  mocks	  
Winston,	  telling	  him	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  not	  his	  strong	  suit.	  	  But	  Winston,	  a	  man	  who	  for	  
years	  has	  tried	  to	  be	  human,	  knows	  that	  a	  system	  founded	  in	  continual	  pursuit	  of	  the	  
thrill	  of	  power	  cannot	  survive	  forever.	  	  “It	  is	  impossible	  to	  found	  a	  civilization	  on	  fear	  
and	  hatred	  and	  cruelty.	  	  It	  would	  never	  endure.”85	  	  Even	  when	  O’Brien’s	  voice	  “had	  
battered	  Winston	  helpless,”	  the	  man	  speaks	  against	  the	  nightmare	  O’Brien	  praises.	  	  
“And	  yet,”	  Orwell	  writes,	  
he	  could	  not	  keep	  silent.	  	  Feebly,	  without	  arguments,	  with	  nothing	  to	  support	  
him	  except	  his	  inarticulate	  horror	  of	  what	  O’Brien	  had	  said,	  he	  returned	  the	  
attack.	  
	   “I	  don’t	  know—I	  don’t	  care.	  	  Somehow	  you	  will	  fail.	  	  Something	  will	  
defeat	  you.	  	  Life	  will	  defeat	  you.”86	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As	  his	  story	  closes,	  Winston	  is	  shattered,	  as	  he	  knew	  he	  would	  be.	  	  “He	  had	  won	  the	  
victory	  over	  himself,”	  Orwell	  writes.	  	  “He	  loved	  Big	  Brother.”87	  	  In	  truth,	  however,	  
Winston	  does	  not.	  	  He	  has	  been	  tortured,	  mind,	  soul	  and	  body.	  	  O’Brien	  has	  denied	  
Winston	  Smith’s	  personhood	  and	  agency.	  	  Love,	  as	  Winston	  witnessed	  it	  in	  his	  mother	  
and	  in	  the	  care	  Julia	  evokes	  from	  him,	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  choice	  and	  actions.	  	  It	  is	  not	  
real	  unless	  freely	  chosen,	  freely	  committed,	  and	  freely	  practiced.	  	  In	  forcing	  Winston	  to	  
“love”	  Big	  Brother,	  O’Brien	  has	  denied	  and	  deeply	  bruised	  Winston’s	  capacity	  to	  love	  at	  
all.	  
Through	  their	  stories,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  show	  that	  developing	  a	  sense	  
and	  practice	  of	  personal	  integrity	  is	  basic	  to	  becoming	  an	  accountable	  actor.	  	  To	  be	  a	  
responsible	  person,	  you	  first	  have	  to	  be	  a	  person.	  	  Their	  narratives	  show	  that	  the	  effort	  
to	  be	  a	  whole	  person,	  who	  is	  oriented	  toward	  distinct	  goals	  and	  resistant	  to	  the	  
pressure	  other	  people	  exert	  on	  behalf	  of	  contrary	  goals,	  entails	  risk	  and	  conflict.	  	  It	  is	  an	  
ongoing	  journey,	  in	  which	  men	  sometimes	  fail,	  or	  are	  subject	  to	  overwhelming	  pressure	  
from	  others.	  	  Integrity	  is	  costly.	  	  And	  yet—in	  the	  contrast	  between	  characters	  who	  live	  in	  
integrity	  and	  those	  who	  live	  in	  subjection	  to	  the	  arbitrary	  will	  of	  others—each	  of	  the	  
stories	  shows	  that	  integrity	  is	  attractive.	  	  For,	  each	  story	  shows	  that	  integrity	  is	  essential	  
to	  a	  truly	  satisfying	  life.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  




FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  POLITICAL	  SOCIETY	  
	  
“The	  Party	  seeks	  power	  entirely	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  	  We	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  good	  of	  
others;	  we	  are	  interested	  solely	  in	  power…We	  are	  different	  from	  all	  the	  other	  oligarchies	  
of	  the	  past,	  in	  that	  we	  know	  what	  we	  are	  doing.”	  
	  
-­‐	  O’Brien,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four1	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
My	  intent	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  protagonists	  in	  Brave	  New	  World,	  
That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  respectively,	  discover	  and	  challenge	  
the	  lust	  for	  order	  that	  the	  rulers	  the	  World	  State,	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  and	  Oceania,	  respectively,	  
have	  established	  as	  the	  foundation	  and	  goal	  of	  their	  political	  society.	  	  Rulers	  in	  each	  
regime	  assert	  objectives,	  and	  corollary	  claims	  of	  authority	  over	  individuals,	  that	  the	  hero	  
must	  challenge	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  the	  human	  obligations	  he	  senses.	  	  In	  each	  story,	  the	  
hero	  finds	  that	  the	  lust	  for	  order	  is	  toxic	  to	  the	  dignity	  of	  persons	  and,	  ultimately,	  to	  the	  
possibility	  of	  political	  community.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  want	  to	  briefly	  describe	  the	  conflict	  
between	  the	  protagonist	  and	  his	  political	  oppressors.	  	  Next,	  I	  show	  how	  each	  novel	  
details	  the	  hero’s	  resistance	  to	  aims	  that	  undermine	  human	  purpose	  and	  genuine	  
political	  society.	  	  Lastly,	  I	  will	  compare	  and	  evaluate	  the	  accounts	  given	  in	  each	  novel.	  
	  
BEAUTY	  OF	  ORDER	  AND	  ABUSE	  OF	  POWER	  
	   There	  is	  a	  literature	  of	  the	  beauty	  of	  order	  that	  extends	  from	  Plato	  to	  Hobbes.	  	  
As	  works	  of	  art	  and	  political	  thought,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	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Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  contribute	  to	  that	  line	  of	  inquiry	  as	  they	  portray	  rulers	  who	  value	  
order	  above	  all	  else.	  	  In	  each	  novel,	  the	  hero	  discovers	  that,	  underlying	  certain	  men’s	  
aims	  for	  the	  state	  and	  its	  citizens,	  there	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  secure	  order	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
order	  and	  power	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  power.	  	  In	  short,	  while	  our	  heroes	  appreciate	  the	  
significance	  and	  beauty	  of	  order,	  they	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  those	  who	  embody	  an	  
overzealous	  and	  inordinate	  desire	  for	  order.	  
To	  be	  sure,	  each	  hero	  appreciates	  the	  need	  for	  order	  as	  an	  essential	  condition	  of	  
political	  community.	  	  None	  of	  our	  heroes	  are	  anarchists;	  none	  desires	  to	  overthrow	  
political	  authority	  as	  such.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  protagonists,	  more	  than	  through	  
those	  who	  oppress	  them	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  order,	  that	  the	  reader	  gains	  an	  appreciation	  for	  
a	  well-­‐ordered	  society—a	  society	  that	  preserves	  peace,	  respects	  persons,	  and	  facilitates	  
the	  pursuit	  of	  human	  goods.	  	  Even	  more	  importantly,	  it	  is	  through	  John	  the	  Savage,	  
Winston	  Smith,	  Mark	  Studdock,	  and	  Jane	  Studdock	  that	  we	  glimpse	  various	  visions	  of	  
cosmic	  order.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  protagonists	  find	  that	  when	  a	  society	  aims	  primarily	  at	  
order	  through	  control,	  its	  members	  become	  increasingly	  blind	  to	  the	  very	  things	  that	  
make	  human	  life	  worth	  living.	  	  In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  I	  describe	  the	  conversation,	  
present	  in	  all	  three	  stories,	  in	  which	  those	  in	  power	  reveal	  their	  goals	  for	  political	  
society.	  	  In	  Brave	  New	  World,	  World	  Controller	  Mustapha	  Mond	  explains	  the	  
foundations	  of	  the	  World	  State	  to	  John	  the	  Savage,	  Helmholtz	  Watson,	  and,	  while	  he	  
can	  stand	  it,	  Bernard	  Marx.	  	  In	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  O’Brien	  tells	  Winston	  Smith	  about	  
the	  Party’s	  program	  of	  a	  society	  based	  on	  the	  continual	  achievement	  of	  power.	  	  Under	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duress,	  Winston	  responds.	  	  In	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  the	  conversation	  unfolds	  in	  
segments.	  	  First,	  at	  dinner	  three	  men	  (Winter,	  Filastrato,	  and	  Gould)	  discuss	  the	  real	  
aims	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  with	  potential	  N.I.C.E.	  initiate,	  Mark	  Studdock.	  	  Another	  principal	  
character,	  Ransom,	  later	  returns	  to	  the	  same	  themes.	  	  Toward	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  
story,	  there	  is	  a	  conversation	  between	  members	  of	  the	  company	  at	  St.	  Anne’s	  regarding	  
the	  aims	  and	  characters	  of	  nations.	  	  Throughout,	  Jane	  Studdock	  struggles	  with	  the	  
tension	  between	  her	  desires	  for	  individual	  autonomy,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  for	  
significance,	  on	  the	  other.	  
Huxley	  draws	  out	  the	  contrast	  between	  stability,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  
potential	  for	  real	  happiness,	  a	  posture	  toward	  life	  that	  entails	  both	  suffering	  and	  
satisfaction,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  While	  his	  account	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  prescient	  portrayal	  of	  
the	  use	  of	  technology	  to	  subdue	  uncertainty,	  it	  fails	  to	  explore	  the	  motives	  that	  drive	  
men	  to	  pursue	  stability	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  more	  profound	  sources	  of	  human	  significance	  and	  
satisfaction.	  	  To	  his	  novel	  I	  now	  turn.	  
	  
STABILITY,	  SATISFACTION,	  AND	  SUFFERING	  
The	  world	  Huxley’s	  reader	  first	  meets	  in	  the	  Hatcheries	  and	  Conditioning	  Center,	  
and	  then	  through	  the	  Savage’s	  eyes	  as	  he	  lives	  in	  London,	  is	  built	  on	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  
directors	  of	  the	  World	  State.	  	  Mustapha	  Mond,	  one	  of	  the	  World	  Controllers,	  reveals	  
these	  aims	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  the	  Savage,	  Helmholtz,	  and	  Bernard.	  	  The	  goal	  is	  social	  
stability—a	  shallow	  and	  false	  happiness	  that	  fits	  into	  a	  predictable	  world	  and	  quells	  the	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real	  passion,	  satisfaction	  and	  suffering,	  that	  comes	  with	  genuine	  human	  experience.	  	  As	  
Mond	  says,	  “The	  world’s	  stable	  now.”2	  	  He	  continues,	  
People	  are	  happy;	  they	  get	  what	  they	  want,	  and	  they	  never	  want	  what	  they	  can’t	  
get.	  	  They’re	  well	  off;	  they’re	  safe;	  they’re	  never	  ill;	  they’re	  not	  afraid	  of	  death;	  
they’re	  blissfully	  ignorant	  of	  passion	  and	  old	  age;	  they’re	  plagued	  with	  no	  
mothers	  or	  fathers;	  they’ve	  got	  no	  wives	  or	  children	  or	  lovers	  to	  feel	  strongly	  
about;	  they’re	  so	  conditioned	  that	  they	  practically	  can’t	  help	  behaving	  as	  they	  
ought	  to	  behave.	  	  And	  if	  anything	  should	  go	  wrong,	  there’s	  soma.	  
	  
Mond	  censures	  the	  Savage	  for	  jeopardizing	  this	  stability	  “in	  the	  name	  of	  liberty,	  
Mr.	  Savage.	  	  Liberty!”3	  	  	  Against	  John’s	  quest	  for	  meaning,	  the	  World	  Controller	  explains	  
that	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  World	  State	  are	  pursuing	  a	  lower,	  but	  more	  stable	  standard	  for	  
human	  welfare.	  	  He	  says,	  “Our	  Ford	  himself	  did	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  shift	  the	  emphasis	  from	  
truth	  and	  beauty	  to	  comfort	  and	  happiness.”4	  	  Those	  in	  power	  made	  this	  decision,	  Mond	  
emphasizes,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  quiet	  the	  deadly	  political	  chaos	  that	  characterized	  the	  
modern	  world	  in	  the	  previous	  era.	  	  The	  trade-­‐offs	  seemed	  justified:	  “What’s	  the	  point	  of	  
truth	  or	  beauty	  or	  knowledge	  when	  the	  anthrax	  bombs	  are	  popping	  all	  around	  you?”	  	  
People	  wanted	  order	  restored.	  	  “Anything	  for	  a	  quiet	  life.”	  	  Once	  established,	  the	  
project	  continued	  to	  develop	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  its	  own	  logic.	  	  Mond	  explains	  to	  John	  and	  
Watson,	  “We’ve	  gone	  on	  controlling	  ever	  since.	  	  It	  hasn’t	  been	  very	  good	  for	  truth,	  of	  
course.	  	  But	  it’s	  been	  very	  good	  for	  happiness.	  	  One	  can’t	  have	  something	  for	  nothing.”5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








The	  exchange	  of	  significance	  for	  stability	  is	  easy—unless,	  as	  the	  Savage	  
maintains,	  humans	  really	  are	  meant	  for	  more	  and	  accountable	  for	  our	  lives.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  
Savage	  asks	  whether	  our	  sense	  of	  getting	  away	  with	  stability	  and	  comfort	  as	  our	  highest	  
personal	  and	  political	  goal	  is	  really	  our	  punishment.	  	  When	  Watson	  leaves	  for	  exile	  to	  an	  
island	  of	  individuals,	  Mustapha	  Mond	  shares	  with	  the	  Savage	  a	  passage	  from	  Cardinal	  
John	  Henry	  Newman.	  	  Importantly,	  Mond	  himself	  is	  confident	  in	  his	  own	  ability	  and	  
authority	  to	  define	  the	  parameters	  for	  his	  own	  action	  as	  he	  does	  for	  citizens	  of	  the	  
World	  State.	  	  He	  informs	  John,	  for	  example,	  “But	  as	  I	  make	  the	  laws	  here,	  I	  can	  break	  
them.”6	  	  However,	  Mond	  reads	  to	  John	  a	  quite	  different	  perspective	  from	  Newman.	  
He	  opened	  the	  book	  at	  the	  place	  marked	  by	  a	  slip	  of	  paper	  and	  began	  to	  read.	  	  
“‘We	  are	  not	  our	  own	  any	  more	  than	  what	  we	  possess	  is	  our	  own.	  	  We	  did	  not	  
make	  ourselves,	  we	  cannot	  be	  supreme	  over	  ourselves.	  	  We	  are	  not	  our	  own	  
masters.	  	  We	  are	  God’s	  property.	  	  Is	  it	  not	  our	  happiness	  thus	  to	  view	  the	  
matter?	  	  Is	  it	  any	  happiness	  or	  any	  comfort,	  to	  consider	  that	  we	  are	  our	  own?	  	  It	  
may	  be	  thought	  so	  by	  the	  young	  and	  prosperous.	  	  These	  may	  thing	  it	  a	  great	  
thing	  to	  have	  everything,	  as	  they	  suppose,	  their	  own	  way—to	  depend	  on	  no	  
one—to	  have	  to	  thing	  of	  nothing	  out	  of	  sight,	  to	  be	  without	  the	  irksomeness	  of	  
continual	  acknowledgement,	  continual	  prayer,	  continual	  reference	  of	  what	  they	  
ought	  to	  do	  to	  the	  will	  of	  another.	  	  But	  as	  time	  goes	  on,	  they,	  as	  all	  men,	  will	  find	  
that	  independence	  was	  not	  made	  for	  man—that	  it	  is	  an	  unnatural	  state—will	  do	  
for	  a	  while,	  but	  will	  not	  carry	  us	  on	  safely	  to	  the	  end.’”7	  
	  
As	  their	  conversation	  continues,	  the	  Savage	  questions	  Mond’s	  assurance	  that	  he	  
and	  fellow	  members	  of	  the	  brave	  new	  world	  can	  successfully	  redefine	  men’s	  purpose	  
and	  order	  political	  society	  accordingly.	  	  He	  draws	  on	  a	  scene	  from	  Shakespeare	  with	  
which	  Mond	  seems	  to	  be	  familiar:	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7	  Ibid.,	  232.	  	  The	  excerpt	  is	  from	  Newman’s	  “Sermon	  6:	  Remembrance	  of	  Past	  Mercies,”	  in	  vol.	  5,	  Works	  of	  
John	  Henry	  Newman.	  	  The	  National	  Institute	  for	  Newman	  Studies,	  2007.	  Available	  at	  
http://www.newmanreader.org/works/parochial/volume5/sermon6.html.	  Retrieved	  on	  August	  2,	  2014.	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“Do	  you	  remember	  that	  bit	  in	  King	  Lear?”	  said	  the	  Savage	  at	  last.	  	  “‘The	  gods	  are	  
just	  and	  of	  our	  pleasant	  vices	  make	  instruments	  to	  plague	  us.”	  
	  
When	  Mond	  reassures	  him	  that	  men	  really	  can	  define	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  existence—
that	  “Providence	  takes	  its	  cue	  from	  men”—the	  Savage	  continues	  to	  question	  him.	  	  “The	  
gods	  are	  just.	  	  Haven’t	  they	  used	  his	  pleasant	  vices	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  degrade	  him?”	  	  
The	  Savage	  starts	  with	  an	  assumption	  much	  closer	  to	  Newman’s—namely,	  that	  “value	  
dwells	  not	  in	  a	  particular	  will,”	  but	  is	  given	  to	  men—while	  Mond,	  by	  contrast,	  insists	  
that	  men	  can	  invent	  new	  values	  at	  will.8	  
In	  the	  face	  of	  political	  chaos,	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  World	  State	  choose	  to	  sacrifice	  
beauty,	  truth,	  and	  genuine	  happiness	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  stability	  and	  admittedly	  shallow	  
pleasures.	  	  As	  Mond	  sums	  it,	  “We	  prefer	  to	  do	  things	  comfortably.”9	  	  Against	  this	  narrow	  
world,	  the	  Savage	  declares	  that	  he	  will	  hold	  onto	  a	  more	  fully	  human	  existence.	  	  He	  
replies,	  “But	  I	  don’t	  want	  comfort.	  	  I	  want	  God,	  I	  want	  poetry,	  I	  want	  real	  danger,	  I	  want	  
freedom,	  I	  want	  goodness,	  I	  want	  sin.”10	  	  In	  claiming	  the	  right	  to	  be	  unhappy,	  he	  clings	  
to	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  more	  truly	  happy	  and	  more	  fully	  human.	  
	  
THE	  HUMAN	  SPIRIT	  AND	  A	  MERCILESS	  WORLD	  
Notably,	  Orwell	  makes	  O’Brien	  speak	  most	  clearly	  when	  it	  matters	  most.	  	  Toward	  
the	  end	  of	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  O’Brien	  gives	  the	  real	  motive	  for	  the	  Party’s	  program:	  
power	  is	  erotic.	  	  As	  he	  endures	  O’Brien’s	  torture,	  Winston	  anticipates	  that	  O’Brien	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Huxley,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  236.	  
	  




offer	  a	  clichéd	  dictator’s	  defense	  of	  power.	  	  He	  expects	  his	  tormentor	  to	  say	  that	  the	  
Party	  concentrates	  and	  exercises	  power	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  majority.11	  	  However,	  
O’Brien	  bluntly	  states	  the	  Party’s	  aims	  to	  Winston:	  “The	  Party	  seeks	  power	  entirely	  for	  
its	  own	  sake.	  	  We	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  good	  of	  others;	  we	  are	  interested	  solely	  in	  
power.”12	  	  By	  making	  O’Brien	  describe	  the	  Party’s	  aims	  in	  the	  clearest	  possible	  terms,	  
Orwell	  allows	  his	  characters	  and	  readers	  to	  wrestle	  more	  directly	  with	  the	  nature	  and	  
consequences	  of	  a	  regime	  designed	  to	  achieve	  a	  recurring	  thrill	  of	  power.	  	  O’Brien	  says	  
to	  Winston,	  “We	  are	  different	  from	  all	  the	  oligarchies	  of	  the	  past,	  in	  that	  we	  know	  what	  
we	  are	  doing.”13	  	  By	  casting	  O’Brien	  as	  a	  Party	  agent	  who	  understands	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  
the	  Party’s	  endeavor,	  Orwell	  deals	  directly	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  power,	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  
watch	  as	  Winston	  does	  the	  same.	  
Orwell	  has	  O’Brien	  describe	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  regime	  Winston	  has	  been	  formed	  
by,	  questioned,	  and	  tried	  to	  resist.	  	  The	  Party	  agent	  affirms,	  “Power	  is	  not	  a	  means,	  it	  is	  
an	  end.”14	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  two	  essential	  features	  of	  power	  to	  Winston.	  
The	  first	  feature	  illuminates	  the	  Party’s	  attempts	  to	  erase	  personal	  identity.	  	  
Winston	  waits	  for	  another	  jolt	  of	  electricity	  to	  rip	  through	  his	  being.	  	  “The	  first	  thing	  you	  
must	  realize,”	  O’Brien	  says,	  “is	  that	  power	  is	  collective.	  	  The	  individual	  only	  has	  power	  in	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so	  far	  as	  he	  ceases	  to	  be	  an	  individual.”15	  	  Individuals	  die.	  	  Death,	  says	  O’Brien	  “is	  the	  
greatest	  of	  all	  failures.”16	  	  He	  tells	  Winston	  the	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  death	  to	  which	  	  
every	  individual	  eventually	  comes.	  	  “But	  if	  he	  can	  make	  complete,	  utter	  submission,	  if	  he	  
can	  escape	  from	  his	  identity,	  if	  he	  can	  merge	  himself	  in	  the	  Party	  so	  that	  he	  is	  the	  Party,	  
then	  he	  is	  all-­‐powerful	  and	  immortal.”17	  
	   The	  next	  feature	  of	  power	  O’Brien	  describes	  helps	  explain	  why	  the	  Party’s	  agents	  
are	  most	  interested	  in	  the	  thoughts	  and	  habits	  of	  those	  under	  its	  command.	  	  “The	  
second	  thing	  for	  you	  to	  realize,”	  he	  says,	  is	  that	  power	  is	  power	  over	  human	  beings.”18	  	  
The	  Party’s	  agents	  are	  driven	  by	  an	  inherently	  unlimited	  lust	  for	  power.	  	  Accordingly,	  
they	  primarily	  want	  power	  not	  over	  mere	  nature,	  but	  over	  human	  beings.	  	  The	  way	  to	  
exercise	  power	  over	  persons	  is	  to	  compel	  them	  to	  disbelieve	  the	  evidence	  of	  common	  
sense	  and	  their	  own	  experience.	  	  Party	  agents	  therefore	  want	  to	  control	  the	  whole	  
person,	  mind	  and	  body	  and	  soul.	  
	   The	  motive	  that	  drives	  Party	  agents—the	  insatiable	  motive	  that	  O’Brien	  thinks	  
will	  ensure	  the	  Party’s	  everlasting	  dominance—is	  the	  thrill	  of	  power.	  	  He	  mocks	  
Winston:	  “always	  there	  will	  be	  the	  intoxication	  of	  power,	  constantly	  increasing	  and	  
constantly	  growing	  subtler.	  	  Always,	  at	  every	  moment,	  there	  will	  be	  the	  thrill	  of	  victory,	  
the	  sensation	  of	  trampling	  on	  an	  enemy	  who	  is	  helpless.”19	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What,	  then,	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  power’s	  attraction?	  	  The	  thrill	  of	  power	  is	  the	  thrill	  
of	  unlimited	  and	  unaccountable	  mastery	  over	  other	  persons.	  	  First,	  the	  thrill	  of	  power	  
depends	  on	  its	  unlimited	  exercise.	  	  Unlimited	  power	  violates	  the	  moral,	  intellectual,	  
emotional,	  or	  physical	  boundaries	  of	  another.	  	  The	  mark	  of	  power	  achieved	  is	  making	  
another	  person	  conform	  their	  will	  to	  yours,	  against	  their	  own	  will.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  
make	  someone	  do	  what	  you	  want	  them	  to	  do	  when	  they	  have	  no	  reason	  or	  inclination	  
of	  their	  own	  to	  do	  so.	  	  When	  a	  man	  makes	  another	  human	  act	  against	  his	  own	  reason,	  
affections,	  and	  inclinations,	  against	  all	  his	  internal	  guides	  to	  action,	  that	  man	  coerces	  
the	  other	  to	  abandon	  his	  own	  identity	  in	  submission.	  	  The	  man	  who	  seeks	  to	  dominate	  
must	  strip	  the	  other	  person	  of	  his	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  absorb	  that	  person	  into	  the	  
identity	  of	  the	  one	  exercising	  power.	  	  In	  short,	  power	  denies	  agency.	  
Moreover,	  the	  thrill	  of	  power	  depends	  on	  its	  unaccountable	  exercise—it	  is	  an	  
exercise	  of	  force	  in	  which	  the	  agent	  answers	  to	  no	  one.	  	  Importantly,	  those	  who	  abuse	  
power	  do	  not	  deny	  nature;	  rather,	  they	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐make	  it.	  	  O’Brien	  says	  there	  is	  no	  
human	  nature.	  	  But	  he	  exults	  in	  shattering	  and	  re-­‐making	  nature.	  	  The	  thrill	  of	  dominion	  
is	  not	  in	  denying	  nature,	  but	  in	  re-­‐making	  nature.	  	  If	  one’s	  aim	  is	  the	  excitement	  of	  
exerting	  control	  over	  humans,	  then	  the	  ability	  to	  break	  and	  re-­‐make	  human	  nature	  
would	  be	  evidence	  of	  ultimate	  power.	  	  O’Brien	  hammers	  the	  point	  to	  Winston:	  
“How	  does	  one	  man	  assert	  his	  power	  over	  another,	  Winston?”20	  
Winston	  thought.	  	  “By	  making	  him	  suffer,”	  he	  said.	  
“Exactly,”	  [said	  O’Brien.]	  	  “By	  making	  him	  suffer.	  	  Obedience	  is	  not	  
enough.	  	  Unless	  he	  is	  suffering,	  how	  can	  you	  be	  sure	  that	  he	  is	  obeying	  your	  will	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and	  not	  his	  own?	  	  Power	  is	  inflicting	  pain	  and	  humiliation.	  	  Power	  is	  in	  tearing	  
human	  minds	  to	  pieces	  and	  putting	  them	  together	  again	  in	  shapes	  of	  your	  own	  
choosing.”21	  
	  
What	  Winston	  gets	  at	  and	  holds	  to,	  even	  if	  he	  cannot	  directly	  express	  it,	  is	  that	  
the	  conflict	  between	  the	  agents	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  the	  human	  beings	  they	  want	  to	  control	  
is	  not	  merely	  a	  battle	  of	  wills.	  	  If	  the	  conflict	  was	  merely	  a	  conflict	  of	  wills,	  then	  O’Brien	  
would	  be	  right:	  if	  the	  test	  is	  solely	  a	  test	  of	  power,	  then	  whoever	  lasts	  the	  longest	  wins.	  	  
But	  Winston	  is	  on	  to	  the	  truth.	  	  The	  contest	  is	  not	  merely	  one	  of	  power.	  	  Winston	  knows	  
that	  even	  when	  O’Brien	  breaks	  his	  will,	  the	  right,	  “the	  obvious,	  the	  silly	  and	  the	  true”	  
will	  stand.	  
Critically,	  the	  reality	  Winston	  clings	  to	  reminds	  him	  that	  an	  increasingly	  merciless	  
society	  cannot	  endure.	  	  In	  Winston,	  Orwell	  shows	  us	  a	  man	  who	  is	  human	  enough	  to	  
know	  that	  a	  system	  based	  on	  the	  thrill	  of	  power	  is	  so	  contrary	  to	  human	  nature	  that	  it	  
cannot	  endure.	  	  O’Brien	  describes	  to	  Winston	  the	  kind	  of	  world	  the	  Party’s	  agents	  are	  
creating:	  “A	  world	  of	  fear	  and	  treachery	  and	  torment,	  a	  world	  of	  trampling	  and	  being	  
trampled	  upon,	  a	  world	  which	  will	  not	  grow	  less	  but	  more	  merciless	  as	  it	  refines	  itself.”22	  	  
Yet	  Winston	  has	  experiences	  that	  tell	  him	  that	  an	  increasingly	  merciless	  society	  cannot	  
endure.	  
Mercy	  is	  love	  that	  does	  not	  stop.	  	  Winston’s	  limited	  experience	  of	  mercy	  is	  his	  
mother’s	  love.	  	  He	  remembers	  his	  mother	  as	  a	  woman	  who	  “possessed	  a	  kind	  of	  
nobility,	  a	  kind	  of	  purity,	  simply	  because	  the	  standards	  that	  she	  obeyed	  were	  private	  





ones.”23	  	  Her	  standard	  for	  action,	  he	  reflects,	  is	  not	  efficacy,	  but	  meaning.	  	  This	  standard	  
enables	  her	  to	  love	  her	  children	  when	  they	  do	  not	  want	  or	  reciprocate	  her	  love,	  and	  
when	  she	  is	  powerless	  to	  change	  their	  material	  circumstances.	  	  In	  her	  mind,	  “If	  you	  
loved	  someone,	  you	  loved	  him,	  and	  when	  you	  had	  nothing	  else	  to	  give,	  you	  still	  gave	  
him	  love.”24	  
To	  promise	  and	  practice	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  good	  of	  another	  is	  beyond	  
rationality,	  and	  makes	  us	  human.	  	  “The	  terrible	  thing	  that	  the	  Party	  had	  done,”	  Winston	  
realizes	  one	  night	  in	  bed	  with	  Julia,	  “was	  to	  persuade	  you	  that	  mere	  impulses,	  mere	  
feelings,	  were	  of	  no	  account,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  robbing	  you	  of	  power	  over	  the	  
material	  world.”25	  	  When	  Winston	  remembers	  his	  mother’s	  love,	  he	  remembers	  a	  world	  
where	  people	  “were	  not	  loyal	  to	  a	  party	  or	  a	  country	  or	  an	  idea,	  they	  were	  loyal	  to	  one	  
another.”26	  	  In	  the	  next	  instant,	  he	  sees	  the	  humanity	  of	  the	  proles.	  	  They	  “had	  stayed	  
human…They	  had	  held	  on	  to	  the	  primitive	  emotions	  which	  he	  himself	  had	  to	  re-­‐learn	  by	  
conscious	  effort.”27	  
Further,	  when	  Winston	  remembers	  affection	  and	  inclination	  and	  unstopping	  
love,	  he	  gains	  a	  new	  standard	  for	  success.	  	  The	  “object,”	  he	  realizes	  anew,	  is	  “not	  to	  stay	  
alive,	  but	  to	  stay	  human.”28	  	  To	  be	  human,	  he	  concludes,	  requires	  one	  to	  honor	  the	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inclinations	  and	  affections	  one	  discovers	  in	  oneself.	  	  The	  agents	  of	  the	  Party	  “could	  lay	  
bare	  in	  the	  utmost	  detail	  everything	  that	  you	  had	  done	  or	  said	  or	  thought;	  but	  the	  inner	  
heart,	  whose	  workings	  were	  mysterious	  even	  to	  yourself,	  remained	  impregnable.”29	  
Even	  before	  he	  remembers	  his	  mother’s	  love,	  Winston	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  
experience	  the	  mysterious	  workings	  of	  the	  inner	  heart	  as	  his	  aggressive	  lust	  for	  Julia	  was	  
transformed	  into	  affection.	  	  One	  day,	  when	  he	  had	  been	  caught	  in	  a	  flash	  of	  possessive	  
anger	  against	  Julia,	  she	  reached	  toward	  him	  and	  “gave	  the	  tips	  of	  his	  fingers	  a	  quick	  
squeeze	  that	  seemed	  to	  invite	  not	  desire	  but	  affection.”30	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  story,	  
Winston’s	  capacity	  for	  affection	  is	  re-­‐awakened.	  	  He	  begins	  to	  care	  about	  her	  for	  her	  
own	  sake,	  instead	  of	  as	  “a	  physical	  necessity,	  something	  that	  he	  not	  only	  wanted	  by	  felt	  
he	  had	  a	  right	  to.”	  	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  he	  glimpses	  the	  nature	  of	  committed,	  daily	  love.	  	  
In	  that	  moment,	  “a	  deep	  tenderness,	  such	  as	  he	  had	  not	  felt	  for	  her	  before,	  suddenly	  
took	  hold	  of	  him.	  	  He	  wished	  they	  were	  a	  married	  couple	  of	  ten	  years’	  standing.”	  
	   Winston	  had	  been	  a	  merciless	  child,	  cruel	  toward	  his	  mother	  and	  baby	  sister,	  
and	  yet	  his	  mother	  loved	  him.	  	  Winston	  had	  been	  a	  merciless	  man,	  until	  in	  relationship	  
with	  Julia	  he	  began	  to	  learn	  to	  love.	  	  Through	  these	  relationships,	  Winston	  has	  been	  
loved	  and	  awakened	  to	  the	  knowledge	  that	  respect	  for	  the	  mysterious	  workings	  of	  the	  
inner	  heart	  is	  the	  mark	  of	  humanity.	  	  He	  knows	  that	  an	  increasingly	  merciless	  society	  
commits	  suicide.	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Importantly,	  O’Brien	  says	  the	  Party	  is	  making	  a	  world	  that	  grows	  increasingly	  
merciless	  “as	  it	  refines	  itself.”31	  	  But	  Winston	  knows	  that	  a	  world	  cannot	  refine	  itself.	  	  
Rather,	  men	  make	  choices:	  the	  Party’s	  agents	  have	  been	  malformed	  by	  their	  own	  will	  or	  
by	  the	  will	  of	  others,	  into	  agents	  of	  the	  Party	  who	  implement	  its	  perverse	  practices.	  	  
Some,	  like	  O’Brien,	  are	  self-­‐consciously	  driven	  by	  lust	  for	  power;	  some,	  like	  Parsons,	  are	  
less	  consciously	  driven	  by	  habit	  and	  fear,	  because	  the	  Party	  has	  ensured	  that	  the	  
patterns	  of	  their	  workdays,	  meals,	  relationships,	  and	  passions	  deadens	  their	  capacity	  to	  
imagine	  or	  act	  differently.	  
	   As	  he	  battles	  the	  disorienting	  force	  of	  O’Brien’s	  physical	  and	  mental	  violence,	  
Winston	  affirms	  all	  he	  knows:	  “I	  don’t	  know—I	  don’t	  care.	  	  Somehow	  you	  will	  fail.	  	  
Something	  will	  defeat	  you.	  	  Life	  will	  defeat	  you.”32	  	  When	  O’Brien	  defines	  “Humanity”	  as	  
members	  of	  the	  Party,	  Winston	  clings	  to	  what	  he	  has	  learned	  about	  humanity.	  He	  
promises	  O’Brien	  that	  the	  “spirit	  of	  Man”	  will	  destroy	  the	  Party.	  
Stunningly,	  in	  siding	  with	  human	  allegiances	  against	  the	  Party,	  Winston	  has	  
actually	  aligned	  himself	  to	  the	  thing	  O’Brien	  clutches	  for:	  to	  be	  part	  of	  something	  great	  
that	  endures	  beyond	  the	  short	  reach	  of	  one’s	  own	  short	  life.	  	  It	  is	  Winston,	  not	  O’Brien,	  
who	  is	  most	  truly	  a	  member	  of	  something	  great	  that	  endures	  beyond	  the	  short	  reach	  of	  
one’s	  own	  life.	  	  O’Brien	  clutches	  for	  power	  because	  he	  thinks	  it	  will	  endure.	  	  Winston	  
holds	  onto	  being	  human—being	  a	  person,	  being	  committed	  not	  to	  an	  idea	  or	  a	  party,	  
but	  to	  other	  persons.	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REAL	  LIFE	  IS	  MEETING	  
Like	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  C.S.	  Lewis	  shows	  his	  reader	  a	  political	  society	  in	  which	  men	  
clutch	  for	  power	  through	  bureaucracy	  and	  biotechnology.	  	  The	  N.I.C.E.	  aims	  to	  
overcome	  death	  by	  overcoming	  organic	  life.	  	  As	  Filostrato	  says	  to	  Mark,	  the	  real	  goal	  is	  
to	  become	  free	  of	  nature.	  	  Like	  Orwell’s	  Party	  agent	  O’Brien,	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  
understand	  that	  the	  essential	  test	  of	  absolute	  power	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  re-­‐make	  the	  
meaning	  of	  persons	  and	  political	  society.	  	  Accordingly,	  Filostrato	  explains	  to	  Mark	  that	  
the	  Institute	  is	  not	  primarily	  for	  “housing	  and	  vaccinations	  and	  faster	  trains	  and	  curing	  
the	  people	  of	  cancer.”	  	  Fundamentally,	  he	  explains,	  it	  is	  for	  the	  conquest	  of	  nature.	  
It	  is	  for	  the	  conquest	  of	  death:	  or	  for	  the	  conquest	  of	  organic	  life,	  if	  you	  prefer.	  	  
They	  are	  the	  same	  thing.	  	  It	  is	  to	  bring	  out	  of	  that	  cocoon	  of	  organic	  life	  which	  
sheltered	  the	  babyhood	  of	  mind	  the	  New	  Man,	  the	  man	  who	  will	  not	  die,	  the	  
artificial	  man,	  free	  from	  Nature.	  	  Nature	  is	  the	  ladder	  we	  have	  climbed	  up	  by,	  
now	  we	  kick	  her	  away.33	  
	  
The	  Institute’s	  intent	  is	  to	  rule	  over	  men	  and	  to	  re-­‐make	  them	  so	  that	  they	  are	  fit	  
for	  a	  world	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  susceptible	  to	  the	  passions	  and	  ills	  of	  organic	  life.	  	  Lewis	  
shows	  in	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  as	  he	  does	  in	  The	  Abolition	  of	  Man,	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  
conquer	  nature	  ends	  ultimately	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  men.	  	  As	  Filostrato	  confirms	  to	  
Studdock,	  “You	  know	  as	  well	  as	  I	  do	  that	  Man’s	  power	  over	  Nature	  means	  the	  power	  of	  
some	  men	  over	  other	  men	  with	  Nature	  as	  the	  instrument.	  	  There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  
Man—it	  is	  a	  word.	  	  There	  are	  only	  men.”34	  	  Lewis	  shows	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  subdue	  and	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standardize	  human	  nature	  by	  force,	  particularly	  through	  the	  abuse	  of	  biotechnology,	  
harms	  individual	  persons.	  
Lewis’s	  character	  Ransom	  explains	  the	  poisonous	  nature	  of	  the	  lust	  for	  total	  
control.	  	  Like	  Mond,	  Ransom	  notes	  that	  men	  have	  chosen	  power	  over	  truth:	  “Despair	  of	  
objective	  truth	  had	  been	  increasingly	  insinuated	  into	  the	  scientists;	  indifference	  to	  it,	  
and	  a	  concentration	  upon	  mere	  power,	  had	  been	  the	  result.”35	  	  This	  choice	  bears	  
consequences	  for	  daily	  life.	  
“You	  do	  not	  understand,”	  he	  said.	  	  “The	  poison	  was	  brewed	  in	  these	  West	  lands	  
but	  it	  has	  spat	  itself	  everywhere	  by	  now.	  	  However	  far	  you	  went	  you	  would	  find	  
these	  machines,	  the	  crowded	  cities,	  the	  empty	  thrones,	  the	  false	  writings,	  the	  
barren	  beds:	  men	  maddened	  with	  false	  promises	  and	  soured	  with	  true	  miseries,	  
worshipping	  the	  iron	  works	  of	  their	  own	  hands,	  cut	  off	  from	  Earth	  their	  mother	  
and	  from	  the	  Father	  in	  Heaven.”36	  
	  
What	  Ransom	  means	  is	  that	  men’s	  desire	  for	  control	  plays	  out	  as	  an	  ongoing	  Babel	  
project,	  in	  which	  individuals	  and	  entire	  societies	  attempt	  to	  use	  knowledge	  and	  
technology	  to	  overcome	  the	  limitations	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  The	  trouble,	  however,	  is	  that	  
because	  they	  deny	  their	  true	  nature,	  men	  find	  themselves	  more	  dissatisfied	  than	  ever.	  
Eventually,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  Mark	  recognizes	  this	  reality	  and	  is	  converted	  away	  
from	  the	  lust	  for	  power	  that	  drives	  the	  N.I.C.E.	  and	  its	  political	  program.	  	  He	  sees	  that	  
arbitrary	  and	  unlimited	  power	  consumes	  those	  it	  attracts.	  	  His	  transformation	  is	  
fascinating,	  and	  a	  point	  of	  focus	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  I	  want	  to	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  other	  
hero	  in	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  Jane	  Studdock.	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Jane’s	  story	  is	  especially	  important	  because,	  like	  Mark,	  Jane	  is	  converted	  away	  
from	  the	  lust	  for	  individual	  autonomy.	  	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  fully	  than	  Mark,	  however,	  
she	  discovers	  that	  only	  when	  we	  have	  put	  down	  the	  lust	  for	  power	  are	  we	  free	  to	  live	  
significant	  lives.	  	  Jane	  learns	  that	  her	  grasping	  for	  individual	  autonomy	  cripples	  her	  
quest	  for	  meaning.	  	  Only	  as	  she	  becomes	  open	  to	  unpredictability	  and	  risk	  is	  she	  freed	  
for	  relationship	  and	  joy.	  	  While	  Jane’s	  story	  is	  less	  explicitly	  political	  than	  Mark’s,	  she	  
discovers	  the	  same	  choice	  between	  certainty	  through	  power,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
meaning	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  unpredictability,	  on	  the	  other,	  that	  all	  of	  the	  protagonists	  in	  our	  
stories	  find	  and	  face.	  	  Through	  their	  separate	  journeys,	  both	  Mark	  and	  Jane	  discover	  the	  
themes	  and	  experiences	  that	  give	  meaning	  to	  life,	  and	  at	  once	  validate	  and	  transcend	  
politics.	  	  Like	  Winston	  and	  John,	  they	  learn	  that	  persons	  and	  political	  communities	  act	  
quite	  differently	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  think	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  their	  existence	  is	  
survival,	  or	  whether	  they	  have	  goals	  higher	  than	  mere	  survival.	  
Lastly,	  I	  note	  that	  Lewis	  draws	  out	  the	  idea	  that	  individuals	  and	  nations	  alike	  are	  
formed	  by	  their	  choices	  to	  pursue	  power	  or	  to	  pursue	  right.	  	  Critically,	  he	  rejects	  the	  
idea,	  popular	  among	  many	  theorists	  of	  modernity,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  single	  form	  of	  political	  
society	  toward	  which	  all	  societies	  must	  progress	  if	  they	  are	  progressing	  at	  all.	  	  Ransom	  
explains,	  
You	  see,	  MacPhee,	  if	  one	  is	  thinking	  simply	  of	  goodness	  in	  the	  abstract,	  one	  soon	  
reaches	  the	  fatal	  idea	  of	  something	  standardized—some	  common	  kind	  of	  life	  to	  
which	  all	  nations	  ought	  to	  progress.	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  universal	  rules	  to	  which	  
all	  goodness	  must	  conform.	  	  But	  that’s	  only	  the	  grammar	  of	  virtue.	  	  It’s	  not	  there	  
that	  the	  sap	  is…The	  whole	  work	  of	  healing	  Tellus	  [Earth]	  depends	  on	  nursing	  that	  
little	  spark,	  on	  incarnating	  that	  ghost,	  which	  is	  still	  alive	  in	  every	  real	  people,	  and	  
different	  in	  each.	  	  When	  Logres	  really	  dominates	  Britain,	  when	  the	  goddess	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Reason,	  the	  divine	  clearness,	  is	  really	  enthroned	  in	  France,	  when	  the	  order	  of	  
Heaven	  is	  really	  followed	  in	  China—why,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  spring.37	  
	  
In	  short,	  while	  the	  grammar	  of	  virtue	  is	  the	  same,	  the	  spark	  of	  goodness	  present	  and	  
awaiting	  development	  in	  each	  nation	  takes	  on	  diverse	  incarnations.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
Through	  their	  novels,	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  invite	  us	  to	  examine	  the	  
relationship	  between	  power	  and	  passion—or	  stability	  and	  passion,	  or	  control	  and	  
affection,	  or	  power	  and	  love—as	  a	  fundamental	  tension	  that	  at	  once	  shapes	  and	  
transcends	  politics.	  	  All	  three	  novelists	  warn	  that	  human	  attempts	  at	  control	  cannot	  save	  
us—indeed,	  that	  human	  efforts	  to	  secure	  control	  by	  applying	  the	  strongest	  of	  our	  
technologies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  destroy	  than	  to	  save	  us.	  	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  and	  Orwell	  all	  
focus	  on	  the	  conflict	  between	  power	  and	  passion,	  and	  yet	  offer	  different	  depths	  of	  
analysis	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  this	  tension	  bears	  on	  politics.	  	  My	  goal,	  in	  what	  follows,	  has	  
not	  been	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  Huxley,	  Lewis,	  or	  Orwell’s	  political	  
theory.	  	  Instead,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  how	  they	  present	  each	  hero’s	  conflict	  with	  those	  in	  
power	  over	  the	  purpose	  of	  human	  life	  and	  political	  community.	  
To	  close,	  I	  compare	  their	  accounts.	  	  Huxley	  is	  most	  prescient	  in	  his	  portrayal	  of	  
use	  of	  science	  in	  society.	  	  Orwell,	  however,	  comprehends	  much	  more	  fully	  the	  motive	  
that	  drives	  pursuit	  of	  stability	  through	  science.	  	  That	  motive,	  as	  he	  shows	  us,	  is	  the	  
erotic	  thrill	  of	  achieving	  dominion.	  	  Lewis,	  in	  turn,	  shows	  us,	  perhaps	  with	  greater	  insight	  
than	  the	  others,	  that	  men’s	  lust	  for	  order	  and	  grasping	  for	  power	  is	  an	  enduring	  feature	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  Ibid.,	  369.	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of	  human	  experience.	  	  More	  importantly,	  like	  Huxley	  and	  Orwell,	  Lewis	  shows	  us	  what	  
we	  lose	  in	  our	  drive	  for	  autonomy	  and	  dominion.	  	  And,	  even	  better,	  he	  points	  us	  to	  the	  
path	  to	  freedom	  from	  the	  lust	  for	  power.	  
Huxley	  shows	  us	  a	  society	  that	  tries	  to	  control	  persons	  by	  appeal	  to	  base	  
pleasures,	  accompanied	  by	  surveillance	  and	  soma.	  	  Orwell	  shows	  us	  a	  society	  that	  tries	  
to	  control	  persons	  by	  appeal	  to	  base	  fears,	  accompanied	  by	  surveillance	  and	  torture.	  	  
Both	  are	  regimes	  in	  which	  some	  men	  attempt	  to	  secure	  power	  over	  persons.	  	  Huxley	  
shows	  us	  that	  stability	  must	  forever	  be	  opposed	  to	  the	  risks	  and	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  
affections	  and	  actions	  that	  characterize	  genuinely	  human	  relationships.	  	  He	  does	  not,	  
however,	  show	  us	  why	  stability	  is	  so	  attractive.	  
Huxley	  writes	  to	  Orwell,	  essentially,	  that	  the	  modern	  world	  will	  use	  Mustapha	  
Mond’s	  methods,	  not	  O’Brien’s.	  	  “My	  own	  belief,”	  he	  says,	  “is	  that	  the	  ruling	  oligarchy	  
will	  find	  less	  arduous	  and	  wasteful	  ways	  of	  governing	  and	  of	  satisfying	  its	  lust	  for	  power,	  
and	  these	  ways	  will	  resemble	  those	  which	  I	  have	  described	  in	  Brave	  New	  World.”38	  	  But	  
he	  fails	  to	  see	  that	  O’Brien’s	  methods	  will	  also	  endure	  precisely	  because	  he	  fails	  to	  see	  
the	  temptation	  that	  motivates	  men	  to	  apply	  them.	  
The	  appearance	  and	  methods	  of	  power	  change.	  	  Huxley	  focuses	  on	  one	  form,	  
Orwell	  on	  another,	  Lewis	  on	  a	  combination.	  	  The	  point	  is	  what	  these	  forms	  of	  power	  
have	  in	  common:	  they	  are	  all	  attempts	  by	  some	  humans	  to	  convince	  other	  humans	  that	  
the	  point	  of	  their	  lives	  is	  something	  other	  than	  what	  it	  actually	  is—that	  it	  is,	  for	  
example,	  primarily	  pleasure,	  or	  primarily	  power,	  or	  primarily	  mere	  survival.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  “A	  Letter	  to	  George	  Orwell,”	  Letters	  of	  Aldous	  Huxley.	  	  Ed.	  Grover	  Smith	  (New	  York:	  
Harper	  &	  Row,	  1969).	  	  Quoted	  in	  Appendix	  to	  Huxley,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  13.	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Orwell	  excels	  Huxley	  in	  understanding	  the	  temptation	  to	  gain	  and	  exercise	  
power	  over	  persons.	  	  He	  conveys	  the	  seductive	  nature	  of	  power	  with	  greater	  insight	  and	  
force	  than	  Huxley.	  	  Huxley’s	  Mustapha	  Mond	  sees	  that	  his	  choice	  is	  between	  stability	  
and	  real	  happiness,	  the	  kind	  that	  entails	  real	  sorrow	  and	  suffering,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  tell	  
us	  why	  stability	  is	  ultimately	  desirable.	  	  By	  contrast,	  Orwell’s	  O’Brien	  conveys	  to	  us,	  in	  
his	  actions	  and	  words,	  the	  erotic	  thrill	  of	  achieving	  total	  control	  over	  other	  humans.	  	  In	  
other	  words,	  Mond	  sees	  that	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  stability	  and	  happiness,	  but	  
O’Brien	  knows	  why	  stability	  is	  seductive—because	  of	  the	  thrill	  that	  attends	  the	  ability	  to	  
subject	  and	  master	  others.	  
Importantly,	  Lewis	  goes	  further	  that	  Orwell	  when	  he	  identifies	  the	  ultimate	  
source	  of	  the	  lust	  for	  power—the	  desire	  to	  be	  God.	  	  Orwell	  sees	  that	  power	  makes	  men	  
God.	  	  He	  knows	  men	  must	  fail	  in	  this	  endeavor.	  	  They	  must	  fail,	  says	  Winston,	  because	  
of	  the	  human	  spirit.	  	  Lewis	  sees,	  similarly	  but	  even	  more	  clearly,	  that	  men	  must	  fail	  
because	  they	  set	  themselves	  up	  against	  what	  is	  truly	  human.	  	  The	  attempt	  to	  be	  more	  
than	  human	  always	  results	  in	  human	  destruction.	  	  Lewis	  connects	  his	  own	  story	  with	  
one	  of	  the	  oldest	  treatments	  of	  this	  reality,	  the	  story	  of	  Babel.	  
In	  Huxley’s	  World	  State,	  in	  Lewis’s	  England	  under	  the	  N.I.C.E.,	  and	  in	  Orwell’s	  
Oceania,	  the	  goals	  that	  orient	  each	  society	  together	  matter	  for	  how	  they	  form	  men,	  and	  
for	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  rule	  they	  legitimize.	  	  In	  summary,	  these	  texts	  portray	  
rulers	  who	  strive	  to	  destroy	  men’s	  capacity	  to	  become	  accountable	  actors.	  	  Powerful	  
men	  in	  each	  regime	  claim	  unlimited	  power	  over	  others	  because	  they	  work	  from	  a	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conception	  of	  the	  person,	  and	  thus	  of	  justice,	  that	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  inherent	  





People	  without	  hope	  not	  only	  don’t	  write	  novels,	  but	  what	  is	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  they	  
don’t	  read	  them.	  	  They	  don’t	  take	  long	  looks	  at	  anything,	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  courage.	  	  
The	  way	  to	  despair	  is	  to	  refuse	  to	  have	  any	  kind	  of	  experience,	  and	  the	  novel,	  of	  course,	  
is	  a	  way	  to	  have	  experience.1	  
	  
-­‐	  Flannery	  O’Connor	  
	  
I	  began	  this	  study	  with	  questions	  about	  the	  possibility	  and	  meaning	  of	  personal	  
responsibility	  in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  oppression.	  	  I	  wanted	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  
resources	  of	  personal	  accountability	  and	  action.	  	  I	  think	  that,	  together,	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  
C.S.	  Lewis,	  and	  George	  Orwell	  teach	  us	  that	  politics	  depends	  upon	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  
human	  capacity	  for	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  action.	  
The	  nature	  of	  political	  action,	  as	  Aristotle	  and	  Leo	  Strauss	  observe,	  is	  that	  it	  aims	  
to	  preserve	  or	  achieve	  a	  good	  end	  for	  persons	  and	  their	  political	  community.2	  	  The	  
World	  State,	  the	  National	  Center	  for	  Co-­‐ordinated	  Experiments,	  and	  Oceania,	  however,	  
impose	  upon	  their	  citizens	  new	  goals,	  which	  are	  not	  related	  to	  the	  good	  of	  persons	  or	  of	  
their	  society.3	  	  Yet,	  as	  John	  the	  Savage,	  Mark	  Studdock,	  and	  Winston	  Smith	  learn,	  to	  
varying	  degrees,	  responding	  to	  “the	  longing	  for	  justice	  and	  the	  just	  city”	  that	  is	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  political	  experience	  requires	  us	  to	  care	  for	  persons	  and	  their	  good.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Flannery	  O’Connor,	  “The	  Nature	  and	  Aim	  of	  Fiction,”	  in	  Mystery	  and	  Manners,	  78.	  
	  
2	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  Book	  I;	  Leo	  Strauss,	  “What	  is	  Political	  Philosophy?”	  in	  What	  is	  Political	  
Philosophy?	  And	  Other	  Studies.	  Glencoe,	  IL:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1959.	  
	  
3	  Cf.	  Alain	  Besançon,	  “On	  the	  Difficulty	  of	  Defining	  the	  Soviet	  Regimes,”	  in	  The	  Great	  Lie.	  
	  
4	  Quoting	  Leo	  Strauss,	  “What	  is	  Political	  Philosophy?”	  
	  177	  
At	  the	  close	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  am	  convinced,	  now	  more	  than	  ever,	  that	  the	  practice	  
of	  becoming	  accountable	  actors	  in	  political	  community	  requires	  us	  to	  cultivate	  integrity	  
in	  the	  language	  we	  use	  and	  in	  the	  persons	  we	  are	  becoming.	  	  The	  capacity	  for	  personal	  
responsibility	  is	  a	  capacity	  that	  belongs	  to	  individual	  human	  beings.	  	  It	  is	  a	  capacity	  
strengthened	  by	  friendship	  and	  memory,	  footholds	  in	  reality	  that	  in	  turn	  give	  life	  to	  our	  
vision	  for	  justice	  and	  the	  just	  city.	  	  As	  we	  practice	  becoming	  accountable	  actors,	  we	  
become	  better	  able	  to	  evaluate	  and	  act	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  constraints	  of	  power	  and	  the	  
aims	  of	  the	  societies	  in	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves.	  
When	  I	  began	  this	  study,	  two	  main	  reasons	  motivated	  my	  work.	  	  First,	  like	  many	  
others,	  I	  am	  drawn	  to	  stories	  of	  men	  and	  women	  who	  live	  with	  grace	  and	  honesty	  in	  
moments	  where	  brutality	  and	  betrayal	  seem	  to	  be	  prevailing.	  	  As	  a	  girl,	  I	  found	  beautiful	  
and	  compelling	  the	  stories	  of	  characters	  who	  lived	  in	  dehumanizing	  situations	  with	  
clear-­‐sightedness	  and	  courage.	  	  These	  stories,	  works	  of	  fiction	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐fiction,	  
included	  Ian	  Serraillier’s	  Escape	  from	  Warsaw,	  Anne	  Frank’s	  Diary	  of	  a	  Young	  Girl,	  Corrie	  
ten	  Boom’s	  The	  Hiding	  Place,	  Esther	  Hautzig’s	  The	  Endless	  Steppe,	  and	  Lowis	  Lowry’s	  
Number	  the	  Stars.	  	  These	  are	  the	  stories	  that	  first	  quickened	  my	  heart	  as	  through	  them	  I	  
witnessed	  the	  resolve,	  loss,	  and	  hope	  that	  shape	  individuals,	  families,	  and	  communities	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  power.	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  these	  stories	  have	  included	  the	  lives	  
and	  works	  of	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  Dietrich	  Bonhoeffer,	  and	  Sophie	  Scholl	  and	  her	  friends.	  	  As	  I	  
considered	  what	  works	  I	  wanted	  to	  spend	  a	  year	  thinking	  and	  writing	  about,	  it	  quickly	  
became	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  examine	  books	  whose	  central	  characters	  fight	  to	  
hear	  and	  heed	  the	  call	  to	  personal	  responsibility.	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In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  wrote	  about	  personal	  responsibility	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  regimes	  distinguished	  by	  their	  oppressive	  nature.	  	  Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  
Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  invite	  us	  to	  observe	  different	  kinds	  of	  
regimes.	  	  John	  the	  Savage	  encounters	  a	  regime	  that	  coerces	  persons	  gently;	  Winston	  
Smith	  endures	  a	  regime	  that	  finds	  perverse	  satisfaction	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  force	  against	  
persons;	  Mark	  Studdock	  enters,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  regime,	  an	  Inner	  Circle	  that	  demands	  
total	  allegiance.	  	  What	  these	  regimes	  have	  in	  common	  is	  their	  effort	  to	  constrain	  human	  
conscience	  and	  action	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  contrived	  reality.	  	  The	  claim	  of	  that	  contrived	  
reality	  is,	  as	  Václav	  Havel	  writes,	  “that	  the	  center	  of	  power	  is	  identical	  with	  the	  center	  of	  
truth.”5	  	  What	  makes	  each	  central	  character	  compelling,	  insofar	  as	  he	  is	  compelling,	  is	  
his	  awareness	  of	  and	  response	  to	  the	  regime’s	  attempt	  to	  constrain	  human	  conscience	  
and	  action.	  
Second,	  I	  was	  attracted	  to	  a	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  that	  is	  not	  usually	  associated	  with	  
the	  canon	  of	  western	  political	  thought:	  the	  story.	  	  I	  became	  interested	  in	  stories	  for	  
epistemological	  and	  pedagogical	  reasons.	  	  I	  wanted	  to	  understand	  how	  stories	  work	  as	  
carriers	  of	  ethical	  insight,	  and	  to	  practice	  handling	  a	  medium	  that	  I	  thought	  might	  be	  a	  
helpful	  addition	  to	  studies	  in	  political	  science	  with	  undergraduate	  students.	  
I	  began	  this	  study	  mindful	  that	  my	  intent	  was	  not	  to	  focus	  primarily	  on	  regimes,	  
laws,	  and	  institutions.	  	  Instead,	  I	  chose	  to	  approach	  politics	  by	  way	  of	  a	  study	  of	  human	  
action	  and	  character.	  	  With	  Aristotle	  and	  Aquinas,	  I	  want	  to	  observe	  and	  understand	  the	  
importance	  of	  sound	  laws	  and	  institutions	  that	  restrain	  us	  in	  our	  worst	  moments	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Václav	  Havel,	  “The	  Power	  of	  the	  Powerless,”	  in	  The	  Great	  Lie,	  ed.	  Flagg	  F.	  Taylor	  IV.	  	  Wilmington,	  DE:	  ISI	  
Books,	  2011,	  28.	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educate	  us	  in	  our	  best	  moments.	  	  Without	  diminishing	  the	  significance	  of	  laws	  and	  
institutions,	  my	  dissertation	  builds	  on	  the	  insight	  that	  the	  study	  of	  politics	  encompasses	  
the	  study	  of	  character	  as	  well	  as	  constitutions.	  In	  particular,	  I	  was	  interested	  in	  a	  certain	  
dimension	  of	  human	  character—namely,	  that	  which	  enables	  a	  person	  to	  answer	  to	  a	  
standard	  of	  right,	  even	  when	  the	  persons	  and	  organizations	  of	  political	  power	  around	  
him	  deny	  these	  standards.	  
	   My	  next	  question	  was	  how	  to	  conduct	  a	  study	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  As	  I	  
read	  Brave	  New	  World,	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four,	  and	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  a	  few	  striking	  
themes	  emerged.	  	  As	  I	  reflected	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  responsibility,	  I	  discovered	  that	  it	  
requires	  access	  to	  a	  coherent	  and	  adequate	  language,	  a	  sense	  of	  individuality	  and	  
purpose,	  and	  a	  horizon	  of	  action	  not	  limited	  one’s	  immediate	  political	  society.	  	  I	  
examined	  these	  elements,	  one	  at	  a	  time.	  	  In	  the	  chapters	  above,	  I	  open	  with	  a	  brief	  
reflection	  on	  the	  theme	  and	  then	  examine	  the	  theme	  as	  it	  appeared	  in	  each	  novel.	  
	   Once	  I	  had	  identified	  the	  main	  themes	  of	  my	  inquiry,	  before	  I	  could	  proceed	  to	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  texts,	  I	  found	  that	  I	  needed	  to	  know	  how	  and	  why	  stories	  worked.	  	  I	  
knew	  from	  experience	  that	  stories	  were	  capable	  of	  conveying	  the	  moral	  dimensions	  of	  
human	  and	  political	  experience.	  	  I	  belong,	  however,	  to	  a	  culture	  that	  is	  prone	  to	  
overvalue	  intellect	  and	  certainty,	  and	  to	  devalue	  story	  and	  imagination.	  	  I	  found	  in	  C.S.	  
Lewis’s	  epistemology	  resources	  for	  revalidating	  a	  healthy	  relationship	  between	  intellect	  
and	  imagination.	  	  Aware	  of	  classical	  distinctions	  between	  noetic	  and	  dianoetic	  reason,	  I	  
adopted	  Lewis’s	  language	  of	  imagination	  and	  intellect	  to	  speak	  of	  similar	  phenomena.	  	  
Next,	  to	  explain	  why	  authors	  write	  stories	  to	  deal	  with	  political	  questions	  and	  what	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these	  stories	  convey,	  I	  drew	  on	  Lewis’s	  understanding	  of	  knowledge	  and	  moral	  meaning,	  
informed	  as	  it	  is	  by	  classical	  and	  medieval	  sources.	  	  In	  these	  closing	  pages,	  I	  want	  to	  
conduct	  a	  general	  comparison	  of	  the	  texts,	  and	  then	  consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  
responsibility	  and	  justice.	  
	  
REFLECTION	  ON	  THE	  STORIES	  
	   One	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  reading	  these	  stories	  side-­‐by-­‐side,	  as	  I	  have	  in	  this	  
inquiry,	  is	  that	  each	  story	  highlights	  strengths	  and	  reveals	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  others.	  	  For	  
example,	  George	  Orwell	  clearly	  presents	  the	  most	  detailed,	  resonant	  portrayal	  of	  
intellectual	  and	  emotional	  manipulation.	  	  It	  is	  painful	  and	  frightening	  to	  read	  Winston’s	  
struggle,	  in	  daily	  life	  and	  during	  his	  torture	  at	  O’Brien’s	  hand,	  to	  cling	  to	  what	  he	  knows	  
to	  be	  real.	  	  Likewise,	  Orwell’s	  treatment	  of	  language	  is	  striking.	  	  He	  makes	  us	  see	  the	  
importance	  of	  language	  for	  expressing	  reality,	  and	  the	  deep	  perversity	  in	  abusing	  
language	  to	  obscure	  reality.	  	  While	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  masterfully	  portrays	  Winston’s	  
fight	  for	  sanity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  abuse,	  his	  end	  and	  the	  story’s	  close	  leave	  the	  
reader	  with	  fundamental	  questions.	  	  At	  worst,	  the	  story’s	  conclusion	  shows	  us	  a	  man	  
who	  is	  beaten	  beyond	  redemption.	  	  At	  best,	  it	  is	  appropriately	  unsettling,	  and	  ultimately	  
helpful,	  as	  it	  shows	  us	  a	  man	  who	  came	  to	  know	  that	  meaningful	  allegiances	  are	  bonds	  
to	  persons,	  not	  to	  abstractions,	  and	  to	  affirm	  reality	  independent	  of	  the	  Party,	  so	  far	  as	  
it	  lies	  with	  him.	  	  I	  think	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  compelling	  interpretation	  of	  a	  story	  that	  draws	  us	  
to	  ask	  our	  own	  questions	  alongside	  Winston.	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   Aldous	  Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  World	  is	  remarkable	  for	  its	  ability	  to	  demonstrate	  
that	  the	  project	  for	  human	  perfection	  through	  technology—the	  quest	  for	  stability	  
through	  pleasure—ends	  in	  slavery.	  	  Toward	  this	  end,	  conversations	  Huxley	  constructs	  
with	  World	  Controller	  Mond	  at	  the	  start	  and	  finish	  of	  the	  book	  are	  marvelous	  moments.	  	  
In	  addition,	  while	  Lewis	  and	  Orwell	  show	  their	  heroes	  interacting	  meaningfully	  with	  
works	  of	  literature,	  Huxley	  alone	  offers	  a	  sustained	  study	  of	  literature	  as	  a	  source	  of	  
personal	  formation.	  
Despite	  these	  great	  strengths,	  Brave	  New	  World	  turns	  out,	  on	  the	  whole,	  to	  be	  
the	  weakest	  of	  the	  three	  novels	  featured	  in	  this	  study.	  	  Throughout	  the	  story,	  Huxley	  
juxtaposes	  the	  conventions	  of	  the	  World	  State	  with	  the	  banned	  concept	  of	  purpose.	  	  He	  
develops	  this	  conflict	  in	  the	  closing	  conversation	  between	  John	  the	  Savage,	  Helmholtz	  
Watson,	  and	  Mustafa	  Mond.	  	  This	  conversation	  brilliantly	  illuminates	  the	  tension	  
between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  project	  for	  human	  control,	  and	  the	  other,	  the	  possibility	  
of	  being	  truly	  human,	  an	  experience	  that	  encompasses	  real	  happiness	  and	  joy	  as	  well	  as	  
real	  sorrow	  and	  suffering.	  	  Yet	  the	  ending	  Huxley	  gives	  the	  story—the	  Savage’s	  insane	  
self-­‐destruction—reveals	  a	  weakness	  that	  may	  undermine	  the	  whole	  work.	  	  It	  leaves	  the	  
reader	  with	  questions.	  	  What	  is	  it,	  exactly,	  that	  has	  been	  John’s	  guiding	  light	  throughout	  
the	  story?	  	  Where	  and	  why	  did	  it	  fail	  him?	  	  Did	  it	  fail	  him,	  or	  did	  he	  fail	  it?	  	  What	  now?	  
C.S.	  Lewis	  excels	  in	  his	  depiction	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  language	  within	  the	  
bureaucratic	  institutions	  of	  the	  modern	  state.	  	  His	  character	  John	  Wither	  dribbles	  words	  
that	  are	  meaningless,	  without	  bounds	  or	  content.	  	  Wither’s	  character	  and	  language	  are,	  
I	  think,	  precisely	  the	  kind	  Orwell	  diagnoses	  when	  he	  says	  that,	  when	  abused,	  words	  and	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meaning	  part	  company.6	  	  At	  another	  level,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength	  stands	  out	  as	  the	  most	  
poetic	  of	  the	  three	  stories.	  	  It	  embodies	  the	  qualities	  of	  myth	  and	  transcendence	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  makes	  it	  perhaps	  the	  most	  meaningful	  and	  mysterious	  of	  the	  three	  works.	  	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  as	  others	  have	  noted,	  Lewis	  burdens	  the	  book	  with	  too	  many	  plotlines	  
and	  characters.	  	  Finally,	  like	  both	  Orwell	  and	  Huxley,	  but	  more	  than	  either,	  Lewis	  makes	  
us	  see	  the	  role	  of	  beauty	  in	  moral	  experience.	  	  Incidentally,	  if	  there	  were	  one	  chapter	  I	  
would	  add	  to	  this	  inquiry,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  chapter	  on	  the	  role	  of	  beauty	  in	  making	  men	  
responsible	  actors.	  
	  
PERSONAL	  RESPONSIBILITY	  AND	  MORAL	  IMAGINATION	  
	   This	  study	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  poetic	  imagination	  has	  value	  for	  
readers,	  for	  students	  of	  political	  science,	  and	  for	  teachers.	  	  As	  they	  appeal	  to	  poetic	  
imagination,	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  and	  George	  Orwell	  help	  restore	  its	  role	  as	  our	  
means	  for	  moral	  experience—that	  is,	  they	  help	  restore	  imagination	  to	  its	  role,	  as	  Lewis	  
says,	  as	  the	  organ	  of	  meaning.	  	  More	  immediately,	  all	  three	  stories	  issue	  a	  challenge	  to	  
the	  reader.	  	  By	  taking	  the	  reader	  on	  a	  journey	  of	  challenge,	  choice,	  oppression,	  force,	  
and	  sometimes	  grace,	  each	  story	  presents	  the	  reader	  with	  opportunities	  to	  reflect	  on	  
the	  hero	  and	  his	  actions,	  and	  then	  to	  ask	  questions	  and	  make	  choices	  alongside	  the	  
hero.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	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  Orwell,	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   Brave	  New	  World,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  and	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  situate	  us	  in	  
the	  space	  between	  reality	  as	  John,	  Mark,	  and	  Winston	  slowly	  discover	  it,	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  the	  contrived	  reality	  imposed	  by	  the	  regimes	  in	  which	  they	  live,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  
Eric	  Voegelin	  deals	  with	  the	  conflict	  between	  reality	  and	  the	  contrived	  image	  of	  another	  
reality	  at	  the	  close	  of	  his	  analysis	  in	  the	  lectures	  published	  as	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Germans.	  	  
There	  Voegelin	  says,	  
Even	  if	  Hegel,	  Marx,	  and	  Nietzsche	  thoroughly	  murder	  God	  and	  explain	  him	  away	  
as	  dead,	  divine	  being	  remains	  eternal	  and	  man	  must	  still	  get	  on	  with	  living	  his	  life	  
sealed	  by	  his	  creatureliness	  and	  by	  death.	  	  When	  concupiscent	  fantasy	  shifts	  the	  
accents	  of	  reality,	  it	  then	  superimposes	  a	  false	  image	  on	  reality.	  	  We	  speak	  of	  this	  
fantasy	  image	  as	  the	  second	  reality.7	  
	  
Voegelin	  goes	  on	  to	  highlight	  the	  major	  consequence	  of	  the	  friction	  between	  first	  and	  
second	  reality.	  
	  
And	  when	  man	  tries	  to	  live	  in	  this	  second	  reality,	  when	  he	  attempts	  to	  transform	  
himself	  from	  the	  imago	  Dei	  into	  the	  imago	  hominis,	  then	  conflicts	  arise	  with	  the	  
first	  reality,	  whose	  order	  continually	  exists.	  
	  
These	  texts	  illuminate	  in	  narrative	  mode	  the	  substitution	  of	  second	  reality	  for	  first	  
reality	  that	  justified	  the	  destruction	  of	  millions	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  recent	  history.	  	  	  
Finally,	  this	  study	  in	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  poetic	  imagination	  has	  
implications	  for	  teaching	  political	  science.	  	  It	  confirms	  literature	  as	  a	  special	  means	  for	  
communicating	  and	  raising	  fundamental	  questions	  in	  politics—question	  about	  human	  
nature,	  the	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  political	  power,	  the	  influence	  of	  institutions	  on	  persons,	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and	  possible	  resources	  for	  becoming	  responsible	  actors	  in	  the	  face	  of	  challenges	  from	  
without	  and	  from	  within.	  
Political	  philosophy,	  as	  we	  find	  it	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  Augustine,	  it	  is	  about	  the	  quest	  
for	  right	  order	  in	  relations	  between	  persons	  and	  communities.	  	  At	  a	  very	  basic	  level,	  it	  is	  
about	  our	  place	  in	  reality.	  	  For	  that	  kind	  of	  inquiry,	  literature	  presents	  itself	  as	  an	  aid	  of	  
great	  potential	  value.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  Flannery	  O’Connor	  writes,	  
The	  type	  of	  mind	  that	  can	  understand	  good	  fiction	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  
educated	  mind,	  but	  it	  is	  at	  all	  times	  the	  kind	  of	  mind	  that	  is	  willing	  to	  have	  its	  
sense	  of	  mystery	  deepened	  by	  contact	  with	  reality,	  and	  its	  sense	  of	  reality	  
deepened	  by	  contact	  with	  mystery.8	  
	  
PERSONAL	  RESPONSIBILITY	  AND	  THE	  QUEST	  FOR	  JUSTICE	  
As	  we	  follow	  their	  stories,	  we	  see	  Winston	  Smith,	  John	  the	  Savage,	  Jane	  
Studdock,	  and	  Mark	  Studdock	  discover	  and	  develop	  themselves	  as	  individuals	  capable	  of	  
action.	  	  They	  come	  to	  know	  themselves	  as	  actors,	  and	  they	  act.	  	  In	  all	  three	  stories,	  
moreover,	  the	  hero	  senses	  that	  he	  is	  accountable	  to	  some	  standard	  of	  right,	  or	  justice,	  
which	  is	  independent	  and	  immovable.	  	  But	  to	  what	  do	  these	  actors	  find	  themselves	  
accountable?	  
	   Winston	  Smith	  names	  the	  human	  spirit	  and,	  finally,	  life	  itself,	  as	  the	  principle	  
that	  will	  defeat	  O’Brien	  and	  the	  Party’s	  game	  to	  achieve	  perpetually	  the	  thrill	  of	  victory.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  collapse	  of	  totalitarian	  regimes	  around	  the	  world	  seems	  to	  confirm	  
Winston’s	  hope.	  	  But	  what	  stands	  beyond	  the	  crushed	  human	  spirit?	  	  Why	  is	  it	  that,	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  Flannery	  O’Connor,	  “The	  Nature	  and	  Aim	  of	  Fiction,”	  in	  Mystery	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  Manners,	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despite	  the	  endurance	  of	  O’Brien’s	  whose	  picture	  of	  success	  is	  a	  boot	  stamping	  a	  human	  
face	  for	  ever,	  life	  itself	  wins	  out	  time	  and	  again?	  
	   John	  the	  Savage	  answers	  to	  a	  vision	  of	  nobility	  and	  purity,	  which	  seems,	  
however,	  to	  be	  not	  ultimately	  convincing	  to	  him	  or	  to	  Huxley.	  	  The	  ending	  Huxley	  gives	  
to	  the	  Savage	  and	  to	  the	  story	  is	  not	  persuasive.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  conversation	  between	  
Mond,	  Helmholtz,	  and	  John	  is	  engaging	  and	  satisfying:	  it	  presents	  a	  choice	  between	  
men’s	  dehumanizing	  attempts	  at	  control,	  which	  utilize	  pleasure	  as	  mass	  sedative,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  real	  happiness	  that	  entails	  both	  
suffering	  and	  sorrow,	  but	  which	  remains	  attractive	  because	  it	  resonates	  with	  the	  
profound	  knowledge	  that	  humans	  are	  made	  for	  a	  purpose—even	  for	  God,	  as	  the	  
sources	  Mond	  introduces	  claim.	  	  After	  this	  conversation	  and	  the	  farewell	  between	  
Helmholtz,	  Bernard,	  and	  John,	  there	  is	  a	  break	  in	  the	  text.9	  	  This	  break	  in	  the	  text,	  I	  
think,	  also	  marks	  a	  break	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  narrative.	  	  The	  ending	  that	  follows	  the	  break	  
loses	  coherence.	  	  It	  is	  not	  satisfying	  as	  tragedy.	  	  In	  fact,	  Huxley	  became	  dissatisfied	  with	  
the	  ending	  and	  later	  reconsidered	  it.10	  
After	  the	  break	  in	  the	  text,	  the	  Savage	  subjects	  himself	  to	  rituals	  of	  penitence	  
and,	  in	  the	  end,	  engages	  in	  a	  night	  of	  insane	  sensuality	  and	  then	  hangs	  himself.	  	  One	  can	  
contrast	  the	  Savage’s	  penitence—namely,	  his	  isolation,	  his	  attempts	  to	  prove	  himself	  
worthy,	  his	  endeavor	  to	  beat	  the	  lust,	  sloth,	  and	  greed	  out	  of	  his	  head	  and	  out	  of	  his	  
body—on	  the	  one	  hand,	  with	  the	  high	  humor,	  the	  festal	  gladness,	  the	  humble,	  mutual	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  Brave	  New	  World,	  243.	  
	  
10	  See	  Huxley’s	  retrospective	  in	  his	  Preface	  to	  the	  1976	  Penguin	  edition.	  	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  Brave	  New	  World	  
(Harmondsworth,	  England:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1976	  [1932]).	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self-­‐giving	  and	  anticipation	  of	  consummation	  that	  closes	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  on	  the	  
other.	  	  The	  ending	  Huxley	  gives	  the	  Savage	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  make	  any	  sense.	  
Then	  again,	  maybe	  it	  makes	  perfect	  sense.	  	  It	  is	  true	  to	  experience,	  is	  it	  not,	  that	  
it	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  any	  human	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  what	  is	  real	  with	  clarity,	  when	  the	  
swirling	  opinions,	  pressures,	  coercion,	  and	  temptation	  around	  him	  and	  within	  him	  
threaten	  to	  overwhelm?	  	  The	  only	  times	  the	  ordinary	  heroes	  we	  journey	  with—Winston,	  
Mark,	  Jane,	  the	  Savage—manage	  to	  keep	  their	  heads,	  hearts,	  and	  bodies	  in	  integrity	  and	  
in	  courage	  are	  moments	  marked,	  however	  faintly,	  by	  some	  kind	  of	  grace.	  	  Interestingly,	  
right	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  self-­‐imposed	  exile,	  Huxley	  has	  the	  Savage	  throw	  himself	  into	  a	  
thornbush	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  battle	  his	  lustful	  thoughts	  about	  Lenina.	  	  It	  is	  the	  very	  same	  
discipline	  for	  the	  same	  sin	  that	  St.	  Benedict	  (born	  AD	  480)	  inflicted	  on	  himself	  during	  his	  
stint	  as	  a	  hermit.11	  	  	  Before	  long,	  however,	  Benedict	  caught	  onto	  a	  very	  different	  
understanding	  of	  the	  human	  person	  and	  community	  that	  led	  him	  to	  found	  the	  monastic	  
order	  that	  still	  exists	  today.	  	  What	  Benedict	  saw,	  which	  the	  Savage	  never	  saw,	  was	  a	  
gentler	  yet	  more	  difficult	  path	  to	  being	  whole,	  to	  living	  the	  life	  we	  are	  meant	  to	  live:	  
that	  is	  the	  path	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  community	  with	  others	  and	  God.	  
	   Mark	  Studdock	  answers	  to	  the	  Normal.	  	  While	  I	  have	  described	  the	  scenes	  in	  
which	  Mark	  meets	  the	  Normal	  (above),	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  here	  on	  Jane	  Studdock’s	  
encounter	  with	  the	  same	  standard	  of	  right.	  	  After	  wrestling	  with	  herself	  for	  years,	  Jane	  
one	  day	  has	  an	  experience	  that	  brings	  her	  face	  to	  face	  with	  the	  standard	  which	  she	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




long	  sensed	  but	  refused	  to	  acknowledge.	  	  She	  is	  out	  on	  a	  walk	  when,	  Lewis	  says,	  she	  
crosses	  some	  kind	  of	  boundary.	  	  She	  has	  come	  into	  the	  presence	  of	  what	  claims	  her.	  	  
She	  experiences	  the	  claim	  as	  a	  demand	  like	  nothing	  she	  had	  experienced	  before.	  	  “This	  
demand,”	  Lewis	  writes,	  
which	  now	  pressed	  upon	  her	  was	  not,	  even	  by	  analogy,	  like	  any	  other	  demand.	  	  
It	  was	  the	  origin	  of	  all	  right	  demands	  and	  contained	  them.	  	  In	  its	  light	  you	  could	  
understand	  them;	  but	  from	  them	  you	  could	  know	  nothing	  of	  it.	  	  There	  was	  
nothing,	  and	  never	  had	  been	  anything,	  like	  this.	  	  And	  now	  there	  was	  nothing	  
except	  this.	  	  Yet	  also,	  everything	  had	  been	  like	  this;	  only	  by	  being	  like	  this	  had	  
anything	  existed.12	  
	  
The	  special	  nature	  of	  this	  demand	  is	  that	  it	  is,	  as	  Lewis	  writes	  earlier,	  “more	  like	  a	  dance	  
than	  a	  drill.”13	  	  Thus,	  in	  different	  forms,	  yet	  unmistakably,	  call	  of	  justice	  reverberates	  
through	  the	  experience	  of	  characters	  in	  each	  story.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Lewis,	  That	  Hideous	  Strength,	  315.	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